Individual differences in delay discounting: relation to intelligence, working memory, and anterior prefrontal cortex

Lower delay discounting (better self-control) is linked to higher intelligence, but the basis of this relation is uncertain. To investigate the potential role of working memory (WM) processes, we assessed delay discounting, intelligence (g), WM (span tasks, 3-back task), and WM-related neural activity (using functional magnetic resonance imaging) in 103 healthy adults. Delay discounting was negatively correlated with g and WM. WM explained no variance in delay discounting beyond that explained by g, which suggests that processes through which WM relates to delay discounting are shared by g. WM-related neural activity in left anterior prefrontal cortex (Brodmann's area 10) covaried with g, r= .26, and delay discounting, r=-.40, and partially mediated the relation between g and delay discounting. Overall, the results suggest that delay discounting is associated with intelligence in part because of processes instantiated in anterior prefrontal cortex, a region known to support the integration of diverse information.     

Getting technical about awareness

It has recently been argued that post-decision wagering provides an objective measure of awareness. We critically evaluate this claim, emphasizing the distinction between performance without awareness and a reluctance to gamble in full awareness of weak sensory evidence. We address two key methodological issues. The first is the design of the pay-off matrix to reward a strategy of wagering that reflects the strength of sensory evidence. The second is the use of signal detection theory to analyze the resulting data. We argue that proper treatment of these issues is essential if post-decision wagering is to prove valuable in validating claims of perception without awareness in normal subjects and neuropsychological patients.     

Prepared for the worst: readiness to acquire threat bias and susceptibility to elevate trait anxiety

Although people differ in their susceptibility to elevate trait anxiety in response to extended stress, little is known about the cognitive substrate of this particular individual difference. We report three studies designed to evaluate the hypothesis that individual differences in readiness to acquire an attentional bias toward threat cues, in response to a contingency that makes the acquisition of such a bias adaptive, underlie individual differences in susceptibility to elevate trait anxiety in response to extended stress. Our findings confirm that the ease with which such a threat bias can be transiently evoked by experimental conditions that encourage its acquisition predicts the degree to which trait anxiety later becomes elevated by extended exposure to a mild stressor. Furthermore, this reflects the fact that such early measures of attentional bias plasticity predict the later naturalistic acquisition of attentional bias in response to subsequent stress, which in turn is associated with a consequent increase in trait anxiety level. These findings are consistent with our proposed account of individual differences in susceptibility to elevate trait anxiety in response to stress.     

The morality of harm

In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117-131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.     

Revolutionary Claims and Visions in Psychotherapy: An Anthropathological Perspective

Consideration of the semantic problem of revolution in psychotherapy is followed by some justifications for a critical and subjective approach to this discussion. Alleged revolutions in the field are critically examined, followed by an envisaged revolution and its possible ingredients. Attention is paid to the concept of a revolutionary new human, with affective-somatic and embodied-mystical examples given. Obstacles to such revolution are briefly examined and the concept of universal human sickness or anthropathology is discussed, along with the notion of an anti-anthropathological revolution.     

Affectionate Writing Reduces Total Cholesterol: Two Randomized,Controlled Trials

In two 5‐week trials, healthy college students were randomly assigned either to experimental or control groups. Participants in the experimental groups wrote about their affection for significant friends, relatives, and/or romantic partners for 20 minutes on three separate occasions; on the same schedule, those in the control groups wrote about innocuous topics. Total cholesterol was assessed via capillary blood at the beginning of the trials and again at the end. Participants in the experimental groups experienced statistically significant reductions in total cholesterol. Control participants in the first study experienced a significant increase during the same period, whereas those in the second study did not. Cholesterol changes were largely unmoderated by linguistic features of the writing produced in the intervention. Potential therapeutic implications are discussed.     

Logic with numbers

Many people regard utility theory as the only rigorous foundation for subjective probability, and even de Finetti thought the betting approach supplemented by Dutch Book arguments only good as an approximation to a utility-theoretic account. I think that there are good reasons to doubt this judgment, and I propose an alternative, in which the probability axioms are consistency constraints on distributions of fair betting quotients. The idea itself is hardly new: it is in de Finetti and also Ramsey. What is new is that it is shown that probabilistic consistency and consequence can be defined in a way formally analogous to the way these notions are defined in deductive (propositional) logic. The result is a free-standing logic which does not pretend to be a theory of rationality and is therefore immune to, among other charges, that of “logical omniscience”.     

Capturing conceptual implicit memory: The time it takes to produce an association

Conceptual implicit memory is demonstrated when, in the absence of explicit retrieval, performance on a task requiring conceptual processing benefits more from prior conceptual encoding than from prior nonconceptual encoding. In the present study, we sought to provide an improved measure of conceptual implicit memory by minimizing contamination from explicit retrieval. On a modified word association test, participants free-associated to the actually studied items, with response time to produce any associate serving as the dependent measure. Experiment 1 varied whether words were read or generated at study and showed that generated words were associated to more quickly than were read words. Experiment 2 varied level of processing at study and showed that words processed semantically were associated to more quickly than were words processed nonsemantically. With modifications to ensure its implicit nature, a conceptual implicit test can be consistently affected by the same encoding manipulations as those that affect conceptual explicit memory tests.