ONE ENCHANTED BEING: NEUROEXISTENTIALISM AND MEANING

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World is my attempt to explain whether and how existential meaning is possible in a material world, and how such meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Neuroexistentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin plus neuroscience. The prospects for our kind of being-in-the-world are limited by our natures as smart but fully embodied short-lived animals. Many find this picture disenchanting, even depressing. I respond to four criticisms of my relentless upbeat naturalism: that naturalism can make no room for norms, for values; that I overvalue truth at the expense of happiness; that I underestimate the extent to which supernaturalism has made peace with naturalism; and that I can give no account for why humans as finite animals should want to overcome our given natures and seek impersonal, self-transcendent value.     

ON NATURALIZING THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.     

A Review of: Growing Up With Autism: Working With School-Age Children and Adolescents With Autism,edited by Robin L. Gabriels and Dina E. Hill (Eds.).

The influence of adult presence, peer smiling, and peer praise on the unprogrammed generalization of physical sharing over time was investigated. During free play three groups of five preschool children were taught to share toys via a behavioral training package composed of instructions, modeling, behavior rehearsal, prompts, and praise. Immediately following free play the children were given art materials and observed in the presence of different adults. An ABA design with a manipulation of adult presence nested within east phase was used. For all three groups, regardless of the adult presence manipulation, treatment facilitated sharing in both settings. In addition, two groups continued to share in both settings after termination of the training. The presence of an adult was necessary for unprogrammed maintenance of treatment gains in both settings whereas peer smiling and peer praise were not. Observer presence suppressed physical sharing and smiling prior to, during, and after treatment. Implications for behavioral assessment and applied significance are discussed.     

Brief Book,Software, and Test Announcements

This study extended previous cross-cultural work regarding the tripartite model of anxiety and depression by developing Serbian translations of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale for Children (PANAS–C), the Physiological Hyperarousal Scale for Children (PH–C), and the Affect and Arousal Scale (AFARS). Characteristics of the scales were examined using 449 students (M age = 12.61 years). Applying item retention criteria established in other studies, PH–C, PANAS–C, and AFARS translations with psychometric properties similar to English-language versions were identified. Preliminary validation of the scales was conducted using a subset of 194 students (M age = 12.37 years) who also completed measures of anxiety and depression. Estimates of reliability, patterns of correlations among scales, and age and gender differences were consistent with previous studies with English-speaking samples. Findings regarding scale validity were mixed, although consistent with existing literature. Serbian translations of the PH–C, PANAS–C, and AFARS mirror the original English-language scales in terms of both strengths and weaknesses.     

PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter ) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God's memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.     

THE PASSIONS OF PUNISHMENT

I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotions and of their associated behaviors that are consistent with Abolitionism, the view that punishment is unjustified.     

DAVIDSON AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: PARATAXIS AND SELF-EXPRESSION

Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.