Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-Regulation

We review a growing body of literature that evidences the reciprocal relationship between body and mind, known as embodied cognition. We argue that an embodied mind may serve a functional purpose, aiding in self-regulatory processes. Specifically, we suggest that embodied cognition assists in self-regulation by increasing signal strength, encouraging appropriate goal-relevant action, and incorporating situational constraints to cue appropriate information processing styles. Furthermore, we propose that affect serves as the link between an embodied mind and self-regulatory action. Finally, we situate this research in debates on theories of mind, and we advocate for a highly interactive system that integrates information across modalities.     

What is a “schedule of reinforcement”?

Several ambiguities in the present terminology of behavior theory obscure some important theoretical assumptions and experimental details in current research. Left unclarified, such ambiguities impede the accurate analysis of laboratory procedures, and prevent reliable communication among researchers. This paper focuses on the term “schedule of reinforcement.” It points out that two distinguishable operational rules are implicated in the term: in the case where reinforcement is of the so-called response contingent type, the “schedule” is really a rule to identify the response to be reinforced; in the case of non-contingent reinforcement, the “schedule” is truly a rule for delivery of reinforcement. Other terminological ambiguities that are encountered in a discussion of this term include “reinforcement” and “intermittency.” A resolution of these problems will necessarily involve the procedures of non-contingent reinforcement, and the parameter of reinforcement probability.     

Family connectedness and women's sexual risk behaviors: implications for the prevention/intervention of STD/HIV infection

The present study explores the relationship between connectedness with the intergenerational family and women's sexual risk-taking as a guide to the development of family-focused prevention and intervention. Cross-sectional interview data from a pilot study were analyzed for correlations between a number of self-reported, risky sexual practices, the range of extended family members with whom the respondent was in contact, and awareness of stories pertaining to intergenerational family history. Structured interviews were administered by female interviewers to 56 women from two contexts: a STD (sexually transmitted disease) Clinic (N = 26), and an inner-city, Hispanic Community Organization (N = 30). Knowledge of stories about grandparents or great-grandparents was a robust predictor of lower sexual risk-taking in the STD Clinic sample. This relationship persisted, but only at the trend level in the Community Organization sample. In both the total sample and the STD subsample, the number of categories of extended family members with whom a respondent was in at least monthly contact was correlated with less sexual risk-taking. Given the fundamental importance of the family system as the primary social unit, these findings argue for further family theory-based research and for its potential application in the development of health prevention and intervention. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.     

The long-term effect of high- and low-rate responding histories on fixed-interval responding in rats

Tell rats were given extended lever-press training on a fixed-interval (FI) 30-s food reinforcement schedule from the outset or following exposure to one or two previous reinforcement schedules. For 4 rats the previots schedule was either fixed-ratio 20, which generated high response rates, or differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate 20 s, which produced low response rates. For 4 additional rats the extended training on FI 30 s was preceded by experience with two schedules: fixed-ratio 20 followed by differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate 20 s; or the same two schedules in the reverse order. Fixed-interval response rates were initially affected by the immediately preceding schedule, but after 80 to 100 sessions, all traces of prior schedule history had disappeared. The results also showed no long-term effect of schedule history on the interfood-interval patterns of responding on the FI 30-s schedule. These results support one of the most central tenets of the experimental analysis of behavior: control by the immediate consequences of behavior.     

Emotional and deliberative reactions to a public crisis: Mad Cow disease in France

Although most theories of choice are cognitive, recent research has emphasized the role of emotions. We used a novel context--the Mad Cow crisis in France--to investigate how emotions alter choice even when consequences are held constant. A field study showed that individuals reduced beef consumption in months after many newspaper articles featured the emotional label "Mad Cow," but beef consumption was unaffected after articles featured scientific labels for the same disease. The reverse pattern held for the disease-related actions of a government bureaucracy. A lab study showed that the Mad Cow label induces people to make choices based solely on emotional reactions, whereas scientific labels induce people to consider their own probability judgments. Although the Mad Cow label produces less rational behavior than scientific labels, it is two to four times more common in the environment.     

Object onset and parvocellular guidance of attentional allocation

The parvocellular visual pathway in the primate brain is known to be involved with the processing of color. However, a subject of debate is whether an abrupt change in color, conveyed via this pathway, is capable of automatically attracting attention. It has been shown that the appearance of new objects defined solely by color is indeed capable of modulating attention. However, given evidence suggesting that the visual system is particularly sensitive to new onsets, it is unclear to what extent such results reflect effects of color change per se, rather than effects of object onset. We assessed attentional capture by color change that occurred as a result of either new objects appearing or already-present "old" objects changing color. Results showed that although new object onsets accrued attention, changing the color of old objects did not. We conclude that abrupt color change per se is not sufficient to capture attention.     

The closing of the theory of mind: A critique of perspective-taking

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another’s viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the “pictorial” theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.