PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter ) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God's memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.     

Adolescents' Attitudes About the Role of Mental Illness in Suicide,and Their Association with Suicide Risk

We examined teenagers' attitudes about the role of mental illness in suicidal behavior and the relationship between these attitudes and suicide risk. Serious suicidal ideation or behavior and associated risk factors (gender, depression, substance problems, and first‐hand experience with a suicidal peer) were assessed in 2,419 students at six New York high schools. Less than one fifth of students thought that mental illness was a major contributor to suicide. Suicidal adolescents and those at risk were less likely than their nonsuicidal and low‐risk counterparts to associate suicide with mental illness. Our findings contribute to the debate over whether accepting attitudes toward suicide increase suicide risk.     

THE PASSIONS OF PUNISHMENT

I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotions and of their associated behaviors that are consistent with Abolitionism, the view that punishment is unjustified.     

DAVIDSON AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: PARATAXIS AND SELF-EXPRESSION

Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.