Stuck on semantics: Processing of irrelevant object-scene inconsistencies modulates ongoing gaze behavior

People have an amazing ability to identify objects and scenes with only a glimpse. How automatic is this scene and object identification? Are scene and object semantics—let alone their semantic congruity—processed to a degree that modulates ongoing gaze behavior even if they are irrelevant to the task at hand? Objects that do not fit the semantics of the scene (e.g., a toothbrush in an office) are typically fixated longer and more often than objects that are congruent with the scene context. In this study, we overlaid a letter T onto photographs of indoor scenes and instructed participants to search for it. Some of these background images contained scene-incongruent objects. Despite their lack of relevance to the search, we found that participants spent more time in total looking at semantically incongruent compared to congruent objects in the same position of the scene. Subsequent tests of explicit and implicit memory showed that participants did not remember many of the inconsistent objects and no more of the consistent objects. We argue that when we view natural environments, scene and object relationships are processed obligatorily, such that irrelevant semantic mismatches between scene and object identity can modulate ongoing eye-movement behavior.     

Real-time sharing of gaze data between multiple eye trackers–evaluation,tools, and advice

Technological advancements in combination with significant reductions in price have made it practically feasible to run experiments with multiple eye trackers. This enables new types of experiments with simultaneous recordings of eye movement data from several participants, which is of interest for researchers in, e.g., social and educational psychology. The Lund University Humanities Laboratory recently acquired 25 remote eye trackers, which are connected over a local wireless network. As a first step toward running experiments with this setup, demanding situations with real time sharing of gaze data were investigated in terms of network performance as well as clock and screen synchronization. Results show that data can be shared with a sufficiently low packet loss (0.1 %) and latency (M = 3 ms, M A D = 2 ms) across 8 eye trackers at a rate of 60 Hz. For a similar performance using 24 computers, the send rate needs to be reduced to 20 Hz. To help researchers conduct similar measurements on their own multi-eye-tracker setup, open source software written in Python and PsychoPy are provided. Part of the software contains a minimal working example to help researchers kick-start experiments with two or more eye trackers.     

Selection-for-action in visual search

Grasping an object rather than pointing to it enhances processing of its orientation but not its color. Apparently, visual discrimination is selectively enhanced for a behaviorally relevant feature. In two experiments we investigated the limitations and targets of this bias. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we were interested to find out whether the effect is capacity demanding, therefore we manipulated the set-size of the display. The results indicated a clear cognitive processing capacity requirement, i.e. the magnitude of the effect decreased for a larger set size. Consequently, in Experiment 2, we investigated if the enhancement effect occurs only at the level of behaviorally relevant feature or at a level common to different features. Therefore we manipulated the discriminability of the behaviorally neutral feature (color). Again, results showed that this manipulation influenced the action enhancement of the behaviorally relevant feature. Particularly, the effect of the color manipulation on the action enhancement suggests that the action effect is more likely to bias the competition between different visual features rather than to enhance the processing of the relevant feature. We offer a theoretical account that integrates the action-intention effect within the biased competition model of visual selective attention.     

The influence of chromatic and achromatic variability on chromatic induction and perceived colour

Judgments of the colour of a surface are influenced by the colour of the surrounding. To determine whether only the average colour of the surrounding matters, or also the chromatic variability, judgments in colourful scenes are often compared with ones in which a target is surrounded by a plain background that provides the same average physical illumination of the retina as the colourful scene. The variability sometimes makes a difference (eg Shevell and Wei, 1998 Vision Research 38 1561-1566), and sometimes it does not (eg Brenner and Cornelissen, 1998 Vision Research 38 1789-1793). Is this because of the nonlinearity in cone responses? We designed scenes that stimulated the cones in an equivalent manner, both on average and in terms of variability, and yet differed markedly in chromatic variability. The more colourful surroundings had considerably less influence on subjects' colour judgments. We conclude that early cone-specific regulation of sensitivity cannot be responsible for the change in perceived colour, and deduce that chromatic induction takes place after contrast gain control.     

A Commentary on “Positive Psychology and Indian Psychology: In Need of Mutual Reinforcement”

For those who consider Indian Psychology (IP) a cause worthy of support, comparing IP with Positive Psychology (PP) is a compelling, but at first sight rather embarrassing exercise. Though these two approaches to psychology started roughly at the same time with similar-looking intentions, PP has made by now a major impact in terms of published papers, books and “name recognition”, while IP is still no more than a fringe phenomenon that is hardly on the map, even in India. K. Ramakrishna Rao’s analysis of the situation is as always impressive, but alternative perspectives are possible. To start, I agree of course with Prof. Ramakrishna Rao that these two new schools of psychology are similar in their intent of bringing some more “goodness” into mainstream psychology, but in my humble opinion, their similarity ends there. PP is a simple attempt at correcting mainstream psychology’s tendency to focus primarily on difficulties and negative emotional states. Beyond that, it doesn’t challenge the mainstream in any way. In spite of a not very successful attempt at internationalising itself (for an excellent critique see Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008), it is still solidly American, and as a whole it fits perfectly and noiselessly within the existing discipline and its supporting culture.