Western scrub-jays (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Aphelocoma californica</Emphasis>) solve multiple-string problems by the spatial relation of string and reward

String-pulling is a widely used paradigm in animal cognition research to assess what animals understand about the functionality of strings as a means to obtain an out-of-reach reward. This study aimed to systematically investigate what rules Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) use to solve different patterned string tasks, i.e. tasks in which subjects have to choose between two or more strings of which only one is connected to the reward, or where one is more efficient. Arranging strings in a parallel configuration showed that the jays were generally capable of solving multiple-string tasks and acted in a goal-directed manner. The slanted and crossed configurations revealed a reliance on a “proximity rule”, that is, a tendency to choose the string-end closest to the reward. When confronted with strings of different lengths attached to rewards at different distances the birds chose according to the reward distance, preferring the reward closest to them, and were sensitive to the movement of the reward, but did not consistently prefer the shorter and therefore more efficient string. Generally, the scrub-jays were successful in tasks where the reward was closest to the string-ends they needed to pull or when string length and reward distance correlated, but the birds had problems when the wrong string-end was closest to the reward or when the food items were in close proximity to each other. These results show that scrub-jays had a partial understanding of the physical principles underlying string-pulling but relied on simpler strategies such as the proximity rule to solve the tasks.     

Morally based self-esteem, drinking motives, and alcohol use among college students.

This research examined the relationship of morally based self-esteem with drinking motives and alcohol consumption among college students. Basing self-esteem on morals was expected to be negatively associated with drinking behavior. We further expected this relationship to be mediated by drinking motives. Participants (N = 201; 45% male, 55% female) completed self-report measures of contingencies of self-worth, drinking motives, and drinking behavior. Previous research was supported in that college students whose self-esteem was more strongly contingent upon following personal morals consumed less alcohol. The current research extended these findings by showing that this relationship was mediated by drinking motives. Results suggest that it may be useful to better incorporate personal values into interventions for college students. The implementation of personal values in combination with brief treatments is discussed.     

Establishing and Evaluating the Substantive Adequacy of Positive Behavioral Support Plans

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (2004) renewed the commitment to provide positive behavioral support (PBS) for students that engage in persistent problem behavior. Behavior intervention plans (also known as PBS plans) serve as legal documents that help guide the implementation of intervention strategies to encourage more positive forms of behavior. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the substantive adequacy of PBS plans developed for special education students. This was accomplished by documenting the content of plans developed by two different groups of educators using a rating instrument based on the key concepts of PBS planning. Results revealed that the majority of plans developed by teams without identified training and expertise in PBS were rated as substantively inadequate, lacking critical information related to effective behavioral support planning. The implications of the results for everyday practice in the schools and directions for future research are discussed.     

Non-tool-using rooks, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Corvus frugilegus</Emphasis>, solve the trap-tube problem

The trap-tube problem is used to assess whether an individual is able to foresee the outcome of its actions. To solve the task, an animal must use a tool to push a piece of food out of a tube, which has a trap along its length. An animal may learn to avoid the trap through a rule based on associative processes, e.g. using the distance of trap or food as a cue, or by understanding relations between cause and effect. This task has been used to test physical cognition in a number of tool-using species, but never a non-tool-user. We developed an experimental design that enabled us to test non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus. Our modification of the task removed the cognitive requirements of active tool use but still allowed us to test whether rooks can solve the trap-tube problem, and if so how. Additionally, we developed two new control tasks to determine whether rooks were able to transfer knowledge to similar, but novel problems, thus revealing more about the mechanisms involved in solving the task. We found that three out of seven rooks solved the modified trap-tube problem task, showing that the ability to solve the trap-tube problem is not restricted to tool-using animals. We found no evidence that the birds solved the task using an understanding of its causal properties, given that none of the birds passed the novel transfer tasks.     

Differences in inter-rater reliability and accuracy for a treatment adherence scale

Inter-rater reliability and accuracy are measures of rater performance. Inter-rater reliability is frequently used as a substitute for accuracy despite conceptual differences and literature suggesting important differences between them. The aims of this study were to compare inter-rater reliability and accuracy among a group of raters, using a treatment adherence scale, and to assess for factors affecting the reliability of these ratings. Paired undergraduate raters assessed therapist behavior by viewing videotapes of 4 therapists' cognitive behavioral therapy sessions. Ratings were compared with expert-generated criterion ratings and between raters using intraclass correlation (2,1). Inter-rater reliability was marginally higher than accuracy (p = 0.09). The specific therapist significantly affected inter-rater reliability and accuracy. The frequency and intensity of the therapists' ratable behaviors of criterion ratings correlated only with rater accuracy. Consensus ratings were more accurate than individual ratings, but composite ratings were not more accurate than consensus ratings. In conclusion, accuracy cannot be assumed to exceed inter-rater reliability or vice versa, and both are influenced by multiple factors. In this study, the subject of the ratings (i.e. the therapist and the intensity and frequency of rated behaviors) was shown to influence inter-rater reliability and accuracy. The additional resources needed for a composite rating, a rating based on the average score of paired raters, may be justified by improved accuracy over individual ratings. The additional time required to arrive at a consensus rating, a rating generated following discussion between 2 raters, may not be warranted. Further research is needed to determine whether these findings hold true with other raters and treatment adherence scales.     

Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

Episodic memory: what can animals remember about their past?

The question of whether episodic memory, the ability to recall unique, personal experiences, is restricted to humans is a matter of current controversy. Recent work on food-storing jays suggests that several features of episodic memory may not be as exclusive to humans as previously thought. In this review we outline the critical features of episodic memory in humans, its relationship to declarative memory, and recent results revealing that jays can learn to perform a task that depends on certain features of episodic memory and can thus be considered 'episodic-like'. Finally, we compare this avian performance with a contemporary definition of human episodic memory and consider the implications for studies of hippocampal function and animal cognition.