Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?

In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson argue that current attempts to use neuroscience to inform the theory and practice of law founder because they are built on confused conceptual foundations. Proponents of neurolaw attribute to the brain or to its parts psychological properties that belong only to people; this mistake vitiates many of the claims they make. Once neurolaw is placed on a sounder conceptual footing, Pardo and Patterson claim, we will see that its more dramatic claims are false or meaningless, though it might be able to provide inductive evidence for particular less dramatic claims (that a defendant may be lying, or lacks control over their behavior, for instance). In response, I argue that the central conceptual confusions identified by Pardo and Patterson are not confusions at all. Though some of the claims made by its proponents are hasty and sometimes they are confused, there are no conceptual barriers to attributing psychological properties to brain states. Neuroscience can play a role in producing evidence that is more reliable than subjective report or behavior; it therefore holds out the possibility of dramatically altering our self-conception as agents and thereby the law.     

Philosophy for Resilience: A Meaningful Intervention for Medical Students

Journal of Academic Ethics - Philosophy and ethics in medicine is an interesting and often fascinating topic of enquiry, however uptake amongst medical students is highly variable and it...     

Defending the Possibility of Knowledge

In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.     

Recognition by association: Within‐ and cross‐modality associative priming with faces and voices

Recent literature has raised the suggestion that voice recognition runs in parallel to face recognition. As a result, a prediction can be made that voices should prime faces and faces should prime voices. A traditional associative priming paradigm was used in two studies to explore within‐modality priming and cross‐modality priming. In the within‐modality condition where both prime and target were faces, analysis indicated the expected associative priming effect: The familiarity decision to the second target celebrity was made more quickly if preceded by a semantically related prime celebrity, than if preceded by an unrelated prime celebrity. In the cross‐modality condition, where a voice prime preceded a face target, analysis indicated no associative priming when a 3‐s stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was used. However, when a relatively longer SOA was used, providing time for robust recognition of the prime, significant cross‐modality priming emerged. These data are explored within the context of a unified account of face and voice recognition, which recognizes weaker voice processing than face processing.     

Automated Integrative Complexity: Current Challenges and Future Directions

Automating integrative complexity is fraught with many challenges. To address these challenges, we discuss the tension between a specificity approach and a more flexible multiple‐pass approach, the multifaceted nature of the complexity construct, the gold standard for complexity measurement, the difficulty of human scoring and its consequences for automation, and some ways forward for creating the best complexity measurements. In so doing, we present new data demonstrating (1) initial evidence for the validity of a new automated system for measuring two different forms of complexity (elaborative and dialectical), (2) the danger of constructing measurements in a purely ad hoc fashion that ignores prospective testing, (3) human‐to‐computer correspondence is in part a function of human‐to‐human correspondence, (4) human‐to‐computer correspondence increases systematically as one uses tests with larger units of analysis, and (5) the lack of correspondence of different systems (both human and automated) may occur in part because they were designed for different units of analysis.     

Online Advertisements and Conceptual Implicit Memory: Advances in Theory and Methodology

We conducted three experiments to further our understanding, both theoretically and methodologically, of conceptual implicit memory within the advertising context. Results from the first experiment confirmed what previous research had suggested: using a brand generation task is a conceptual implicit memory measure. The first experiment also demonstrated that conceptual priming can be found using realistic‐looking advertisements embedded within a news website. Results from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that not only is providing specific encoding instructions not necessary to induce conceptual or semantic processing but also that there were no differences based on whether the experimental procedure was conducted in a laboratory or online. Together, these results have implications for increasing the ecological validity of this type of research. By allowing participants to view realistic advertisements outside of a laboratory without specific encoding instructions, the procedure much more closely mimics how individuals actually interact with advertisements in real life. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

Nation,Narration, and Health in Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Guantánamo Diary</Emphasis>

Scholars have mostly analyzed information from mental health practitioners, attorneys, and institutions to critique mental health practices in the War on Terror. These sources offer limited insights into the suffering of detainees. Detainee accounts provide novel information based on their experiences at Guantánamo. Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary is the only text from a current detainee that provides a first-person account of his interrogations and interactions with health professionals. Despite being advertised as a diary, however, it has undergone redaction from American government officials. This article examines Slahi’s account of his interrogations and representations of mental health at Guantánamo and considers its role within the narrative function of the nation. At stake is the right of detainees to narrate, scholars to critique medical practices in the War on Terror, and the nation’s attempts to control its narration.     

Ecological Networks and Community Attachment and Support Among Recently Resettled Refugees

Interventions aimed at enhancing mental health are increasingly centered around promoting community attachment and support. However, few have examined and tested the specific ecological factors that give rise to these key community processes. Drawing from insights from the ecological network perspective, we tested whether spatial and social overlap in routine activity settings (e.g., work, school, childcare) with fellow ethnic community members is associated with individuals’ attachment to their ethnic communities and access to social resources embedded in their communities. Data on routine activity locations drawn from the Refugee Well‐Being Project (based in a city in the Southwestern United States) were used to reconstruct the ecological networks of recently resettled refugee communities, which were two‐mode networks that comprise individuals and their routine activity locations. Results indicated that respondents’ community attachment and support increased with their ecological network extensity—which taps the extent to which respondents share routine activity locations with other community members. Our study highlights a key ecological process that potentially enhances individuals’ ethnic community attachment that extends beyond residential neighborhoods.