Fifty states of self-control: A U.S. statewide examination of the initiation and inhibition dimensions of self-regulation

Individual differences in self-control have been shown to reflect two underlying dimensions: initiation and inhibition. We examined the possibility that degrees of self-control might likewise be modeled at a broader social level, similar to other socio-cultural differences that operate at an individual level (e.g., collectivism). To test this notion, we used a variety of mundane behaviors measured at the level of U.S. states to create inhibitory and initiatory indices of self-control at a collective level. We show that statewide levels of initiatory and inhibitory self-control, despite being correlated with one another, exhibit unique patterns of association with a wide range of outcomes, including homicide, suicide, home foreclosures, divorce, and infidelity. This study represents one of the first attempts to model the dimensional structure of self-control at a social level and supports the utility of conceptualizing self-control as an important socio-cultural variable.     

A Review of Best Practice Recommendations for Text Analysis in R (and a User-Friendly App)

In recent decades, the amount of text available for organizational science research has grown tremendously. Despite the availability of text and advances in text analysis methods, many of these techniques remain largely segmented by discipline. Moreover, there is an increasing number of open-source tools (R, Python) for text analysis, yet these tools are not easily taken advantage of by social science researchers who likely have limited programming knowledge and exposure to computational methods. In this article, we compare quantitative and qualitative text analysis methods used across social sciences. We describe basic terminology and the overlooked, but critically important, steps in pre-processing raw text (e.g., selection of stop words; stemming). Next, we provide an exploratory analysis of open-ended responses from a prototypical survey dataset using topic modeling with R. We provide a list of best practice recommendations for text analysis focused on (1) hypothesis and question formation, (2) design and data collection, (3) data pre-processing, and (4) topic modeling. We also discuss the creation of scale scores for more traditional correlation and regression analyses. All the data are available in an online repository for the interested reader to practice with, along with a reference list for additional reading, an R markdown file, and an open source interactive topic model tool (topicApp; see https://github.com/wesslen/topicApp, https://github.com/wesslen/text-analysis-org-science, https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.15139/S3/R4W7ZS).     

Moral Luck and the Possibility of Agential Disjunctivism

Most presentations of the problem of moral luck invoke the notion of control, but little has been said about what control amounts to. We propose a necessary condition on an agent's having been in control of performing an action: that the agent's effort to perform the action ensured that the agent performed the action. The difficulty of satisfying this condition (or one like it) leads many on both sides of the moral luck debate to conclude that much of what we do is not within our control, and, at the limit, underpins agential skepticism, the view that no one has ever been in control of having performed an action in the external world. We propose a response to the agential skeptic modeled on the epistemological disjunctivist's response to the skeptic about perceptual experience. According to agential disjunctivism, the necessary condition on control can be met, thus undermining agential skepticism and one motivation for the problem of moral luck. Our view can be understood as resisting moral luck not by shrinking the domain of robust moral evaluation but by refusing to contract the realm of robust control.     

Metacognitive control in self-regulated learning: Conditions affecting the choice of restudying versus retrieval practice

In two experiments, learners studied word pairs one or two times and took a final cued recall test. They studied each pair upon its initial presentation and decided whether they would restudy it later, take a practice test on it later (retrieval practice), or forego all further practice with the pair. Whether learners preferred restudying or testing depended upon conditions. Regardless of whether practice tests were followed by feedback, they chose to take practice tests relatively more often when items were easy and the lag or spacing interval between the first and second occurrence was short, whereas they chose to restudy relatively more when items were hard and the lag was long. That is, they preferred testing under conditions in which successful retrieval on the practice test was likely. In Experiment 2, we varied the number of points each item was worth if recalled on the final test. A high point value led to a marked increase in both the preference for testing when the lag was short and the preference for restudying when the lag was long. Results support the hypothesis that learners appreciate at some level that retrieval practice can be a more effective learning strategy than restudying. However, they appear to believe that successful retrieval is necessary to reap the benefits of retrieval practice. As a consequence, their tendency to choose testing is influenced by conditions (item difficulty and spacing interval) that affect the likelihood of successful practice-test retrieval.     

Moral property eliminativism

This paper argues that there is significant motivation for contemporary ethicists to affirm a view I call “moral property eliminativism.” On this eliminativist view, there are no moral properties, but there are moral truths that are made true by only nonmoral entities. Moral property eliminativism parallels eliminativist views defended in other domains of philosophical inquiry, but has gone nearly entirely overlooked by contemporary ethicists. I argue that moral property eliminativism is motivated by the claim that there cannot be differences in moral truths without differences in nonmoral ontology—a claim widely endorsed by contemporary ethicists. Engaging with a variety of ways whereby one might resist the motivation I cite for moral property eliminativism, I argue that alternative contemporary metaethical views tend to purchase moral properties at the price of unnecessary theoretical complexity.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

On a Supposed Solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title ‘Objection R/S’ and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S.     

Mobile Internet Testing: An analysis of equivalence,individual differences,and reactions

Mobile internet testing (MIT) is the latest cost effective technological push in employment testing. The ability to access assessments via the internet using mobile devices provides increased speed and convenience for both administrators and respondents. In this article, we examine the equivalence of MIT compared with testing on personal computers (PCs) and whether attitudes and other individual differences influence responses and reactions to MIT. Results demonstrated equivalence for a supervisory situational judgment test across testing modes, but not for a cognitive ability test. Significant relationships were found between anxiety and both performance and reactions to mobile assessment. Respondents also reported significantly more positive reactions when tested on a PC versus a mobile device. Future research and practical implications are discussed.