THE USE OF ADVOCACY AND CONFRONTATION COUNSELING THE DISADVANTAGED

Middle-class counselors and disadvantaged clients appear to be alienated due to a basic difference in values. This alienation can be overcome by the counselor assuming the role of “social advocate.” Several examples are given to illustrate how social advocacy might be utilized. As the counseling relationship develops, and the client's trust and confidence strengthen, the counselor can begin to assert himself and confront the client concerning the unsolvable problems he presents as reasons for his unemployment and failure. Some differences exist as to counseling needs on the basis of sex and ethnic background. The confrontation program described would seem to be more effective with disadvantaged men than with disadvantaged women.     

Addition in kindergarten: The role of mothers’ and teachers’ language

Data from a longitudinal investigation were used to examine the effects of mothers’ and teachers’ language on children’s developing mathematical competencies during the kindergarten year. Specifically, 1) mothers’ use of metamemory talk, or references to the process of remembering, and 2) teachers’ use of cognitive processing language (CPL), or instruction that encourages deep levels of processing and metacognition, were related to students’ addition skills in kindergarten. The findings indicated that while maternal metamemory talk was associated with children’s mathematical competencies at school entry, teachers’ use of CPL was associated with the amount of growth that students demonstrated across the year, especially regarding strategy use. The results highlight the need for additional research that examines students’ academic trajectories longitudinally as a function of the language to which they are exposed at home and school.     

Pattern of Neuropsychological Deficit at Age Five Years Following Neonatal Unilateral Brain Injury

The pattern of language deficit following left-hemisphere brain injury and visual/spatial deficit following right-hemisphere injury in an adult or older child is well recognized, but has been inconsistently reported following presumed neonatal brain injury. Our prospective study of 24 children at age 5 with documented neonatal unilateral brain injury lends support to the theory of hemisphere specialization at the time of birth. Twelve children who had unilateral left-hemisphere lesion were compared to 12 children with unilateral right-hemisphere lesion of similar timing and severity. Relative visual/spatial deficit following right-hemisphere lesion and receptive language deficit following left-hemisphere lesion were identified. Lateralized measures of grip strength, fine motor speed, and fine motor dexterity were not significantly different between the groups for either hand in this nonhemiparetic study sample. Only one child with a left-hemisphere lesion was left-handed, and only one child (right-lesion) had a hemiparesis.     

Simple and choice reaction time methods in the study of motor programming

In an extensive series of experiments Sternberg, Monsell, Knoll, and Wright (1978) reported that simple RT increased as a linear function of the number of items to be pronounced or typed. The present experiments replicate a portion of these results, but show that the effect is less general than may have been supposed. Since the effect does not occur in every case in which a response programming interpretation would predict it, this interpretation must be rejected. This conclusion is consistent with the viewpoint that response programming should be investigated in a choice- rather than simple-RT paradigm. In this view, motivated subjects can program responses in advance of the simple-RT interval because the particular response to be made has been precued. Effects of response parameters which are observed for motivated subjects in the simple-RT paradigm, such as those reported by Sternberg et al. (1978), should be attributed to processes other than programming motor responses.     

Thinking about luck

Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that due to Nicholas Rescher. I also assess some novel analyses of luck that incorporate plausible elements of Pritchard’s and Rescher’s accounts.     

Asymptotically distribution-free (ADF) interval estimation of coefficient alpha

The point estimate of sample coefficient alpha may provide a misleading impression of the reliability of the test score. Because sample coefficient alpha is consistently biased downward, it is more likely to yield a misleading impression of poor reliability. The magnitude of the bias is greatest precisely when the variability of sample alpha is greatest (small population reliability and small sample size). Taking into account the variability of sample alpha with an interval estimator may lead to retaining reliable tests that would be otherwise rejected. Here, the authors performed simulation studies to investigate the behavior of asymptotically distribution-free (ADF) versus normal-theory interval estimators of coefficient alpha under varied conditions. Normal-theory intervals were found to be less accurate when item skewness >1 or excess kurtosis >1. For sample sizes over 100 observations, ADF intervals are preferable, regardless of item skewness and kurtosis. A formula for computing ADF confidence intervals for coefficient alpha for tests of any size is provided, along with its implementation as an SAS macro.     

Impaired Fear Recognition and Social Anxiety Symptoms in Adolescence

This study represents the first examination of adolescent anxiety in relation to peer emotion recognition, rather than adult emotion recognition. Additionally, we examine potential mechanisms for the development of social anxiety in females. Facial emotion recognition (FER) is important for accurate social cognition, which is impaired in individuals with various disorders, including anxiety disorders. Social anxiety often onsets during adolescence, is observed more commonly in females, and is often associated with FER difficulties. Given the importance of peer interaction during adolescence, and some evidence that FER may differ as a function of the stimuli (adolescent or adult faces), we sought to study FER in relation to social anxiety symptoms using stimuli portraying adolescent faces. Male and female adolescents (N = 64) completed an online survey in which they rated 257 child and adolescent emotional faces and completed a self-report measure of social anxiety symptoms. We examined differences in emotion recognition (e.g., fear, anger, sadness) between individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety symptoms. Adolescents with high social anxiety symptoms were more likely to have problems correctly identifying fearful expressions (90.55 % accuracy) compared to adolescents with low social anxiety symptoms (96.00 % accuracy; t = 2.375, p = .021, d = 0.594), and this effect was observed exclusively in female adolescents. The observed sex difference in accurate identification of fearful faces in relation to social anxiety could suggest a potential mechanism for social anxiety development in adolescent females.     

Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?

This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism. In Sect. 2, I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown (2008a). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne (2004), Brown (2008b), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA’s least secure premises. In Sect. 4, I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA from the objection developed in Sect. 3.     

Two claims about epistemic propriety

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments against both claims.