The Citizenship Project Part II: Impact of a Citizenship Intervention on Clinical and Community Outcomes for Persons with Mental Illness and Criminal Justice Involvement

This study assessed the effectiveness of an intervention based on a theoretical framework of citizenship on reducing psychiatric symptoms, alcohol use, and drug use, and increasing quality of life for persons with serious mental illness (SMI) and criminal justice involvement. One-hundred fourteen adults with SMI and a history of criminal justice involvement participated in a 2 × 3 longitudinal randomized controlled trial of a four-month citizenship intervention versus usual services. Linear mixed model analyses were used to assess the intervention’s impact on quality of life, symptoms, and substance use. After controlling for baseline covariates, participants in the experimental condition reported significantly increased quality of life, greater satisfaction with and amount of activity, higher satisfaction with work, and reduced alcohol and drug use over time. However, individuals in the experimental condition also reported increased anxiety/depression and agitation at 6 months (but not 12 months) and significantly increased negative symptoms at 12 months. Findings suggest that community-oriented, citizenship interventions for persons with SMI and criminal justice histories may facilitate improved clinical and community outcomes in some domains, but some negative clinical findings suggest the need for post-intervention support for intervention participants. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.     

Improved matrix reasoning is limited to training on tasks with a visuospatial component

Recent studies (e.g.,  and ) have provided evidence that scores on tests of fluid intelligence can be improved by having participants complete a four week training program using the dual n-back task. The dual n-back task is a working memory task that presents auditory and visual stimuli simultaneously. The primary goal of our study was to determine whether a visuospatial component is required in the training program for participants to experience gains in tests of fluid intelligence. We had participants complete variations of the dual n-back task or a short-term memory task as training. Participants were assessed with four tests of fluid intelligence and four cognitive tests. We were successful in corroborating Jaeggi et al.'s results, however, improvements in scores were observed on only two out of four tests of fluid intelligence for participants who completed the dual n-back task, the visual n-back task, or a short-term memory task training program. Our results raise the issue of whether the tests measure the construct of fluid intelligence exclusively, or whether they may be sensitive to other factors. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for conceptualizing and assessing fluid intelligence.     

When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and Unreasonable Religions

Some religiously devout individuals believe divine command can override an obligation to obey the law where the two are in conflict. At the extreme, some individuals believe that acts of violence that seek to change or punish a political community, or to prevent others from violating what they take to be God’s law, are morally justified. In the face of this apparent clash between religious and political commitments it might seem that modern versions of political morality—such as John Rawls’s political liberalism—that refuse to take a stance on controversial religious matters, or eschew appeal to perfectionist doctrines, are beset by a particularly acute version of this problem of religious disobedience. Whilst political liberalism follows this path so as to generate wide and stable support, it raises the question of how political liberals should respond to religiously motivated non-compliance with the norms of that liberal conception of justice. This article evaluates what resources are available to political liberalism to respond to this challenge. It examines whether anti-perfectionism can be sustained in the face of those whose religious beliefs are in conflict with the law. We argue that, under certain circumstances, political liberalism requires direct engagement with the religious views of the unreasonable, including offering religious arguments to show that their particular interpretation of their faith is mistaken. This view takes political liberalism away from its usual ambitions, but it is a position that is both anticipated by Rawls and consistent with his view. It does, however, require that political liberals give up the claim that the view is a wholly non-sectarian, purely political view, and accept that, under certain circumstances it is a partially comprehensive version of liberal theory.     

Behavioural coordination of dogs in a cooperative problem-solving task with a conspecific and a human partner

The process of domestication has arguably provided dogs (Canis familiaris) with decreased emotional reactivity (reduced fear and aggression) and increased socio-cognitive skills adaptive for living with humans. It has been suggested that dogs are uniquely equipped with abilities that have been identified as crucial in cooperative problem-solving, namely social tolerance and the ability to attend to other individuals’ behaviour. Accordingly, dogs might be hypothesised to perform well in tasks in which they have to work together with a human partner. Recently, researchers have found that dogs successfully solved a simple cooperative task with another dog. Due to the simplicity of the task, this study was, however, unable to provide clear evidence as to whether the dogs’ successful performance was based on the cognitive ability of behavioural coordination, namely the capacity to link task requirements to the necessity of adjusting one’s actions to the partner’s behaviour. Here, we tested dogs with the most commonly used cooperative task, appropriate to test behavioural coordination. In addition, we paired dogs with both a conspecific and a human partner. Although dogs had difficulties in inhibiting the necessary action when required to wait for their partner, they successfully attended to the two cues that predicted a successful outcome, namely their partner’s behaviour and the incremental movement of rewards towards themselves. This behavioural coordination was shown with both a conspecific and a human partner, in line with the recent findings suggesting that dogs exhibit highly developed socio-cognitive skills in interactions with both humans and other dogs.     

A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre

In Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown identifies a number of problems for the so-called knowledge view of justification. According to this (unorthodox) view, we cannot justifiably believe what we do not know. Most epistemologists reject this view on the grounds that false beliefs can be justified if, say, supported by the evidence or produced by reliable processes. We think this is a mistake and that many epistemologists are (mistakenly) classifying beliefs as justified because they have properties that indicate that something should be excused. Brown thinks that previous attempts to make this case have been unsuccessful. While the difficulties Brown points to are genuine, I think they show that attempts to explain a classificatory judgment haven't been successful. Still, I would argue that the classification is correct. We need a better explanation of this classificatory judgment. (The situation is similar to the one in which we correctly distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge but then embarrass ourselves trying to explain what this difference consists in.) I will try to clarify the justification-excuse distinction and explain why it's a mistake to insist that beliefs that violate epistemic norms might be justified. Just as it's possible for a rational agent to act without justification in spite of her best intentions (e.g., by using force or violence in trying to defend another from a merely apparent threat), it's possible that a rational thinker who follows the evidence and meets our expectations might nevertheless believe without sufficient justification. If our justified beliefs are supposed to guide us in deciding what to do, we probably should draw on discussions from morality and the law about the justification/excuse distinction to inform our understanding of the epistemic case.

     

An Innovative Model of Behavior Management to Address Behavioral Emergencies in the Acute Medical Inpatient Setting: Pilot Data

Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings - Workplace violence in healthcare is a significant and costly problem. The majority of violent events that occur in the medical inpatient setting...