The organization of motivated and conditional reflex processes

Recent observations on the plasticity of brain and behavior relationships indicate that the temporary connections between environmental and neuroanatomical substrates have tremendous specificity but at the same time are very plastic. Establishment of a conditional reflex by stimulation of the hippocampal pyramidal layer and/or the mesencephalic reticular formation did not interfere with the differential stimulation of very near points in the same structures. These correlations between brain and behavior confirmed the earlier belief that the development of temporary connections between environment and brain is an elementary process of the central nervous system. Complex behavioral functions are organized through both neuronal and humoral afferentation. Data accumulated recently indicate that the descending forebrain influence is inhibitory in the brain stem and diencephalon and controls the sensory input in a somatomotor-specific and situation-specific manner. Humoral factors affecting thresholds can change the dynamic equilibrium existing between ascending excitatory and descending inhibitory systems; these alterations always follow the rule of situation and somatomotor specificity.     

Psychotherapy with families of psychosomatic patients

Paradigmatic complexes in family psychotherapy have been indicating a revolutionary change and the creation of new paradigms for the past thirty years. Starting with the application of the general systems theory and the development of those concepts that have been emerging regarding psychosomatic illnesses we discuss the epistemological confusion created, the methodological problems and the dissociation between theory and practice. We suggest a double process of investigation of the family structure using a knowledge of the basic attitudes and the development of a psychotherapy programme within the family of the psychosomatic patient.     

Some properties of estimated scale invariant covariance structures

Scale invariance is a property shared by many covariance structure models employed in practice. An example is provided by the well-known LISREL model subject only to classical normalizations and zero constraints on the parameters. It is shown that scale invariance implies that the estimated covariannce matrix must satisfy certain equations, and the nature of these equations depends on the fitting function used. In this context, the paper considers two classes of fitting functions: weighted least squares and the class of functions proposed by Swain.Constructive comments by the referees are greatly appreciated. The author gratefully acknowledges Michael Browne's interest in his work.     

Effects of Level of Processing on Implicit and Explicit Memory in Depressed Mood

Recently, several studies have addressed the question of whether depression affects priming in implicit memory tasks. The main aim of this experiment was to assess the presence of a bias for negative information in explicit memory (free recall) and implicit memory (word-stem completion) tasks among subclinically depressed subjects compared to nondepressed subjects, using the typical levels of processing manipulation. The results of this study show the existence of a mood-congruent memory bias for both implicit and explicit memory in depressed subjects. The theoretical implications of these findings for implicit and explicit memory biases associated with depressed mood are discussed.     

Implicit learning: Below the subjective threshold

In this review, we consider three possible criteria by which knowledge might be regarded as implicit or inaccessible: It might be implicit only in the sense that it is difficult to articulate freely, or it might be implicit according to either an objective threshold or a subjective threshold. We evaluate evidence for these criteria in relation to artificial grammar learning, the control of complex systems, and sequence learning, respectively. We argue that the convincing evidence is not yet in, but construing the implicit nature of implicit learning in terms of a subjective threshold is most likely to prove fruitful for future research. Furthermore, the subjective threshold criterion may demarcate qualitatively different types of knowledge. We argue that (1) implicit, rather than explicit, knowledge is often relatively inflexible in transfer to different domains, (2) implicit, rather than explicit, learning occurs when attention is focused on specific items and not underlying rules, and (3) implicit learning and the resulting knowledge are often relatively robust.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Fuzzy Logic and Arithmetical Hierarchy,II

A very simple many-valued predicate calculus is presented; a completeness theorem is proved and the arithmetical complexity of some notions concerning provability is determined.     

Frame multiplicity and policy fiascoes: Limits to explanation

The dynamics of intractability, frame multiplicity and intense controversy not only characterize policy formation struggles, as described by Schön and Rein, but also affect the evaluation of policies and government action. Policy analysts play an important part in the politics of policy evaluation. This article demonstrates that they tend to produce very different explanations for controversial, failing policies. Such differing explanations imply different causal attributions, different allocations of blame, and different lessons for future policy-making. Such differences are not random occurrences; they are embedded in the analytical frames that evaluators use to reconstruct policy processes and to explain their outcomes. It is shown that at least three deep-rooted frames can be reconstructed: fiascoes as failures of public problem solving, fiascoes as institutional imbalances, and fiascoes as system artefacts. One of the great epistemological challenges is how to deal with multiple analytical frames. The final part of the article discusses various strategies.