A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre

In Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown identifies a number of problems for the so-called knowledge view of justification. According to this (unorthodox) view, we cannot justifiably believe what we do not know. Most epistemologists reject this view on the grounds that false beliefs can be justified if, say, supported by the evidence or produced by reliable processes. We think this is a mistake and that many epistemologists are (mistakenly) classifying beliefs as justified because they have properties that indicate that something should be excused. Brown thinks that previous attempts to make this case have been unsuccessful. While the difficulties Brown points to are genuine, I think they show that attempts to explain a classificatory judgment haven't been successful. Still, I would argue that the classification is correct. We need a better explanation of this classificatory judgment. (The situation is similar to the one in which we correctly distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge but then embarrass ourselves trying to explain what this difference consists in.) I will try to clarify the justification-excuse distinction and explain why it's a mistake to insist that beliefs that violate epistemic norms might be justified. Just as it's possible for a rational agent to act without justification in spite of her best intentions (e.g., by using force or violence in trying to defend another from a merely apparent threat), it's possible that a rational thinker who follows the evidence and meets our expectations might nevertheless believe without sufficient justification. If our justified beliefs are supposed to guide us in deciding what to do, we probably should draw on discussions from morality and the law about the justification/excuse distinction to inform our understanding of the epistemic case.

     

An Innovative Model of Behavior Management to Address Behavioral Emergencies in the Acute Medical Inpatient Setting: Pilot Data

Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings - Workplace violence in healthcare is a significant and costly problem. The majority of violent events that occur in the medical inpatient setting...     

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality

In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first‐order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher‐order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be.     

Designing Programs with a Purpose: To Promote Civic Engagement for Life

Curricular and co-curricular civic engagement activities and programs are analyzed in terms of their capacity to contribute to a common set of outcomes associated with nurturing civic-minded graduates: academic knowledge, familiarity with volunteering and nonprofit sector, knowledge of social issues, communication skills, diversity skills, self-efficacy, and intentions to be involved in communities. Different programs that promote civic-mindedness, developmental models, and assessment strategies that can contribute to program enhancement are presented.     

Visceral fit: While in a visceral state, associated states of the world seem more likely

We propose that visceral states can influence beliefs through "visceral fit": People will judge states of the world associated with their current visceral experience as more likely. We found that warmth influenced belief in global warming (Studies 1-3) and that thirst impacted forecasts of drought and desertification (Study 5). These effects emerged in a naturalistic setting (Study 1) and in experimental lab settings (Studies 2, 3, and 5). Studies 2-6 distinguished between 3 mechanistic accounts: temperature as information (Studies 2 and 3), conceptual accessibility (Studies 4 and 5), and fluency of simulation (Studies 6a and 6b). Studies 2 and 3 ruled out the temperature as information account. Feeling warm enhanced belief in global warming even when temperature was manipulated in an uninformative indoor setting, when participants' attention was first directed to the indoor temperature, and when participants' belief about the current outdoor temperature was statistically controlled. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out conceptual accessibility as the key mediator: Priming the corresponding concepts did not produce analogous effects on judgment. Studies 6a and 6b used a causal chain design and found support for a "simulational fluency" account. Participants experiencing the visceral state of warmth constructed more fluent mental representations of hot (vs. cold) outdoor images, and those who were led to construe the same hot outdoor images more fluently believed more in global warming. Together, the results suggest that visceral states can influence one's beliefs by making matching states of the world easier to simulate and therefore seem more likely.     

What can What-When-Where (WWW) binding tasks tell us about young children's episodic foresight? Theory and two experiments

We analyze theoretical differences between conceptualist and minimalist approaches to episodic processing in young children. The ‘episodic-like’ minimalism of Clayton and Dickinson (1998) is a species of the latter. We asked whether an ‘episodic-like’ task (structurally similar to ones used by Clayton and Dickinson) in which participants had to bind What (kind of object), to Where (location of object) to When (temporal duration from present) - WWW-binding - would produce the often-found developmental trajectory in episodic foresight performance of failure at 3 years, transitional performance at 4 and success at 5. Although failure at 3 years was reproduced, the performance of 4 and 5 year olds was likely affected by the executive challenge of inhibiting reference to the currently preferable item.     

Response speed as an individual difference: Its role in moderating the agreeableness-anger relationship

Anger is an emotion that is precipitated by hostile attitudes and high arousal. The trait of agreeableness is a moderately inverse predictor of hostile attitudes and anger. Relations between agreeableness and anger are likely to be stronger to the extent that the person can be characterized as high in dispositional arousal. Arousal-related manipulations speed responses in cognitive tasks. Thus, individual differences in response speed may be informative concerning general tendencies toward aroused states. In three studies (N = 319) individual differences in response speed in basic choice tasks interacted with agreeableness to predict state-related experiences of anger. Specifically, the highest levels of anger were observed among fast/disagreeable individuals. The utility of this probe in future studies is discussed.