Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

One of the main issues in research on ultimatum bargaining is whether bargainers are motivated by self-interest or by a concern for fairness. It is difficult to distinguish between both motivations, because it may be in the own interest to make fair offers. In the current paper on ultimatum bargaining, it is investigated whether bargainers are truly motivated to be fair, or whether they merely strategically use fairness as a means to increase their own outcomes. The results of two experimental studies indicate that social value orientations play an important role: strategic use of fairness is mainly displayed by proselfs.     

On the Counterfactual Nature of Gambling Near‐misses: An Experimental Study

Research on gambling near‐misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses. The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non‐obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the current paper, we investigate how different types of near‐misses influence self‐perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel‐of‐fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, n = 51; Experiment 2, n = 104), we demonstrate that near‐wins (neutral outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self‐perceived luck, whereas near‐losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty) increased luck ratings. The effects of near‐misses varied by near‐miss position (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were more responsive to near‐wins and near‐losses on the wheel‐of‐fortune task. The effect of near‐miss position was attenuated when the anticipatory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and losses, between “clear” and “narrow” outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near‐misses. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions induce concessions via different mechanisms

Does it help or hurt to communicate negative emotions in bargaining? In this article, we propose that behavioral effects are dependent on the type of negative emotion that is communicated and whether such emotions are directed at the offer or the person. We show that the two negative emotions anger and disappointment have opposing effects in negotiations: anger pays when it is directed at the offer, but disappointment pays when it is directed at the person. Offer-directed anger elicits higher offers than person-directed anger, because people infer higher limits from opponents who communicate offer-directed anger. Person-directed disappointment elicits higher offers in others than offer-directed disappointment, because it evokes higher feelings of guilt. Our findings thus show that the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment in negotiation depend critically on the target of the emotion, and that their effects can be explained by different processes.     

On the near miss in public good dilemmas: How upward counterfactuals influence group stability when the group fails

In two studies we investigated the impact of degree of collective failure in a public good dilemma (near miss vs. large miss) on group members' negative reactions (negative affect, attributions of responsibility for the failure, and intention to leave the group). The results show that upward counterfactual thinking has more impact on members' negative responses when experiencing a near miss rather than a large miss. In Experiment 1, the results show that in the case of a near miss (and not a large miss), negative affect and attributions of responsibility were higher when other-focused counterfactuals rather than self-focused counterfactuals were elicited. Negative affect was found to mediate the effect on attributions of responsibility. Experiment 2 replicates these findings on a wider range of negative responses and reveals that the effect of counterfactual thought on willingness to leave the group in the case of a near miss is mediated by attributions of responsibility.     

Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.     

Individuals with Fear of Blushing Explicitly and Automatically Associate Blushing with Social Costs

To explain fear of blushing, it has been proposed that individuals with fear of blushing overestimate the social costs of their blushing. Current information-processing models emphasize the relevance of differentiating between more automatic and more explicit cognitions, as both types of cognitions may independently influence behavior. The present study tested whether individuals with fear of blushing expect blushing to have more negative social consequences than controls, both on an explicit level and on a more automatic level. Automatic associations between blushing and social costs were assessed in a treatment-seeking sample of individuals with fear of blushing who met DSM-IV criteria for social anxiety disorder (n = 49) and a non-anxious control group (n = 27) using a single-target Implicit Association Test (stIAT). In addition, participants’ explicit expectations about the social costs of their blushing were assessed. Individuals with fear of blushing showed stronger associations between blushing and negative outcomes, as indicated by both stIAT and self-report. The findings support the view that automatic and explicit associations between blushing and social costs may both help to enhance our understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie fear of blushing.     

Collective aspirations: collective regulatory focus as a mediator between transformational and transactional leadership and team creativity

Journal of Business and Psychology - This paper examines the mediating role of two emergent team states—collective regulatory focus (CRF) and team initiative—for transmitting the...     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.