Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of the theory. Interestingly, there is only one source in the defeasibilist literature for a precise account of this crucial feature of the theory: one of the most neglected passages in Peter Klein's work on the issue. That crucial feature is put under the spotlight here. Our response to three major objections to the defeasibility theory requires a brief introduction to the theory as an anti-Gettier weapon, an introduction aimed at countering the numbing simplicity that characterizes most introductions to the topic. Following this brief introduction, those three objections are tackled. We conclude, on that basis, that anybody who fails to notice how resilient the defeasibility theory has proven to be for the last fifty years has a seriously deficient understanding of the current state of play in the debate over the Gettier Problem.     

Modification of EEG power spectra and EEG connectivity in autobiographical memory: a sLORETA study

The aim of the present study was to explore the modifications of scalp EEG power spectra and EEG connectivity during the autobiographical memory test (AM-T) and during the retrieval of an autobiographical event (the high school final examination, Task 2). Seventeen healthy volunteers were enrolled (9 women and 8 men, mean age 23.4 ± 2.8 years, range 19–30). EEG was recorded at baseline and while performing the autobiographical memory (AM) tasks, by means of 19 surface electrodes and a nasopharyngeal electrode. EEG analysis was conducted by means of the standardized LOw Resolution Electric Tomography (sLORETA) software. Power spectra and lagged EEG coherence were compared between EEG acquired during the memory tasks and baseline recording. The frequency bands considered were as follows: delta (0.5–4 Hz); theta (4.5–7.5 Hz); alpha (8–12.5 Hz); beta1 (13–17.5 Hz); beta2 (18–30 Hz); gamma (30.5–60 Hz). During AM-T, we observed a significant delta power increase in left frontal and midline cortices (T = 3.554; p < 0.05) and increased EEG connectivity in delta band in prefrontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital areas, and for gamma bands in the left temporo-parietal regions (T = 4.154; p < 0.05). In Task 2, we measured an increased power in the gamma band located in the left posterior midline areas (T = 3.960; p < 0.05) and a significant increase in delta band connectivity in the prefrontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital areas, and in the gamma band involving right temporo-parietal areas (T = 4.579; p < 0.05). These results indicate that AM retrieval engages in a complex network which is mediated by both low- (delta) and high-frequency (gamma) EEG bands.     

Arrows,Balls and the Metaphysics of Motion

The arrow paradox is an argument purported to show that objects do not really move. The two main metaphysics of motion, the At–At theory of motion and velocity primitivism, solve the paradox differently. It is argued that neither solution is completely satisfactory. In particular it is contended that there are no decisive arguments in favor of the claim that velocity as it is constructed in the At–At theory is a truly instantaneous property, which is a crucial assumption to solve the paradox. If so the At–At theory faces the threat that most of our physical theories turn out to be non-Markovian. Finally it is considered whether all those threats and paradoxes are dispelled if only a new metaphysics of persistence is taken into account, namely four-dimensionalism.     

Hallucinations and REM sleep behaviour disorder in Parkinson's disease: dream imagery intrusions and other hypotheses

REM sleep behaviour disorder (RBD) is a REM sleep-related parasomnia which may be considered a “dissociated state of wakefulness and sleep”, given that conflicting elements of REM sleep (dreaming) and of wakefulness (sustained muscle tone and movements) coexist during the episodes, leading to motor and behavioural manifestations reminiscent of an enacted dream. RBD has been reported in association with α-synucleinopathies: around a third of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) have full-blown RBD.Recent data indicate that PD patients with RBD are more prone to hallucinations than PD patients without this parasomnia. However it is still not clear why RBD in PD is associated with an increased prevalence of VHs.Data exist which suggest that visual hallucinations in PD may be the result of untimely intrusions of REM visual imagery into wakefulness. RBD, which is characterised by a REM sleep dissociation pattern, might be a condition that particularly favours such intrusions. However, other hypotheses may be advanced. In fact, deficits in attentional, executive, visuoperceptual and visuospatial abilities have been documented in RBD and found to occur far more frequently in PD with RBD than in PD without RBD. Neuropsychological deficits involving visual perception and attentional processes are thought to play an important role in the pathophysiology of VHs. On this basis, RBD in PD could be viewed as a contributory risk factor for VHs.