The development of temporal coordination in children

The ability to learn temporal patterns in sequenced actions was investigated in elementary-school age children. Temporal learning depends upon a process of integrating timing patterns with action sequences. Children ages 6-13 and young adults performed a serial response time task in which a response and a timing sequence were presented repeatedly in a phase-matched manner, allowing for integrative learning. The degree of integrative learning was measured as the slowing in performance that resulted when phase-shifting the sequences. Learning was similar for the children and adults on average but increased with age for the children. Executive function measured by Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) performance as well as a measure of response speed also improved with age. Finally, WCST performance and response speed predicted temporal learning. Taken together, the results indicate that temporal learning continues to develop in pre-adolescents and that maturing executive function or processing speed may play an important role in acquiring temporal patterns in sequenced actions and the development of this ability.     

Alcohol intoxication and memory for events: a snapshot of alcohol myopia in a real-world drinking scenario

Alcohol typically has a detrimental impact on memory across a variety of encoding and retrieval conditions (e.g., Mintzer, 2007; Ray & Bates, 2006). No research has addressed alcohol's effect on memory for lengthy and interactive events and little has tested alcohol's effect on free recall. In this study 94 participants were randomly assigned to alcohol, placebo, or control groups and consumed drinks in a bar-lab setting while interacting with a "bartender". Immediately afterwards all participants freely recalled the bar interaction. Consistent with alcohol myopia theory, intoxicated participants only differed from placebo and control groups when recalling peripheral information. Expanding on the original hypervigilance hypothesis, placebo participants showed more conservative reporting behaviour than the alcohol or control groups by providing more uncertain and "don't know" responses. Thus, alcohol intoxication had confined effects on memory for events, supporting and extending current theories.     

Realization,explanation and the mind-body relation

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.     

Reconsidering ‘spatial memory’ and the Morris water maze

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.     

Low-income, nonresident father involvement with their toddlers: variation by fathers' race and ethnicity

Using data from a racially and ethnically diverse sample of low-income mothers of 2-year-old children participating in the Early Head Start Research and Evaluation Project (N = 883), the authors examined fathers' education and employment, mother-father relationship, and mothers' relationships with kin in the household to explain variation in nonresident father involvement across racial and ethnic groups. Nonresident White fathers were less involved with their children than were African American and Latino fathers. This difference was explained by the status of mother-father relationships. White nonresident fathers were less likely than minority nonresident fathers to maintain romantic relationships with their child's mother. Mothers in the White father group were also more likely to re-partner, which negatively related to biological fathers' involvement. These findings suggest that approaches to strengthen nonresident father involvement in children's lives need to consider how father ethnicity and mother-father relations are associated with differential patterns of father involvement.     

Maternal depression and infant temperament characteristics

One hundred-thirty-nine women participated in this longitudinal study from the third trimester of pregnancy through 8-months postpartum. Women completed depression scales at several time points and rated their infant's characteristics and childcare stress at 2- and 6-months postpartum. Mothers' reports of infant temperament were significantly different for depressed and non-depressed mothers, with depressed mothers reporting more difficult infants at both measurement points. These differences remained after controlling for histories of maternal abuse or prenatal anxiety, which occurred more often in the depressed mothers. There were no significant differences in childcare stress or perceived support between the groups. Infant temperament and childcare stress did not change over time. Recommendations for practice include consistent ongoing evaluations of the "goodness of fit" within the dyad and exploring interventions for depressed mothers that provide guidance about interactions with their infants and the appropriateness of the infant behaviors.     

The link between motor impairment level and motor imagery ability in children with developmental coordination disorder

The present study examined motor imagery ability in children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD). Specifically, it explored whether children with varying degrees of motor impairment differed in their ability to perform motor imagery tasks. Fourty-two children scoring below the 15th percentile on the Movement ABC were split into two groups--DCD severe (DCD-S), scoring on or below the 5th percentile, and DCD mild (DCD-M), scoring from the 6th to 15th percentiles--and compared to 21 age matched controls. Participants performed two motor imagery tasks--hand (performed without and with specific imagery instructions) and whole-body rotation. The results demonstrated that children in the DCD-S group had a generalized motor imagery deficit in that they were less accurate across tasks than controls (and the DCD-M group on the hand task) and showed little benefit when given specific imagery instructions. The DCD-M group appeared capable of performing simpler motor imagery transformations, but were less successful as task complexity increased. Unlike the DCD-S group, the DCD-M group did show some benefit from specific imagery instructions with increases in accuracy on the hand task. These results suggest that a motor imagery deficit does exist in many children with DCD but that its presentation can vary--factors such as the individual child's level of motor impairment and task complexity appear to be linked to the profile of deficits observed, which could explain the inconsistent findings of previous studies. Although this study lends support to the theory that a deficit in internal modeling is an underlying problem for children with DCD, still more research is required to develop the theory further.     

The procedural learning of action order is independent of temporal learning

How does learning the timing of actions influence our ability to learn the order of actions? A sequence of responses cued by spatial stimuli was learned in a serial reaction time task where the response-to-stimulus intervals (RSIs) were random, constant, or followed a fixed sequence. In this final sequenced-RSI condition, the response and RSI sequences were consistently matched in phase and could be integrated into a common sequence representation. The main result was that the response sequence was learned to a similar degree in all RSI training conditions, indicating that neither the predictability of RSIs nor the integration of the phase-matched response and timing sequences benefited learning of the response sequence. Nevertheless, temporal learning and integration speeded up performance without strengthening the representation of response order.     

Born to adapt, but not in your dreams

The brain adapts to changes that take place in the body. Deprivation of input results in size reduction of cortical representations, whereas an increase in input results in an increase of representational space. Amputation forms one of the most dramatic disturbances of the integrity of the body. The brain adapts in many ways to this breakdown of the afferent–efferent equilibrium. However, almost all studies focus on the sensorimotor consequences. It is not known whether adaptation takes place also at other “levels” in the system. The present study addresses the question whether amputees dream about their intact body, as before the amputation, or about the body after the amputation and whether the dream content was a function of time since the amputation and type of amputation. The results show that the majority of the dreamers reported dreams about their intact body although the mean time that elapsed since the amputation was twelve years. There is no clear relation with the type of amputation. The results give modest evidence for the existence of a basic neural representation of the body that is, at least, partly genetically determined and by this relatively insensitive for changes in the sensory input.     

Individuals with first‐ever clinical presentation of a lacunar infarction syndrome: Is there an increased likelihood of developing mild cognitive impairment in the first 12 months after stroke?

Patients who have suffered a single clinical lacunar syndrome, in the absence of any previous clinical stroke, have a varying neuroradiological profile. We examined general cognition in 30 nonaphasic first‐ever lacunar syndrome participants, using a battery of standard clinical neuropsychological measures. At a group level, stroke participants did not demonstrate any cognitive impairment relative to well‐matched community‐based controls up to 12 months after stroke. There was also no evidence of increased frequencies of mild cognitive impairment after a single clinical lacunar syndrome relative to matched control participants within the first year post‐stroke. The current findings represent the first investigation of the cognitive outcome of nonaphasic individuals who have a first‐ever clinical lacunar syndrome. It was concluded that a clinically diagnosed first ever stroke event, presenting as a lacunar syndrome, was not associated with an elevated risk of developing mild cognitive impairment 12 months post‐stroke.