Effects of prior agonistic experience on risk assessment and approach behavior evoked by familiar or unfamiliar conspecific odors

Risk assessment and appetitive behaviors in response to familiar and unfamiliar conspecific odors were measured in mice rendered dominant or subordinate by a series of resident-intruder encounters. Subordinate mice showed elevated levels of risk assessment in response to the odors of both familiar dominant and unfamiliar males. These behaviors were almost totally absent among dominant males exposed to familiar subordinate or unfamiliar male odors. Subordinate mice showed a marginally significant elevation in latencies to approach familiar, but not unfamiliar, dominant odors. Dominant and subordinate mice spent comparable amounts of time in the cage area containing familiar antagonist odors, however, and the durations of subordinates were mildly elevated, rather than decreased, when unfamiliar conspecific odors were present. There were no group differences in any of the appetitive behaviors. These findings suggest that apparent preferences for conspecific odors may arise from quantitatively and/or qualitatively differing emotional states. The inclusion of risk assessment measures is suggested to be a useful adjunct for studies of olfactory preference/rejection. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

THE USE OF REBT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training, coaching, and consulting with people in leadership roles can be a primary consulting function for clinicians. In this paper, the authors describe their model of leadership, and what they believe to be the central personality or character components of leadership necessary for producing extraordinary results. Throughout they will show where and how REBT skills can make a significant contribution.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Cracking the mirror: on Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship

In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.     

“Primary Relations” In a New Foundational Axiomatic Framework

The new system of axioms we propose is based on the foundational theory of De Giorgi et al. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Preprints di Matematica 26: 1 (1996) slightly modified. In that paper (which is dedicated to a new axiomatic framework for mathematics, informatics and logic) the authors use two kinds of primitive notions: relations and qualities. Since their system is based on the distribution paradigm, they start from distinction. We propose to shift the perspective and to start from unity and then from within unity to pass to distinction; to this end we apply ideas of Lesniewski, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 44 (1992). We introduce only one kind of entity as a primitive notion, namely relations, and treat qualities as articulations of relations. The new concept of “primary relation” permits the introduction of a dynamic, non-standard form of identity, which we hope will find application in various fields where self-referential structures are required.