Detecting and identifying offset gaze

A number of experiments have demonstrated that observers can accurately identify stimuli that they fail to detect (Rollman and Nachmias, 1972; Harris and Fahle, 1995; Allik et al. 1982, 2014). Using a 2x2AFC double judgements procedure, we demonstrated an analogous pattern of performance in making judgements about the direction of eye gaze. Participants were shown two faces in succession: one with direct gaze and one with gaze offset to the left or right. We found that they could identify the direction of gaze offset (left/right) better than they could detect which face contained the offset gaze. A simple Thurstonian model, under which the detection judgement is shown to be more computationally complex, was found to explain the empirical data. A further experiment incorporated metacognitive ratings into the double judgements procedure to measure observers’ metacognitive awareness (Meta-d’) across the two judgements and to assess whether observers were aware of the evidence for offset gaze when detection performance was at and below threshold. Results suggest that metacognitive awareness is tied to performance, with approximately equal Meta-d’ across the two judgements, when sensitivity is taken into account. These results show that both performance and metacognitive awareness rely not only on the strength of sensory evidence but also on the computational complexity of the decision, which determines the relative distance of that evidence from the decision axes.     

From encyclopedia to ontology: toward dynamic representation of the discipline of philosophy

The application of digital humanities techniques to philosophy is changing the way scholars approach the discipline. This paper seeks to open a discussion about the difficulties, methods, opportunities, and dangers of creating and utilizing a formal representation of the discipline of philosophy. We review our current project, the Indiana Philosophy Ontology (InPhO) project, which uses a combination of automated methods and expert feedback to create a dynamic computational ontology for the discipline of philosophy. We argue that our distributed, expert-based approach to modeling the discipline carries substantial practical and philosophical benefits over alternatives. We also discuss challenges facing our project (and any other similar project) as well as the future directions for digital philosophy afforded by formal modeling.     

Mirror,Mirror in the Brain,What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?

Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher‐order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so‐called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher‐order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view.     

The person in political emotion

Recent social psychological theory and research on political issues has returned to once-popular concepts such as political emotion and ideology. Strikingly, however, this work tends to avoid the notion of personality and explicit reference to individual differences. For example, the numerous studies that examine correlations between political beliefs, feelings, and preferences rarely acknowledge that such associations show an ideological coherence in individuals. Instead, correlations between abstract constructs are interpreted as suggesting causal processes. Individuals, and their responses, are aggregated to generate such correlations but remain for the most part unexamined and unmentioned. I discuss 5 practices in research and reporting that make it difficult to find the person in correlational models of political emotion. I use my own research to illustrate these practices and to show how attention to macrolevel forces such as group membership, status, and structure may be integrated with attention to the individual person and meaningful aggregates.     

Evidence from masked‐priming that initial identification of brand names is via abstract letter identities

Although visual‐word recognition is often assumed to proceed on the basis of case‐invariant letter representations, previous research has shown a role for letter‐case in recognizing brand names. One recent study reported early effects of letter‐case in a brand‐decision task using masked primes (Perea et al., 2015, British Journal of Psychology, 106, 162). The present study attempts to replicate this finding using brand names typically presented in all lowercase (e.g., adidas), all uppercase (e.g., IKEA), or titlecase (e.g., Ford). Across three masked‐priming experiments, we found no advantage for case‐matched identity primes over case‐mismatched identity primes. This finding suggests that brand‐specific letter‐case information does not play a role in the early processing of brand names. However, we observed evidence that case may be used as a cue for making brand decisions, which may explain the effect reported by Perea et al. (2015, British Journal of Psychology, 106, 162).     

Ballot Photographs as Cues in Low‐Information Elections

In low‐information elections, voters are often faced with the task of choosing from a list of unknown candidates. By examining a set of low‐information elections where candidate photographs were displayed on the ballot, we test how first impressions of candidates can influence election outcomes. We find that attractive candidates are more likely to be attributed the qualities associated with successful politicians and these trait inferences, based on facial appearances, influence the outcomes of elections. We also find that these trait inferences are based on physical characteristics of the candidates, such as age, race and ethnicity, evident from a photograph. Therefore, first impressions can be important determinants of election outcomes, especially in low‐information elections.     

Plasticity of the association between visual space and action space in a blind-walking task

Many experiments have shown that a brief visual preview provides sufficient information to complete certain kinds of movements (reaching, grasping, and walking) with high precision. This suggests that participants must possess a calibration between visual target location and the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive, and/or vestibular stimulation generated during movement towards the target. We investigated the properties of this calibration using a cue-conflict paradigm in which participants were trained with mismatched locomotor and visual input. After training, participants were presented with visual targets and were asked to either walk to them or locate them in a spatial updating task. Our results showed that the training was sufficient to produce significant, systematic miscalibrations of the association between visual space and action space. These findings suggest that the association between action space and visual space is modifiable by experience. This plasticity could be either due to modification of a simple, task-specific sensory motor association or it could reflect a change in the gain of a path integration signal or a reorganisation of the relationship between perceived space and action space. We suggest further experiments that might help to distinguish between these possibilities.     

‘The Inner Citadels of the Color Line’: Mapping the Micro‐Ecology of Racial Segregation in Everyday Life Spaces

The role of racial segregation in perpetuating racial prejudice and inequality has been widely investigated by social scientists. Most research has concentrated on the macro‐sociological organization of institutions of residence, education and employment. In this paper, we suggest that such work may be usefully complemented by research that investigates the so‐called ‘micro‐ecology of segregation’ in everyday life spaces – the dynamic, largely informal network of social practices through which individuals maintain racial isolation within settings where members of other race groups are physically co‐present. Developing this argument, we discuss some historical examples of research on the micro‐ecological dimension of race segregation in the United States. We also draw examples from an ongoing program of work on everyday practices of contact and segregation in post‐apartheid South Africa. The paper concludes by exploring some conceptual and methodological implications of treating racial segregation as a micro‐ecological practice.     

Group Membership as a ‘Frame of Reference’ for Interpersonal Comparison

Although individuals may view themselves as part of a group (e.g., couple, a family, or a nationality) when comparing to others, most contemporary theory and research in psychology focuses on the interpersonal comparisons that individuals make to other individuals. The prevailing view is quite individually oriented as it emphasizes the closeness between individuals as the most important basis of interpersonal comparison. However, membership in a meaningful ‘reference group’ typically frames interpersonal comparison, even where individuals do not consciously attend to the group. This makes individuals especially likely to make interpersonal comparisons to other members of their reference group and for these comparisons to be especially affecting psychologically. These are the central tenets of reference group theory ( Hyman, 1942 ; Merton, 1957 ). In this paper, we use reference group theory to highlight the role of group membership in what otherwise appear to be individually oriented interpersonal comparisons.     

Distinguishing automatic and controlled components of attitudes from direct and indirect measurement methods

Distinct automatic and controlled processes are presumed to influence social evaluation. Most empirical approaches examine automatic processes using indirect methods, and controlled processes using direct methods. We distinguished processes from measurement methods to test whether a process distinction is more useful than a measurement distinction for taxonomies of attitudes. Results from two studies suggest that automatic components of attitudes can be measured directly. Direct measures of automatic attitudes were reports of gut reactions (Study 1) and behavioral performance in a speeded self-report task (Study 2). Confirmatory factor analyses comparing two-factor models revealed better fits when self-reports of gut reactions and speeded self-reports shared a factor with automatic measures versus sharing a factor with controlled self-report measures. Thus, distinguishing attitudes by the processes they are presumed to measure (automatic versus controlled) is more meaningful than distinguishing based on the directness of measurement.