Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

Episodic memory: what can animals remember about their past?

The question of whether episodic memory, the ability to recall unique, personal experiences, is restricted to humans is a matter of current controversy. Recent work on food-storing jays suggests that several features of episodic memory may not be as exclusive to humans as previously thought. In this review we outline the critical features of episodic memory in humans, its relationship to declarative memory, and recent results revealing that jays can learn to perform a task that depends on certain features of episodic memory and can thus be considered 'episodic-like'. Finally, we compare this avian performance with a contemporary definition of human episodic memory and consider the implications for studies of hippocampal function and animal cognition.     

Reviews: Books and Films

TO REDEEM ONE PERSON IS TO REDEEM THE WORLD: THE LIFE OF FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN. By Gail A. Hornstein. 390 pp. New York: The Free Press, 2000. $35. THE GUIDE TO PASTORAL COUNSELING AND CARE. Edited by Gary Ahlskog and Harry Sands. 415 pp. Madison, CT: International Universities Press and Psychosocial Press, 2000. $60. THE ART OF DYING: A JUNGIAN VIEW OF PATIENTS' DRAWINGS. By Yvonne Barnhouse Williams. 209 pp. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1999. $24.95. LITTLE SAINT. By Hannah Green. New York: Random House, 2000. $25.95. BODY AND SOUL: HUMAN NATURE AND THE CRISIS IN ETHICS. By J.P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae. 350 pp. InterVarsity Press, 2000. $22.99. MUHAMMAD AND THE RISE OF ISLAM: THE CREATION OF GROUP IDENTITY. By Subhash C. Inamdar, M.D. 266 pp. Madison, Ct: International Universities Press and Psychosocial Press, 2001. $40. MANAGING MANAGED CARE: SECRETS FROM A FORMER CASE MANAGER. By Susan Frager. 276 pp. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000. $45. THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY. By Nancy L. Eiesland. 139 pp. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994. $15. A LIFE COMPLETE. By Sallierae Henderson. 222 pp. New York: Scribner, 2000. $24. BIOENGAGEMENT: MAKING A CHRISTIAN DIFFERENCE IN BIOETHICS TODAY. Edited by Nigel Cameron, Scott Daniel and Barbara White. 265 pp. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.B.Eerdmans, 2000. $22. CALLED INTO HEALING: RECLAIMING OUR JUDEO-CHRISTIAN LEGACY OF HEALING TOUCH. By Linda L. Smith. 244 pp. Arvada, CO: HTSM Press, 2000. $22.95. SURVEYING THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: TRENDS IN U.S. BELIEFS. By George Gallup, Jr. and D. Michael Lindsay. 171 pp. Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing, 1999. $17.95. The Straight Story. Snow Falling On Cedars     

WOMEN'S HOSTILITY TOWARD WOMEN

Three studies investigating the self-report correlates of women's hostility toward other women were conducted among a total of 477 college women. In Study 1, hostility toward women was negatively associated with both personal and collective self-esteem and positively associated with hostility toward men, controlling for state anger. In Study 2, hostility toward women was negatively associated with self-efficacy and age and positively associated with emotional dependence on men, but not with self-identification as a feminist or support of the feminist movement. In Study 3, women's hostility toward women was negatively associated with measures of intimacy and life satisfaction and positively associated with acceptance of interpersonal violence. We suggest that women's hostility toward other women not only is an important aspect of women's personal satisfaction, happiness, intimacy, and self-esteem, but also may serve as a barrier to women's progress as a group.