Representation and retention of three-event sequences in pigeons

The present experiments studied a three-event delayed sequence-discrimination (DSD) task: one arrangement (order) of two stimuli (red and yellow overhead lights) taken three in succession (e.g., red, yellow, red) was the positive sequence and the remaining seven arrangements were the negative sequences for responding and reward during the subsequent test stimulus. In Experiment 1, the final stimulus (recency) and the order of stimuli in the positive sequence controlled acquisition of discrimination. In Experiment 2, increasing the duration of memory intervals between stimuli reduced the discriminability of those negative sequences identical to the positive sequence after the delay. Three-event DSD performance in Experiments 1 and 2 was similar to two-event DSD performance in comparable published experiments. Models developed to explain pigeon performance in two-event DSD were extended to the three-event task. Results from both two- and three-event versions of the DSD task falsified a noncumulative model and several cumulative integration models (i.e., adding, averging, and some multiplying models), but corroborated one cumulative, multiplying model.     

Induction of depressive affect after prolonged exposure to a mildly depressed individual

Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) were periodically obtained from the roommates of college students who exhibited a persistent mild depression over a 3-month period. For comparative purposes, BDI scores were also obtained from roommates of individuals who were transiently depressed and from subjects with nondepressed roommates. In comparison with control subjects, the roommates of persistently depressed persons displayed a progressive increase in BDI score over the course of the study.     

Contributions of elicitation to measures of self-control

Pigeons' not pecking or pecking constituted choice between a delayed, large reinforcer and an immediate, small reinforcer (self-control) and at other times between a delayed reinforcer and no reinforcer (omission). Both a tone and a keylight were tested as choice signals, and the delayed reinforcer was either response independent or response dependent. Pigeons pecked during the choice signals on over 95% of the trials in the self-control procedure, and pecked during the choice signals on over 75% of the trials in the omission procedure. Consistent pecking was observed with either the tone or the keylight as a choice signal, with the exception that a tone paired with a response-independent delayed reinforcer did not maintain pecking in the omission procedure. Pigeons pecked during more choice signals when delayed reinforcers were response dependent than when the delayed reinforcers were response independent. These results indicate that Pavlovian conditioning influences self-control experiments, especially in single-key procedures.     

Interpersonal attraction,social identification and psychological group formation

Two perspectives on the nature of the social group and psychological group formation are discussed. The traditional social cohesion approach traces group formation to processes of interpersonal attraction, while the social identity approach defines the group in cognitive terms and considers identification, or self-categorization, to be the mechanism of psychological group formation. On the basis of an experiment by Turner, Sachdev and Hogg (1983) it is hypothesized that interpersonal attraction (positive or negative) is related to group formation only in so far as it enhances intergroup distinctiveness. This hypothesis is experimentally tested in a 2 × 3 (interpersonal liking/disliking per se versus no explicit categorization/random categorization/criterial categorization on the basis of affect) factorial design employing the ‘minimal group’ paradigm. People who like each other and were not explicitly categorized formed a group. This effect was enhanced by criterial categorization but disappeared when categorization was random. Although the results do not support the hypothesis, they are not explicable in social cohesion terms. A social identity explanation is furnished—attraction influences group formation by acting, under certain specifiable conditions, as a cognitive criterion for common category membership. This explanation is located in current theorizing and is proposed as part of a reconceptualization of the relationship between interpersonal attraction and group formation.     

Social categorization,visual cues,and social judgements

Recent research on social cognition suggests that lifelike visual and vocal information about a person may strongly mediate the impact of prior social categorical knowledge on social judgements. Other research, however, on the contribution of visual cues to impression formation, suggests that they have relatively little impact. This study sought to resolve these conflicting findings by examining the effect of visual cues on social judgements when subjects possess prior social categorical knowledge varying in salience to the experimental task. Videotaped target interviews were monitored by observers in either sound and vision or sound only, and measures were taken of the targets' perceived personality, their ‘actual’ and ‘predicted’ social performance, and social acceptance by observers. Whilst salience of categorization strongly influenced the quality of judgements, visual cues had little if any effect. However, visual cues strongly influenced subjects' confidence in all three sets of judgements, sound and vision subjects being consistently more confident than their sound only counterparts. The findings are discussed in relation to previous research in both social cognition and visual cues.     

Preference for decision structures in a social dilemma situation

Additional results from Rutte and Wilke's (1984) study are presented. In the context of a social dilemma situation two variables were manipulated: use and variance. Preference for various decision structures is the issue of the present paper. It appeared that a large majority structure and an unanimity structure were mast preferred. A small majority structure and a structure in which each decides for him/herself were intermediately preferred. Whereas a structure in which one person, a leader, decides for all was least preferred. Further analysis of these data suggested that only the latter two decision structures were influenced by the use and variance manipulations.     

Symbolic comparisons with and without perceptual referents: Is interval information used?

In an attempt to investigate the range effect obtained by Moyer and Bayer (1976), two groups of subjects were taught to associate colors with circles that differed in size by larger or smaller intervals and then participated in a symbolic comparison task, in which they determined which of two simultaneously presented symbols (the first letters of two colors) represented the larger magnitude. A third group of subjects, who merely learned an arbitrary ordering of the colors along the dimension of size, also participated in the symbolic comparison task. Despite the fact that no practice trials were given, there was no effect of interval size in either early or late blocks, and the circle-learning groups did not differ in performance from the group who only learned an arbitrary ordering of colors, even when pairs containing end terms were removed from the analysis. It is concluded that subjects do not use analogue codes in symbolic comparison tasks involving small, repeated sets of arbitrarily defined symbols.     

Clauses and the semantic representation of words

When a sentence with more than one clause is processed, words of the first clause become less available for recall or recognition once the clause boundary has been passed. One common interpretation of this observation is that the representation of a given word shifts from a predominantly surface form (e.g., phonological or lexical) to a semantic form, after the clause boundary. Two experiments that test that interpretation are reported. In the first experiment, two-clause spoken sentences were followed by spoken word or picture probes. Pictures were intended to provide a fast semantic match to probed words, but a slow surface match. Although response times exhibited a robust main effect of the clause position of the probe, no interaction with probe type was found. Similar results were obtained in a second experiment that compared pictures with written word probes. The faster response to picture than to word probes in the second experiment indicates that subjects did not covertly name the picture, but made a semantic match (as intended). These observations suggest the following reinterpretation of earlier sentence memory experiments: Words in the most recent clause of a sentence are more available than words in an earlier clause because their semantic representations are more active, not because their surface representations are more active.