Grounding nonexistence

ABSTRACT

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental.     

Comments on a standardized version of Luria's tests

Appreciation is expressed for the work of Golden's group in the selection of Luria's tests, the standardization of their administration, the collection of norms, and the evaluation of the reliability and validity of the Luria-Nebraska test battery. However, questions are raised concerning the ability of the test to efficiently handle topical diagnosis and to construct rehabilitation programs. Concern is expressed over the possible vulgarization of Luria's doctrine of functional systems and the loss of predictive power in Luria's tests through neglect of qualitative information and methodology. Suggestions are made as to how Luria's qualitative methodology might be incorporated in a standardized version of a neuropsychological examination.     

Of mice and men: The comparative assumption in psychology

Surprisingly, little theoretical attention has so far been paid to the ‘Comparative Assumption’: the attempt to extrapolate from species to species in psychology (and particularly to the human species). This paper examines the problems and the possibilities inherent in the Comparative Assumption. Perhaps the most important conclusion of the paper is that much more work is needed on this intriguing question.