Tests of Matrix Structure for Construct Validation

Psychometrika - Psychologists and other behavioral scientists are frequently interested in whether a questionnaire measures a latent construct. Attempts to address this issue are referred to as...     

Solving probabilistic and statistical problems: a matter of information structure and question form

Is the human mind inherently unable to reason probabilistically, or is it able to do so only when problems tap into a module for reasoning about natural frequencies? We suggest an alternative possibility: naive individuals are able to reason probabilistically when they can rely on a representation of subsets of chances or frequencies. We predicted that naive individuals solve conditional probability problems if they can infer conditional probabilities from the subset relations in their representation of the problems, and if the question put to them makes it easy to consider the appropriate subsets. The results of seven studies corroborated these predictions: when the form of the question and the structure of the problem were framed so as to activate intuitive principles based on subset relations, naive individuals solved problems, whether they were stated in terms of probabilities or frequencies. Otherwise, they failed with both sorts of information. The results contravene the frequentist hypothesis and the evolutionary account of probabilistic reasoning.     

Postdecisional counterfactual thinking by actors and readers

How do individuals think counterfactually about the outcomes of their decisions? Most previous studies have investigated how readers think about fictional stories, rather than how actors think about events they have actually experienced. We assumed that differences in individuals' roles (actor vs. reader) can make different information available, which in turn can affect counterfactual thinking. Hence, we predicted an effect of role on postdecisional counterfactual thinking. Reporting the results of eight studies, we show that readers undo the negative outcome of a story by undoing the protagonist's choice to tackle a given problem, rather than the protagonist's unsuccessful attempt to solve it. But actors who make the same choice and experience the same negative outcome as the protagonist undo this outcome by altering features of the problem. We also show that this effect does not depend on motivational factors. These results contradict current accounts of counterfactual thinking and demonstrate the necessity of investigating the counterfactual thoughts of individuals in varied roles.     

Interpersonal patterns in close relationships: The role of sociotropy–autonomy

Sociotropy and autonomy are conceptualized as two personality dimensions that relate to an individual's vulnerability to depression. Sociotropy is characterized as an excessive investment in interpersonal relationships and autonomy is characterized as an excessive concern with personal achievement and control over the environment. The present research project consisted of two studies examining the relationships between sociotropy–autonomy and interpersonal patterns in close relationships. Data collected via self‐report and behavioural observations suggested that highly sociotropic individuals have a tendency to be high in control and low in affiliation towards individuals who are close to them. In contrast, the data suggested that highly autonomous individuals may be low in both control and affiliation towards people who are close to them. These findings are discussed in the context of the literature regarding the interpersonal characteristics of sociotropic and autonomous individuals.     

Why don’t well-educated adults understand accumulation? A challenge to researchers,educators, and citizens

Accumulation is a fundamental process in dynamic systems: inventory accumulates production less shipments; the national debt accumulates the federal deficit. Effective decision making in such systems requires an understanding of the relationship between stocks and the flows that alter them. However, highly educated people are often unable to infer the behavior of simple stock–flow systems. In a series of experiments we demonstrate that poor understanding of accumulation, termed stock–flow failure, is a fundamental reasoning error. Persistent poor performance is not attributable to an inability to interpret graphs, lack of contextual knowledge, motivation, or cognitive capacity. Rather, stock–flow failure is a robust phenomenon that appears to be rooted in failure to appreciate the most basic principles of accumulation, leading to the use of inappropriate heuristics. We show that many people, including highly educated individuals with strong technical training, use what we term the “correlation heuristic”, erroneously assuming that the behavior of a stock matches the pattern of its flows. We discuss the origins of stock–flow failure and implications for management and education.     

Apraxia in corticobasal degeneration.

Corticobasal degeneration (CBD) is a degenerative disease that often presents with an asymmetric progressive ideomotor limb apraxia. Some apraxic subjects may fail to perform skilled purposive movements on command because they have lost the memories or representations that specify how these movements should be performed (representational deficit). In contrast, other apraxic subjects may have the movement representations but are unable to utilize the information contained in them to execute skilled purposive movements (production-execution deficit). To learn if the apraxic deficit in CBD is induced by a representational or a production-execution deficit, we tested three nondemented subjects with CBD on tasks requiring production of meaningful or meaningless gestures to command, gesture imitation, gesture discrimination, and novel gesture learning. A fourth subject with incomplete data also is presented. The results suggest that the apraxia associated with CBD is initially induced by a production-execution defect with relative sparing of the movement representations.     

Association of solitary binge drinking and suicidal behavior among emerging adult college students

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 26(3) of Psychology of Addictive Behaviors (see record 2012-13892-001). In the article, there is an error in the introductory paragraph. The number of students who had seriously considered attempting suicide in the Barrios, Everett, Simon, & Brener (2000) study should have been reported as 11.4%, not 1.4%. Additionally, in the Participants section, data for the study were collected from March 2009 to September 2010, not March 2009 to January 2010 as reported.] Emerging adult college students who binge drink in solitary contexts (i.e., while alone) experience greater depression and suicidal ideation than do students who only binge drink in social contexts, suggesting that they may be at greater risk for suicidal behavior. This study examined the association of a previous suicide attempt, one of the best predictors of future suicide attempts and suicide, and severity of recent suicidal ideation with drinking in solitary and social contexts. Participants were binge drinking, emerging adult (18- to 25-year-old) college students (N = 182) drawn from two studies of college drinkers. A logistic regression analysis revealed that both suicide attempt history and severity of suicidal ideation were significantly associated with a greater likelihood of being a solitary binge drinker as opposed to only a social binge drinker. Students with a previous suicide attempt were nearly four times more likely to be solitary binge drinkers. Multiple regression analyses revealed that suicide attempt history was significantly associated with greater frequency and quantity of drinking in solitary, but not social contexts. Suicidal ideation was significantly associated with drinks per solitary drinking day, but not frequency of solitary drinking once suicide attempt history was accounted for. Given the associations found between solitary binge drinking and a history of suicide attempts, as well as greater severity of recent suicidal ideation, it appears that these students are in need of suicide prevention efforts, including treatment efforts aimed at reducing binge drinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Proportionate responses to life events influence clinicians' judgments of psychological abnormality

Psychological abnormality is a fundamental concept in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and in all clinical evaluations. How do practicing clinical psychologists use the context of life events to judge the abnormality of a person's current behaviors? The appropriate role of life-event context in assessment has long been the subject of intense debate and scrutiny among clinical theorists, yet relatively little is known about clinicians' own judgments in practice. The authors propose a proportionate-response hypothesis, such that judgments of abnormality are influenced by whether the behaviors are a disproportionate response to past events, rendering them difficult to understand or explain. Licensed, practicing clinical psychologists (N = 77) were presented with vignettes describing hypothetical people's behaviors (disordered, mildly distressed, or unaffected) that had been preceded by either traumatic or mildly distressing events. Experts' judgments of abnormality were strongly and systematically influenced by the degree of mismatch between the past event and current behaviors in strength and valence, such that the greater the mismatch, the more abnormal the person seemed. A separate, additional group of clinical psychologists (N = 20) further confirmed that the greater the degree of mismatch, the greater the perceived difficulty in understanding the patient. These findings held true across clinicians of different theoretical orientations and in disorders for which these patterns of judgments ran contrary to formal recommendations in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The rationality of these effects and implications for clinical decision science are discussed.