Effects of gender marking in pronominal coindexation.

The naming latency of a pronoun was measured when a single previously presented name in a discourse either agreed or did not agree with the pronoun in gender and person. An effect of agreement was found both under conditions in which subjects were likely to have engaged in strategic processing of the pronoun (Experiment 1) and under conditions in which this was unlikely (Experiment 3). The effect of gender agreement was also investigated when two noun phrases were present in the discourse. The results continued to show an immediate effect of gender agreement (naming latencies increased when a pronoun did not agree with one of two previously presented nouns) under experimental conditions likely to engender strategic processing (Experiment 2). This last effect was not significant under experimental conditions that were not likely to engender strategic processing (Experiment 3). The results are discussed in terms of models of the process of identifying the referent of a pronoun in a discourse.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.