Uses and misuses of habituation and related preference paradigms

Houston‐Price and Nakai raise an important problem researchers face when attempting to interpret infant visual preference data. This problem stems from paradigms in which infants are only partially familiarized to a stimulus, and it is unclear whether they should show a novelty or familiarity preference to that stimulus in a subsequent test. As Hunter and Ames' (1988) noted in their important chapter, infants will sometimes show a familiarity preference rather than a novelty preference, particularly when the infants are relatively young and the stimuli are relatively complex. In this commentary, I shall make three points regarding this issue: first, that the familiarity preference problem is real; second, that in most cases there is a simple solution to the problem; and third that certain popular infant paradigms can exacerbate the problem. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Natural-scene perception requires attention

Is visual attention required for visual consciousness? In the past decade, many researchers have claimed that awareness can arise in the absence of attention. This claim is largely based on the notion that natural scene (or "gist") perception occurs without attention. This article presents evidence against this idea. We show that when observers perform a variety of demanding, sustained-attention tasks, inattentional blindness occurs for natural scenes. In addition, scene perception is impaired under dual-task conditions, but only when the primary task is sufficiently demanding. This finding suggests that previous studies that have been interpreted as demonstrating scene perception without attention failed to fully engage attention and that natural-scene perception does indeed require attention. Thus, natural-scene perception is not a preattentive process and cannot be used to support the idea of awareness without attention.     

Pain Intensity,Psychological Inflexibility,and Acceptance of Pain as Predictors of Functioning in Adolescents with Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis: A Preliminary Investigation

Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis (JIA) is a chronic rheumatic disease associated with pain and maladjustment. This study investigated whether pain, acceptance of pain, and psychological inflexibility uniquely predicted functional disability, anxiety, general quality of life (QOL), and health-related quality of life (HQOL) among adolescents with JIA. Twenty-three adolescents with JIA and pain were recruited from a pediatric rheumatology clinic. Participants completed self-report measures pertaining to the key study variables. A series of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that higher pain uniquely predicted higher functional disability. Greater psychological inflexibility uniquely predicted higher anxiety, lower general QOL, and lower HQOL. Increases in acceptance of pain were found to be uniquely related to increases in general QOL. These data confirm prior findings that pain impacts functioning, and provide preliminary findings that psychological inflexibility and acceptance may be important targets of psychological intervention for youth with JIA and pain to improve functioning and QOL.     

Object-based representations govern both the storage of information in visual short-term memory and the retrieval of information from it

Interest is growing in how information is retained in visual short-term memory (VSTM). We describe an experiment that assesses VSTM within the context of multidimensional signal detection theory. On every trial, participants were presented with a 250-ms display containing four colored shapes. They were then probed 900 ms later with a colored shape and made separate old/new judgments about the color and the shape. In any particular trial, one, both, or neither of the probed features had been presented. Performance differed according to whether both probed features belonged to a single object or to two different objects. When both probed features belonged to the same object, featural retrieval was better than would be predicted by independent feature storage. When both probed features belonged to two different objects, featural retrieval was worse than would be predicted by independent feature storage. We conclude that storage in and retrieval from VSTM operate on the basis of object-based representations.     

Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.     

The intention interference effect

Intentions have been shown to be more accessible (e.g., more quickly and accurately recalled) compared to other sorts of to-be-remembered information; a result termed an intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In the current study, we demonstrate an intention interference effect (IIE) in which color-naming performance in a Stroop task was slower for words belonging to an intention that participants had to remember to carry out (Do-the-Task condition) versus an intention that did not have to be executed (Ignore-the-Task condition). In previous work (e.g., Cohen et al., 2005), having a prospective intention in mind was confounded with carrying a memory load. In Experiment 1, we added a digit-retention task to control for effects of cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we eliminated the memory confound in a new way, by comparing intention-related and control words within each trial. Results from both Experiments 1 and 2 revealed an IIE suggesting that interference is very specific to the intention, not just to a memory load.     

What should we expect after the next attack?

A test of any science is its ability to predict events under specified conditions. A test for the psychology represented in this special issue of the American Psychologist is its ability to predict individual and social behavior in the aftermath of a next terror attack. This article draws on that science to make such predictions. These predictions are conditioned on both the nature of the attack and our institutional preparations for it. Some attacks will test our resilience more than others. Whatever the attack, we will reduce its impacts if our institutions take advantage of psychological science. That science can reduce the scope of attacks by limiting terrorists' ability to organize their operations and by enhancing our ability to restrain them. It can reduce the impacts of any attacks that do occur by strengthening the institutions and civil society that must respond to them. Realizing these possibilities will require our social institutions to rely on science, rather than intuition, in dealing with these threats. It will require our profession to provide psychologists with rewards for public service, applied research, and interdisciplinary collaboration, as demanded by complex problems. Responding to these challenges could strengthen society and psychology.     

The what–where trade-off in multiple-identity tracking

Observers are poor at reporting the identities of objects that they have successfully tracked (Pylyshyn, Visual Cognition, 11, 801-822, 2004; Scholl & Pylyshyn, Cognitive Psychology, 38, 259-290, 1999). Consequently, it has been claimed that objects are tracked in a manner that does not encode their identities (Pylyshyn, 2004). Here, we present evidence that disputes this claim. In a series of experiments, we show that attempting to track the identities of objects can decrease an observer's ability to track the objects' locations. This indicates that the mechanisms that track, respectively, the locations and identities of objects draw upon a common resource. Furthermore, we show that this common resource can be voluntarily distributed between the two mechanisms. This is clear evidence that the location- and identity-tracking mechanisms are not entirely dissociable.