Effects of left-hand preference on postinjury measures of distal motor ability

The relationship of preinjury left-hand dominance for motor performance to postinjury distal motor skills following penetrating brain wounds in patients without overt hemiplegia was examined. We studied 13 controls, 13 right-hemisphere brain-damaged patients, and 11 left-hemisphere brain-damaged patients on motor tasks measuring reaction time, strength, and coordination. Our results indicated that no persistent deficits were seen on distal motor tasks in left-handed adults who suffered a penetrating brain wound. These findings are compatible with the relative sparing of persistent neuropsychological deficits in left-handers following brain damage.     

Establishing praise as a conditioned reinforcer: Pairing with one versus multiple reinforcers

Praise and other forms of attention may not function as reinforcers for the behavior of children with autism. Previous research demonstrated that contingently pairing praise with reinforcers (response stimulus) can establish praise as a conditioned reinforcer. We evaluated a procedure for establishing praise as a generalized conditioned reinforcer (pair praise with four reinforcers) and compared it with a procedure to establish praise as a conditioned reinforcer (pair praise with one reinforcer). We compared the two conditions in a reversal design with “praise” and “no programmed consequence” conditions rapidly alternated after pairing phases. With three out of five participants with autism, responding in the “pair‐with‐four” condition showed higher levels of responding or more increasing trends compared with that in “pair‐with‐one” condition. We also replicated previous contingent pairing research with two participants in a multiple baseline across participants design. A limitation was the absence of manipulating motivating operations in assessing the efficacy of praise as a generalized conditioned reinforcer. Nevertheless, these data contribute to the research on establishing praise as a reinforcer, and we recommend directions for future research.     

The effect of presenting multiple images on prospective and retrospective person memory for missing children

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children sometimes present multiple images of the same child on missing-child posters. In the present research, we examined the effect of including multiple pictures of missing children on posters in the context of both prospective and retrospective person memory. Improvements in both prospective person memory and retrospective person memory were obtained in the multiple-image condition. Additionally, in retrospective person memory, participants who were presented with multiple-image posters showed an increased tendency to indicate that a child was previously seen regardless of whether the child actually was previously seen. We discuss these findings as well as policy implications of these results.     

Exercising Doxastic Freedom

This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention. Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions‐reactivity and reasons‐reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntary control. I develop and defend an account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot require voluntary control. Then I show that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. I argue that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxastic states, this would actually undermine our freedom.     

Hemispheric differences in specificity effects in talker identification

In the visual domain, Marsolek and colleagues (1999, 2008) have found support for two dissociable and parallel neural subsystems underlying object and shape recognition: an abstract-category subsystem that operates more effectively in the left cerebral hemisphere (LH), and a specific-exemplar subsystem that operates more effectively in the right cerebral hemisphere (RH). Evidence of this asymmetry has been observed in priming specificity for linguistic (words, pseudoword forms) and nonlinguistic (objects) stimuli. In the auditory domain, the authors previously found hemispheric asymmetries in priming effects for linguistic (spoken words) and nonlinguistic (environmental sounds) stimuli. In the present study, the same asymmetrical pattern was observed in talker identification by means of two long-term repetition-priming experiments. Both experiments consisted of a familiarization phase and a final talker identification test phase, using sentences as stimuli. The results showed that specificity effects (an advantage for same-sentence priming, relative to different-sentence priming) emerged when the target stimuli were presented to the left ear (RH), but not when the target stimuli were presented to the right ear (LH). Taken together, this consistent asymmetrical pattern of data from both domains-visual and auditory-may be indicative of a more general property of the human perceptual processing system. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

The Social Construction of Love Through Intergenerational Processes

Love became an integral part of marriage in Western culture in the mid-1900s. Marriage began to change along with the inclusion of love, which is evidenced by changes in divorce rates. While marriages themselves change, love too may be influenced in a reciprocal process. This study was interested in identifying the association between parental relationship factors, including marital status and interparental conflict, and both the experience of and expectations for love. The sample was collected using online convenience sampling, and included (N = 207) heterosexually married participants. Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to determine the unique contribution of the parent marital factors on love. Higher levels of interparental conflict were associated with lower levels of love and expectations for love, while having parents who were separated was associated with higher relationship expectations. These findings can support case conceptualizations for clinical work with couples and the use of Narrative and Transgenerational therapies.     

Testing and modelling non‐normality within the one‐factor model

Maximum likelihood estimation in the one‐factor model is based on the assumption of multivariate normality for the observed data. This general distributional assumption implies three specific assumptions for the parameters in the one‐factor model: the common factor has a normal distribution; the residuals are homoscedastic; and the factor loadings do not vary across the common factor scale. When any of these assumptions is violated, non‐normality arises in the observed data. In this paper, a model is presented based on marginal maximum likelihood to enable explicit tests of these assumptions. In addition, the model is suitable to incorporate the detected violations, to enable statistical modelling of these effects. Two simulation studies are reported in which the viability of the model is investigated. Finally, the model is applied to IQ data to demonstrate its practical utility as a means to investigate ability differentiation.     

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.