Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.     

Information Density and Dependency Length as Complementary Cognitive Models

Certain English constructions permit two syntactic alternations.

1. a. I looked up the number. b. I looked the number up.
2. a. He is often at the office. b. He often is at the office.

This study investigates the relationship between syntactic alternations and processing difficulty. What cognitive mechanisms are responsible for our attraction to some alternations and our aversion to others? This article reviews three psycholinguistic models of the relationship between syntactic alternations and processing: Maximum Per Word Surprisal (building on the ideas of Hale, in Proceedings of the 2nd Meeting of the North American chapter of the association for computational linguistics. Association for Computational Linguistics, Pittsburgh, PA, pp 159–166, 2001), Uniform Information Density (UID) (Levy and Jaeger in Adv Neural Inf Process Syst 19:849–856, 2007; inter alia), and Dependency Length Minimization (DLM) (Gildea and Temperley in Cognit Sci 34:286–310, 2010). Each theory makes predictions about which alternations native speakers should favor. Subjects were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk and asked to judge which of two competing syntactic alternations sounded more natural. Logistic regression analysis on the resulting data suggests that both UID and DLM are powerful predictors of human preferences. We conclude that alternations that approach uniform information density and minimize dependency length are easier to process than those that do not.     

Neural and behavioral correlates of visual recognition memory in 4- and 8-month-old infants.

The neural and behavioral correlates of the 4- and 8-month-old infant's ability to distinguish between frequently and infrequently presented familiar and novel events was examined. Cortical event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded as infants were familiarized to two faces. During the test trials that followed, one of these faces was presented frequently, and the other infrequently; on each of the remaining 20% of the trials, a previously unseen, novel face was presented. Following the ERP phase, infants' looking times were recorded to pairs of faces, some of which had been seen during the ERP testing, and some of which had not. At 4 months the ERP activity invoked by the three classes of events was similar, suggesting that infants were unable to distinguish among them. At 8 months the ERP activity differed only between the Infrequent Novel events and the two classes of familiar events, but did not differ between the frequently and infrequently presented familiar events. The ERP findings complement previously reported data from 6-month-old infants in describing a trend whereby infants become increasingly able to respond to stimuli on the basis of whether they have been seen before, and not on the basis of how often they had been seen. The behavioral data at both 4 and 8 months were less clear cut than the ERP data. These findings are discussed in the context of the neural and cognitive processes involved in dissociating probability information from novelty detection.     

Longitudinal changes in behavioral approach system sensitivity and brain structures involved in reward processing during adolescence

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 48(5) of Developmental Psychology (see record 2012-09244-001). Figure 2 was distorted in production. The correct version is presented in the erratum.] Adolescence is a period of radical normative changes and increased risk for substance use, mood disorders, and physical injury. Researchers have proposed that increases in reward sensitivity (i.e., sensitivity of the behavioral approach system [BAS]) and/or increases in reactivity to all emotional stimuli (i.e., reward and threat sensitivities) lead to these phenomena. The present study is the first longitudinal investigation of changes in reward (i.e., BAS) sensitivity in 9- to 23-year-olds across a 2-year follow-up. Support was found for increased reward sensitivity from early to late adolescence, and evidence was found for decline in the early 20s. This decline is combined with a decrease in left nucleus accumbens (Nacc) volume, a key structure for reward processing, from the late teens into the early 20s. Furthermore, we found longitudinal increases in sensitivity to reward to be predicted by individual differences in the Nacc and medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) volumes at baseline in this developmental sample. Similarly, increases in sensitivity to threat (i.e., behavioral inhibition system sensitivity) were qualified by sex, with only females participants experiencing this increase, and predicted by individual differences in lateral OFC volumes at baseline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

When does ‘Can’ imply ‘Ought’?

ABSTRACT

The Assistance Principle is common currency to a wide range of moral theories. Roughly, this principle states: if you can fulfil important interests, at not too high a cost, then you have a moral duty to do so. I argue that, in determining whether the ‘not too high a cost’ clause of this principle is met, we must consider three distinct costs: ‘agent-relative costs’, ‘recipient-relative costs’ and ‘ideal-relative costs’.