Hemispheric differences in indexical specificity effects in spoken word recognition

Variability in talker identity, one type of indexical variation, has demonstrable effects on the speed and accuracy of spoken word recognition. Furthermore, neuropsychological evidence suggests that indexical and linguistic information may be represented and processed differently in the 2 cerebral hemispheres, and is consistent with findings from the visual domain. For example, in visual word recognition, changes in font affect processing differently depending on which hemisphere initially processes the input. The present study examined whether hemispheric differences exist in spoken language as well. In 4 long-term repetition-priming experiments, the authors examined responses to stimuli that were primed by stimuli that matched or mismatched in talker identity. The results demonstrate that indexical variability can affect participants' perception of spoken words differently in the 2 hemispheres.     

Parameter identification in multinomial processing tree models

Multinomial processing tree models form a popular class of statistical models for categorical data that have applications in various areas of psychological research. As in all statistical models, establishing which parameters are identified is necessary for model inference and selection on the basis of the likelihood function, and for the interpretation of the results. The required calculations to establish global identification can become intractable in complex models. We show how to establish local identification in multinomial processing tree models, based on formal methods independently proposed by Catchpole and Morgan (1997) and by Bekker, Merckens, and Wansbeek (1994). This approach is illustrated with multinomial processing tree models for the source-monitoring paradigm in memory research.     

The effect of viewing fitness imagery on body dissatisfaction: sex and physical activity differences

Exposure to cultural bodily ideals featuring thinness and muscularity can have deleterious effects on body satisfaction. The current study explores the effect of exposure to such imagery on body dissatisfaction and the influence of internalisation of cultural and athletic ideals. 188 (97 male) adults (18–25yrs; M = 20.97) were grouped according to a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed between-within subjects design (male/female; high/low physical activity; intervention/control). Participants were exposed to images of idealised physiques or neutral images. Internalisation-general, sex, physical activity levels, and Body Mass Index were associated with baseline levels of body dissatisfaction. Internalisation of cultural ideals appears to be an important factor for the prediction of body dissatisfaction. Exposure to idealised images resulted in increases in body dissatisfaction across all groups compared to controls. Neither sex nor physical activity levels buffer young adults from the negative effects of viewing images featuring idealised bodies.     

The effect of priming a thin ideal on the subsequent perception of conceptually related body image words

Our research examined the effects of thin ideal priming on the perception of body image words in participants without an eating disorder. Half of the participants were primed by viewing thin models, and half were primed with gender-neutral shoes. Subsequently, all participants (N = 56) completed a Stroop task for three categories of words: neutral (BOOKS), shoe (CLOGS), and body (THIGHS). Lastly, all participants completed a body dissatisfaction questionnaire. We predicted that body dissatisfaction scores would be correlated with the Stroop effect. We found a significant correlation between body dissatisfaction and the body effect of slower color naming times for the body related words compared to the neutral words. Our study demonstrates that body dissatisfaction and a brief priming with thin models results in subsequent differences in performing a Stroop task in a non clinical population of female participants.     

Belief and aims

Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395?C405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief??s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen??s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.     

The Heteroscedastic Graded Response Model with a Skewed Latent Trait: Testing Statistical and Substantive Hypotheses Related to Skewed Item Category Functions

The Graded Response Model (GRM; Samejima, Estimation of ability using a response pattern of graded scores, Psychometric Monograph No.?17, Richmond, VA: The Psychometric Society, 1969) can be derived by assuming a linear regression of a continuous variable, Z, on the trait, ??, to underlie the ordinal item scores (Takane & de Leeuw in Psychometrika, 52:393?C408, 1987). Traditionally, a normal distribution is specified for Z implying homoscedastic error variances and a normally distributed ??. In this paper, we present the Heteroscedastic GRM with Skewed Latent Trait, which extends the traditional GRM by incorporation of heteroscedastic error variances and a skew-normal latent trait. An appealing property of the extended GRM is that it includes the traditional GRM as a special case. This enables specific tests on the normality assumption of Z. We show how violations of normality in Z can lead to asymmetrical category response functions. The ability to test this normality assumption is beneficial from both a statistical and substantive perspective. In a simulation study, we show the viability of the model and investigate the specificity of the effects. We apply the model to a dataset on affect and a dataset on alexithymia.     

What Assertion Doesn't Show

Abstract: Some recent arguments against the classical invariantist account of knowledge exploit the idea that there is a ‘knowledge norm’ for assertion. It is claimed that, given the existence of this norm, certain intuitions about assertability support contextualism, or contrastivism, over classical invariantism. In this paper I show that, even if we accept the existence of a knowledge norm, these assertability‐based arguments fail. The classical invariantist can accommodate and explain the relevant intuitions about assertability, in a way that retains the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm for assertion. When we consider the role of assertion as a conversational act, it becomes plausible that a subject's epistemic warrant to assert can be defeated even though she has knowledge. This defeasibility thesis is what allows the classical invariantist to accommodate and explain the kinds of intuitions on which assertability‐based arguments depend.     

Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities

Several current debates in the epistemology of testimony are implicitly motivated by concerns about the reliability of rules for changing one’s beliefs in light of others’ claims. Call such rules testimonial norms (tns). To date, epistemologists have neither (i) characterized those features of communities that influence the reliability of tns, nor (ii) evaluated the reliability of tns as those features vary. These are the aims of this paper. I focus on scientific communities, where the transmission of highly specialized information is both ubiquitous and critically important. Employing a formal model of scientific inquiry, I argue that miscommunication and the “communicative structure” of science strongly influence the reliability of tns, where reliability is made precise in three ways.