The Internet as Cognitive Enhancement

Science and Engineering Ethics - The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of...     

A multicriteria decision framework for measuring banks' soundness around the world

In this paper, we use a sample of 894 banks from 79 countries to develop a multicriteria decision aid model, for the classification of banks into three groups on the basis of their soundness. The model is developed with the UTilités Additives DIScriminantes (UTADIS) method, through a 10-fold cross-validation procedure using six financial and four non-financial variables. The ratings of Fitch form the basis for assigning banks into the three groups. The results indicate that the asset quality (as measured by loan loss provisions), capitalization, and the market where banks operate are the most important criteria (in terms of weights) in classifying the banks. Profitability and efficiency in expenses management are also important attributes, whereas size and listing in a stock exchange are the least important ones. UTADIS achieves higher classification accuracies than discriminant analysis and ordinary logistic regression which are used for benchmarking purposes. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anxiety,Depression, and Procrastination Among Students: Rumination Plays a Larger Mediating Role than Worry

Procrastination is prevalent among students and is associated with negative outcomes, including poor academic performance and psychological distress. Research also suggests that anxiety and depression can exacerbate procrastination; however, the mechanisms associated with the development of procrastination are less understood. The current study aimed to clarify the role of negative repetitive thought (i.e., rumination and worry) in the links between anxiety and procrastination, and depression and procrastination. Ninety-one undergraduate students completed self-report measures of anxiety, depression, worry, brooding rumination, and procrastination, and two multiple mediator models were tested. Procrastination was positively correlated with the study variables, including medium effects for anxiety and depression, a large effect for rumination, and a small effect for worry. Rumination independently mediated the relationships between anxiety and procrastination, and depression and procrastination. Worry did not independently mediate these relationships. The current findings suggest rumination plays a larger role in the links between anxiety, depression, and procrastination than worry. Thus, students with higher levels of anxiety and depression engage in more negative repetitive thought, which may contribute to procrastinatory behavior as a result of a preoccupation with depressing or painful thoughts about the past.     

Making the Quantum of Relevance

Summary  The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → − q) & (q→ − p) or defineable as [(p →− q) & (q →− p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and thus a matter of fact. The two types are therefore diametrically opposed.In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. Δ E Δ t ≥ h is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hν plus the Fourier relation Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1. And the Fourier relation assigns a logical incompatibility between Δ ν = 0, Δ t = 0. (Defining a repetitive phenomenon at an instant t → 0 is a self contradictory notion.) An incompatibility, therefore, which is fact independent and unconditional. How can one reconcile this with the fact that Δ EΔ t exists if and only if h > 0, which latter supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a Δ E = 0, Δ t = 0 incompatibility should itself be fact dependent? Are we to say that E and t are unconditionally incompatible (via Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1) on condition that E = hν is at all true? Hence, as presently standing, the UR express a self-contradicting type of incompatibility.To circumvent this undesirable result, I reinterpret E = hν as relating the energy with a period. Though only one such period. And not with frequency literally. (It is false that E = ν . It is true that E = ν times the quantum.) In this way, the literal concept of frequency does not enter as before, rendering Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1 inapplicable. So the above noted contradiction disappears. Nevertheless, the Uncertainties are derived. If energy is only to be defined over a period, momentum only over a distance (formerly a wavelength) resulting during such period, thus yielding quantized action of dimensions Et = pq, then energies will become indefinite at instants, momenta indefinite at points, leading, as demanded, to (symmetric!) Δ E Δ t = Δ p Δ q ≥ h’s.     

Self-Efficacy for Affect Regulation as a Predictor of Future Life Satisfaction and Moderator of the Negative Affect—Life Satisfaction Relationship

Life satisfaction is an important index of mental health and also predicts other important outcomes such as longevity and decreased mortality. Negative affect has a unique inverse relationship with life satisfaction across the life span. Therefore, determining psychological factors that uniquely predict future life satisfaction and that reduce the trait negative affect—life satisfaction relationship is theoretically and clinically important. In light of recent evidence from long-term longitudinal studies that self-efficacy for regulation of negative emotions (SERN) predicts higher future life satisfaction, as well as evidence from a cross-sectional study that a subtype of SERN—self-efficacy for regulating anger—buffers the relationship between trait negative affect and life satisfaction, we tested whether SERN and subtypes of SERN predicted higher life satisfaction and buffered the negative affect—life satisfaction relationship longitudinally over short time periods. After controlling for time 1 life satisfaction, higher time 1 self-efficacy for regulating despondency and distress (SEDes) predicted higher future life satisfaction over average time periods of 17 days (N = 127), 32 days (N = 83), and 41 days (N = 65) among college students. However, in post hoc exploratory regressions that included self-efficacy for experience and expression of positive emotions (SEPos), SEDes predicted higher time 2 life satisfaction, but only SEPos uniquely predicted higher time 3 and time 4 life satisfaction.     

Moving Without Being Where You’re Not; A Non-Bivalent Way

The classical response to Zeno’s paradoxes goes like this: ‘Motion cannot properly be defined within an instant. Only over a period’ (Vlastos.) I show that this ob-jection is exactly what it takes for Zeno to be right. If motion cannot be defined at an instant, even though the object is always moving at that instant, motion cannot be defined at all, for any longer period of time identical in content to that instant. The nonclassical response introduces discontinuity, to evade the paradox of infinite proximity of any point of a distance with any ‘next’. But it introduces the wrong sort of discontinuity because, rather than assuming the discontinuity of motion, as Quantum Theory does, it assumes the discontinuity of space. Due then to the resulting spacetime disorder, though all else is certainly lost, the Tortoise now turns up at least as fast as Achilles and hence not even this much is rescued. Zeno rejects motion because he shows that a moving object must be where it is not. Hence motion, if to occur, must violate the Law of Contradiction (LNC). Applying the concept of quantum discontinuity, I produce an alternative. If an object is to move discontinuously between two boundary points, A and B, what actually obtains is, rather, that it is nowhere at all in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be at two places in-between A and B. And cannot therefore be where it is not. Thus, LNC is conserved. However, in these conditions, the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) fails. To mitigate the undesirability of this effect, I show that LEM fails because LNC holds. Thus, the resulting nonbivalent logic, which is also appropriate for quantized transitions of all kinds, will always turn up nonbivalent, because consistent. And this is not too bad, considering.     

Successful management of automatic dysfunctional thoughts in the context of negative emotions

Background and objectives: Cognitive and affective overloads trigger automatic dysfunctional thoughts and undermine their voluntary management [ADTs; Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York: Meridian; Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychology Review, 101(1), 34–52]. Taking into account intense negative emotions as triggers for the ADTs, we explored whether context (i.e., social context) and emotional experience (i.e., emotional intensity) predict the successful management of ADTs. We also examine the moderating role of difficulties in emotional regulation strategies.

Method: Thirty-eight participants wrote in a personal online diary of at least 10 times in 40 weeks. We analyzed the conditions for managing ADTs by means of multilevel in stages models.

Results: Emotional intensity negatively predicted successful management of ADTs. Attempts to control ADTs and work context positively predicted successful management of ADTs. The negative relation between the emotional intensity and the management of ADTs was stronger as individuals were less aware of their own emotions, and was weaker as they had less clear representations of their own emotions. Superior access to emotion regulation strategies explained a stronger relationship between the work context and the successful management of ADTs.

Conclusions: We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the results.     

Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it.