Hemispheric differences in specificity effects in talker identification

In the visual domain, Marsolek and colleagues (1999, 2008) have found support for two dissociable and parallel neural subsystems underlying object and shape recognition: an abstract-category subsystem that operates more effectively in the left cerebral hemisphere (LH), and a specific-exemplar subsystem that operates more effectively in the right cerebral hemisphere (RH). Evidence of this asymmetry has been observed in priming specificity for linguistic (words, pseudoword forms) and nonlinguistic (objects) stimuli. In the auditory domain, the authors previously found hemispheric asymmetries in priming effects for linguistic (spoken words) and nonlinguistic (environmental sounds) stimuli. In the present study, the same asymmetrical pattern was observed in talker identification by means of two long-term repetition-priming experiments. Both experiments consisted of a familiarization phase and a final talker identification test phase, using sentences as stimuli. The results showed that specificity effects (an advantage for same-sentence priming, relative to different-sentence priming) emerged when the target stimuli were presented to the left ear (RH), but not when the target stimuli were presented to the right ear (LH). Taken together, this consistent asymmetrical pattern of data from both domains-visual and auditory-may be indicative of a more general property of the human perceptual processing system. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Testing and modelling non‐normality within the one‐factor model

Maximum likelihood estimation in the one‐factor model is based on the assumption of multivariate normality for the observed data. This general distributional assumption implies three specific assumptions for the parameters in the one‐factor model: the common factor has a normal distribution; the residuals are homoscedastic; and the factor loadings do not vary across the common factor scale. When any of these assumptions is violated, non‐normality arises in the observed data. In this paper, a model is presented based on marginal maximum likelihood to enable explicit tests of these assumptions. In addition, the model is suitable to incorporate the detected violations, to enable statistical modelling of these effects. Two simulation studies are reported in which the viability of the model is investigated. Finally, the model is applied to IQ data to demonstrate its practical utility as a means to investigate ability differentiation.     

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.     

What is Good Reasoning?

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.     

Cortical correlates of impaired self-regulation in personality disordered patients with traits of psychopathy

Psychopathic personality disordered patients would, by virtue of a failure to self-regulate, be expected to show diminished amplitudes of feedback-related brain potentials. Among a sample of personality disordered patients detained at different levels of security, those who met a Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) criterion of 25 or above were identified (N = 27). Their event-related brain potentials (ERPs), together with those of their nonpsychopathic counterparts (N = 22) and healthy male controls (N = 20), were measured while they performed a visual Go/No Go task, with feedback given for correct and incorrect performance. Psychopathic patients showed a significantly reduced amplitude of an early frontal negative ERP component maximally evoked by negative feedback, and a high rate of errors of commission. Findings are consistent with the idea that psychopathic patients' unsuccessful attempts to self-regulate reflect a cognitive deficit characterised by a failure to attend and respond to a mismatch between expected and obtained outcomes.     

Testing overall and moderator effects in random effects meta‐regression

Random effects meta‐regression is a technique to synthesize results of multiple studies. It allows for a test of an overall effect, as well as for tests of effects of study characteristics, that is, (discrete or continuous) moderator effects. We describe various procedures to test moderator effects: the z, t, likelihood ratio (LR), Bartlett‐corrected LR (BcLR), and resampling tests. We compare the Type I error of these tests, and conclude that the common z test, and to a lesser extent the LR test, do not perform well since they may yield Type I error rates appreciably larger than the chosen alpha. The error rate of the resampling test is accurate, closely followed by the BcLR test. The error rate of the t test is less accurate but arguably tolerable. With respect to statistical power, the BcLR and t tests slightly outperform the resampling test. Therefore, our recommendation is to use either the resampling or the BcLR test. If these statistics are unavailable, then the t test should be used since it is certainly superior to the z test.     

Temporal stability of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity: Test-retest data over five weeks

Recently Lewis, Cruise, and Mc Guckin (2005) have reported on the test-retest reliability of the 7-item version of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity; however, their study was limited. The present aim was to evaluate the temporal stability of both the 24- and 7-item versions of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity over a five-week period among a sample of 114 Irish undergraduate university students. Data demonstrated that stability across the two administrations was very high for both the 24- (r = .95) and 7-item (r = .94) versions. These data support the short-term test-retest reliability of both the 24- and 7-item versions of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity.     

Representation of lexical form

The authors attempted to determine whether surface representations of spoken words are mapped onto underlying, abstract representations. In particular, they tested the hypothesis that flaps--neutralized allophones of intervocalic /t/s and /d/s--are mapped onto their underlying phonemic counterparts. In 6 repetition priming experiments, participants responded to stimuli in 2 blocks of trials. Stimuli in the 1st block served as primes and those in the 2nd as targets. Primes and targets consisted of English words containing intervocalic /t/s and /d/s that, when produced casually, were flapped. In all 6 experiments, reaction times to target items were measured as a function of prime type. The results provide evidence for both surface and underlying form-based representations.     

Hemispheric differences in indexical specificity effects in spoken word recognition

Variability in talker identity, one type of indexical variation, has demonstrable effects on the speed and accuracy of spoken word recognition. Furthermore, neuropsychological evidence suggests that indexical and linguistic information may be represented and processed differently in the 2 cerebral hemispheres, and is consistent with findings from the visual domain. For example, in visual word recognition, changes in font affect processing differently depending on which hemisphere initially processes the input. The present study examined whether hemispheric differences exist in spoken language as well. In 4 long-term repetition-priming experiments, the authors examined responses to stimuli that were primed by stimuli that matched or mismatched in talker identity. The results demonstrate that indexical variability can affect participants' perception of spoken words differently in the 2 hemispheres.