White guilt and racial compensation: the benefits and limits of self-focus

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.     

Hypnotic control of attention in the Stroop task: a historical footnote

Raz, Shapiro, Fan, and Posner (2002) have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say "green"), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a "case study" from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis.     

Implicit activation of alcohol concepts by negative affective cues distinguishes between problem drinkers with high and low psychiatric distress.

This study tested the hypothesis that negative affective (NEG) cues activate alcohol concepts more strongly in problem drinkers with high rather than low psychiatric distress (PD) and that a parallel difference applies to activation of NEG concepts by alcohol cues. A lexical decision task assessed memory activation in 36 problem drinkers with high vs. low scores on the Symptom Checklist-90. High PD drinkers displayed activation in each condition; low PD drinkers displayed inhibition. Activation of alcohol concepts by NEG cues correlated with intensity of PD, bias to drink in NEG states, and confidence to avoid drinking in these states. Results corroborate in vivo cue reactivity studies and indicate a functional difference between problem drinkers with high and low PD.     

Dilution, not load, affects distractor processing

Lavie and Tsal (1994) proposed that spare attentional capacity is allocated involuntarily to the processing of irrelevant stimuli, thereby enabling interference. Under this view, when task demands increase, spare capacity should decrease and distractor interference should decrease. In support, Lavie and Cox (1997) found that increasing perceptual load by increasing search set size decreased interference from an irrelevant distractor. In three experiments, we manipulated the cue set size (number of cued locations) independently of the display set size (number of letters presented). Increasing the display set size reduced distractor interference regardless of whether the additional letters were relevant to the task. In contrast, increasing the cue set size increased distractor interference. Both findings are inconsistent with the load explanation, but are consistent with a proposed two-stage dilution account.     

Anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety

Trait anxiety is an individual-difference variable reflecting variation in state-anxiety elevations resulting from exposure to a stressor. It is usually measured using questionnaire instruments, such as the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T). The present research conceptually distinguishes, and independently assesses, two hypothetical dimensions of anxiety vulnerability which, it is argued, could plausibly make independent contributions to variance in trait-anxiety scores. These dimensions are anxiety reactivity, the probability of experiencing an anxiety reaction to a stressor, and anxiety perseveration, the persistence of anxiety symptoms once elicited. Participants were asked three questions about each STAI-T item. The traditional STAI-T question assessed how much of the time this symptom was experienced; the anxiety-reactivity question assessed the probability of experiencing the symptom in response to a stressor; and the anxiety-perseveration question assessed how long the symptom persisted, if elicited. Regression analysis determined that anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration scores both accounted for independent variance in trait-anxiety scores. It is argued that models of anxiety vulnerability should seek to differentiate both the causes and the consequences of elevated anxiety reactivity and increased anxiety perseveration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism

Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Comment on “Visual layout modulates Fitts’s law: The importance of first and last positions”

Pratt, Adam, and Fischer (2007) investigated the effect of surrounding targets on the time it took to move to an individual target and found that the movement time to a central target was above the Fitts’s law line related to the first and last targets. They explained their results in terms of a “visuomotor hypothesis.” Here, an alternative explanation is given in terms of a previously validated model of the “available target width” that is determined by the size of the target and the width of the finger pad that is being used to hit the target.