The Early Intellectual Careers of Bakhtin and Herzen: Towards a Philosophy of the Act

The article explores common ground shared by Alexander Herzen's `Dilettantism in Science' (1843) and Mikhail Bakhtin's `Towards a Philosophy of the Act' (1919) in the context of the Russian intellectual tradition as a whole. The primary aim is to explore in many ways, perhaps, unlikely affinities between two very different writers in the early stage of their careers. The secondary aim is to explore identifiably `Russian' motifs which may be said to call into question conventional typologies of Russian thought based on the progressive/conservative divide.     

Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation

Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.     

Making sense of powerful qualities

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role.

     

Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-causalist

The causal theory of perception is opposed by anti-causalists, who claim that the notion of causality is not part of our ordinary concept of perception, and sometimes raise the possibility of deviant causal chain counter-examples in an attempt to undermine the causal theory. I argue that such examples in fact cause more difficulties for anti-causalist accounts of perception. Anti-causalists are unable to explain how the examples can be recognized as deviant, and why such cases are incompatible with perception. They have a general problem in providing a satisfactory account of hallucination. A comparison with certain complex cases of illusion suggests that our grasp of the concept of perception does indeed involve some kind of understanding of the kinds of causal chains appropriate to genuine perception.