Mechanisms of motivation–cognition interaction: challenges and opportunities

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.     

Threatening scenes but not threatening faces shorten time-to-contact estimates

We previously reported that time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of threatening scene pictures (e.g., frontal attacks) resulted in shortened estimations and were mediated by cognitive processes, and that judgments of threatening (e.g., angry) face pictures resulted in a smaller effect and did not seem cognitively mediated. In the present study, the effects of threatening scenes and faces were compared in two different tasks. An effect of threatening scene pictures occurred in a prediction-motion task, which putatively requires cognitive motion extrapolation, but not in a relative TTC judgment task, which was designed to be less reliant on cognitive processes. An effect of threatening face pictures did not occur in either task. We propose that an object’s explicit potential of threat per se, and not only emotional valence, underlies the effect of threatening scenes on TTC judgments and that such an effect occurs only when the task allows sufficient cognitive processing. Results are consistent with distinctions between predator and social fear systems and different underlying physiological mechanisms. Not all threatening information elicits the same responses, and whether an effect occurs at all may depend on the task and the degree to which the task involves cognitive processes.     

Continuous Response Monitoring of Relative Time-to-Contact Judgments: Does Effective Information Change During an Approach Event?

In many previous studies of time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of approaching objects, a response was measured after observers viewed the entire event and was used to infer the informational basis for the judgment. Such measures primarily reflect the information used at the end of the approach event and may not reveal whether observers used different information at different times during the event. Evidence indicates that observers use multiple information sources and that the effectiveness of information varies with distance. We introduce a method in which observers continuously report which of 2 approaching objects would reach them first, throughout the approach. We identified the occurrence and time of response reversals. Most observers changed their relative TTC judgments during the event. The pattern of responses indicated that observers did not use tau early during the approach when objects were far and did not use optical size later when the objects were closer. Most observers relied on either optical size or optical expansion rate early during the approach and expansion rate later during the event, although there were individual differences. A single relative TTC judgment measured after observers view an approach event may not reflect judgments or their informational basis throughout the entire event.     

The functional arrangement of objects biases gaze direction

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - A growing number of studies suggest that semantic knowledge can influence the control of gaze in scenes. For example, observers are more likely to look toward...     

Compression of environmental representations following interactions with objects

Previous work reveals that interacting with all objects in an environment can compress spatial memory for the entire group of objects. To assess the scope and magnitude of this effect, we tested whether interacting with a subset of objects compresses spatial memory for all objects in an environment. Participants inspected objects in one or two unmarked regions of space, then recalled the distances between pairs of objects from memory. One group of participants picked up objects in both regions, a second group picked up objects in one region and passively viewed objects in the other region, and a third group passively viewed objects in both regions. When participants manually interacted with objects, they recalled shorter object-pair distances throughout the environment. The magnitude of this effect was the same, regardless of whether participants interacted with all objects in the environment or just a subset of them. Together, these findings suggest that interacting with objects can compress environmental representations in memory, even when observers interact with a relatively small subset of objects.     

Maximus the Confessor and the Problem of Participation

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate (μ?θεξι?) in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification (θ?ωσι?) without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor (580–662) would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi (that ‘of being’ and that ‘of virtue’) are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation.