Motivational pathways to alcohol use and abuse among Black and White adolescents

Using data from a biracial community sample of adolescents, the present study examined trajectories of alcohol use and abuse over a 15-year period, from adolescence into young adulthood, as well as the extent to which these trajectories were differentially predicted by coping and enhancement motives for alcohol use among the 2 groups. Coping and enhancement motivations (M. L. Cooper, 1994) refer to the strategic use of alcohol to regulate negative and positive emotions, respectively. Results showed that Black and White youth follow distinct alcohol trajectories from adolescence into young adulthood and that these trajectories are differentially rooted in the regulation of negative and positive emotions. Among Black drinkers, coping motives assessed in adolescence more strongly forecast differences in alcohol involvement into their early 30s, whereas enhancement motives more strongly forecast differences among White drinkers. Results of the present study suggest that different models may be needed to account for drinking behavior among Blacks and Whites and that different approaches may prove maximally effective in reducing heavy or problem drinking among the 2 groups.     

Excluded emotions: The role of anger in antisocial responses to ostracism

In this article, we examined the role of anger in the link between social exclusion and antisocial behavior. We compared the effects of anger to another negative emotion, sadness. In Study 1, social exclusion was associated with feelings of anger, and anger was associated with antisocial behavior. In contrast, sadness was not associated with antisocial behavior. In Study 2, feelings of anger were manipulated by excluding participants for either a fair or unfair reason. Unfairly excluded participants were more angry and were more likely to engage in antisocial behavior than fairly excluded participants. Implications for the study of emotions in the context of social exclusion are discussed.     

The thrust of the problem: bodily inhibitions and guilt as a function of mortality salience and neuroticism

We argue that existential concerns underlie discomfort with the physicality of the body and that activities likely to make individuals aware of their physical body (e.g., sex, dancing) may be inhibited and cause guilt. Further, individuals high in neuroticism may be especially vulnerable to such difficulties. To test this, individuals high and low in neuroticism were primed with thoughts about their mortality or a control topic and then engaged in an exercise designed to promote body awareness before self-reporting guilt. A comparison group engaged in non-body-oriented behavior. The results revealed that high neuroticism participants inhibited their body-oriented behavior when mortality was salient and that they experienced a marginal increase in guilt after performing the behavior in conjunction with mortality salience. Discussion focuses on the relationship between neuroticism, mortality salience, inhibition surrounding the body, and guilt.     

Graduate students' social and emotional functioning relative to characteristics of eating disorders

The authors explored gender-based patterns of relations between social and emotional functioning and the behaviors empirically supported as being highly potent for eating disorders: drive to be thin and body dissatisfaction. Graduate students between 20 and 25 years of age served as participants. Correlation analyses revealed that for women, personal adjustment and internalizing behaviors had significant relations to drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction. Using hierarchical regression analysis, the authors found that self-esteem contributed to the most variation in the prediction of both outcome variables. A differing pattern emerged for men as drive for muscularity and hyperactivity were most strongly predictive of drive for thinness, but not body dissatisfaction. The authors discuss implications relative to T. L. Tylka and L. M. Subich's (2004) model.     

Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence” (National Gallery, London), the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject.     

The influence of recent experience on perceptions of attractiveness

Adults rate average faces as more attractive than most of the faces used in the creation of the average. One explanation for this is that average faces appear as both more familiar and more attractive because they resemble internal face prototypes formed from experience. Here we evaluated that explanation by examining the influence of recent experience on participants' subsequent judgments of attractiveness. Participants first performed a memory task lasting 8 min in which all of the female faces to be remembered had their features placed in a low, average, or high position, depending on experimental condition. In what was described as a separate experiment, participants then moved the features of a female face with averaged features to their most attractive vertical location. The most attractive location was affected by the faces seen during the memory task, with participants who saw faces with features in the high position placing features in higher locations than participants who saw faces with features in either the low or average positions. The results demonstrate that perceptions of attractiveness are influenced by recent experience, and suggest that internal face prototypes are constantly being updated by experience.     

Can tactile stimuli be subitised? An unresolved controversy within the literature on numerosity judgments

There is a growing interest in the question whether the phenomenon of subitising (fast and accurate detection of fewer than 4-5 stimuli presented simultaneously), widely thought to affect numerosity judgments in vision, can also affect the processing of tactile stimuli. In a recent study, in which multiple tactile stimuli were simultaneously presented across the body surface, Gallace et al (2006 Perception 35 247-266) concluded that tactile stimuli cannot be subitised. By contrast, Riggs et al (2006 Psychological Science 17 271 275), who presented tactile stimuli to participants' fingertips, came to precisely the opposite conclusion, arguing instead that subitising does occur in touch. Here, we re-analyse the data from both studies using more powerful statistical procedures. We show that Riggs et al's error data do not offer strong support for the subitising account and, what is more, Gallace et al's data are not entirely compatible with a linear model account of numerosity judgments in humans either. We then report an experiment in which we compare numerosity judgments for stimuli presented on the fingertips with those for stimuli presented on the rest of the body surface. The results show no major differences between the fingers and the rest of the body, and an absence of subitising in either condition. On the basis of these observations, we discuss whether the purported existence of subitisation in touch reflects a genuine cognitive phenomenon, or whether, instead, it may reflect a bias in the interpretation of the particular psychometric functions that happen to have been chosen by researchers to fit their data.     

Unnatural Access

Jordi Fernández has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second-order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.