A behavioral study of alpha-1b adrenergic receptor knockout mice: increased reaction to novelty and selectively reduced learning capacities

Knockout mice lacking the alpha-1b adrenergic receptor were tested in behavioral experiments. Reaction to novelty was first assessed in a simple test in which the time taken by the knockout mice and their littermate controls to enter a second compartment was compared. Then the mice were tested in an open field to which unknown objects were subsequently added. Special novelty was introduced by moving one of the familiar objects to another location in the open field. Spatial behavior and memory were further studied in a homing board test, and in the water maze. The alpha-1b knockout mice showed an enhanced reactivity to new situations. They were faster to enter the new environment, covered longer paths in the open field, and spent more time exploring the new objects. They reacted like controls to modification inducing spatial novelty. In the homing board test, both the knockout mice and the control mice seemed to use a combination of distant visual and proximal olfactory cues, showing place preference only if the two types of cues were redundant. In the water maze the alpha-1b knockout mice were unable to learn the task, which was confirmed in a probe trial without platform. They were perfectly able, however, to escape in a visible platform procedure. These results confirm previous findings showing that the noradrenergic pathway is important for the modulation of behaviors such as reaction to novelty and exploration, and suggest that this is mediated, at least partly, through the alpha-1b adrenergic receptors. The lack of alpha-1b adrenergic receptors in spatial orientation does not seem important in cue-rich tasks but may interfere with orientation in situations providing distant cues only.     

Lesion of the ventral periaqueductal gray reduces conditioned fear but does not change freezing induced by stimulation of the dorsal periaqueductal gray

Previously-reported evidence showed that freezing to a context previously associated with footshock is impaired by lesion of the ventral periaqueductal gray (vPAG). It has also been shown that stepwise increase in the intensity of the electrical stimulation of the dorsal periaqueductal gray (dPAG) produces alertness, then freezing, and finally escape. These aversive responses are mimicked by microinjections of GABA receptor antagonists, such as bicuculline, or blockers of the glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD), such as semicarbazide, into the dPAG. In this work, we examined whether the expression of these defensive responses could be the result of activation of ventral portion of the periaqueductal gray. Sham- or vPAG electrolytic–lesioned rats were implanted with an electrode in the dPAG for the determination of the thresholds of freezing and escape responses. The vPAG electrolytic lesions were behaviorally verified through a context-conditioned fear paradigm. Results indicated that lesion of the vPAG disrupted conditioned freezing response to contextual cues associated with footshocks but did not change the dPAG electrical stimulation for freezing and escape responses. In a second experiment, lesion of the vPAG also did not change the amount of freezing and escape behavior produced by microinjections of semicarbazide into the dPAG. These findings indicate that freezing and escape defensive responses induced by dPAG stimulation do not depend on the integrity of the vPAG. A discussion on different neural circuitries that might underlie different inhibitory and active defensive behavioral patterns that animals display during threatening situations is presented.     

Learning from the law to address uncertainty in the precautionary principle

Environmentalists have advocated the Precautionary Principle (PP) to help guide public and private decisions about the environment. By contrast, industry and its spokesmen have opposed this. There is not one principle, but many that have been recommended for this purpose. Despite the attractiveness of a core idea in all versions of the principle—that decision-makers should take some precautionary steps to ensure that threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment and public health do not materialize into harm—even one of the most widely endorsed principles needs considerable specification and refinement before it can be used. Moreover, the PP is an approach or guide to utilizing scientific evidence in social or legal decision-making contexts. In this it does not differ in kind from other approaches to using factual information such as in the law. The law provides some models for different strategies to guide decision-making under uncertainty when factual issues cannot be resolved with certainty. These in turn can help guide the formulation of different versions of PP and help clarify some presuppositions of the principle. Once some plausible versions of PP are articulated, I suggest some applications to existing environmental problems.     

Somatosensory processing in the biological relatives of schizophrenia patients: a signal detection analysis of two-point discrimination

This study examined 2-point discrimination performance in 1 st-degree biological relatives (n = 39) of individuals with schizophrenia and normal adult control participants (n = 30) recruited from the community. They completed an objective 2-point discrimination task, adapted for use with a signal detection approach to permit separation of discriminability (i.e., sensitivity, d') from response bias/ criterion (or motivation, lnbeta). Relatives revealed poorer performance on the d' index compared with controls. The 2 groups did not differ on lnbeta, suggesting a genuine difference in sensitivity but not response bias. The sensitivity deficit might reflect decreased spatial acuity and/or impaired intensity cue processing of tactile stimuli. Poor performance on the d' index was most closely associated with 2 schizotypic features, namely "odd beliefs/magical thinking."     

Conjoint recognition and phantom recollection

A new methodology for measuring illusory conscious experience of the "presentation" of unstudied material (phantom recollection) is evaluated that extracts measurements directly from recognition responses, rather than indirectly from introspective reports. Application of this methodology in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Experiments 1 and 2) and in a more conventional paradigm (Experiment 3) showed that 2 processes (phantom recollection and familiarity) contribute to false recognition of semantically related distractors. Phantom recollection was the larger contributor to false recognition of critical distractors in the DRM paradigm, but surprisingly, it was also the larger contributor to false recognition of other types of distractors. Variability in false recognition was tied to variability in phantom recollection. Experimental control of phantom recollection was achieved with manipulations that were motivated by fuzzy-trace theory's hypothesis that the phenomenon is gist-based.     

A step towards ending the isolation of behavior analysis: A common language with evolutionary science

In spite of repeated efforts to explain itself to a wider audience, behavior analysis remains a largely misunderstood and isolated discipline. In this article we argue that this situation is in part due to the terms we use in our technical discussions. In particular, reinforcement and punishment, with their vernacular associations of reward and retribution, are a source of much misunderstanding. Although contemporary thinking within behavior analysis holds that reinforcement and punishment are Darwinian processes whereby behavioral variants are selected and deselected by their consequences, the continued use of the terms reinforcement and punishment to account for behavioral evolution obscures this fact. To clarify and simplify matters, we propose replacing the terms reinforcement and punishment with selection and deselection, respectively. These changes would provide a terminological meeting point with other selectionist sciences, thereby increasing the likelihood that behavior analysis will contribute to Darwinian science.     

Biased estimators, biased experts, and the Ivory Tower: a reply to Grove (2001)

This reply responds to W. M. Grove's (2001) critique of H. O. F. Veiel and R. F. Koopman's (2001) article on bias in widely used methods of estimating premorbid IQ. In this reply, the authors show that Grove is misrepresenting part of Veiel and Koopman's arguments, extend them to show that the proposed adjustment to regression estimates of IQ not only is unbiased but also is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the true IQ, and argue that Grove's notion of the acceptability of biased methods in judicial proceedings reflects a fundamental misapprehension of their nature and purpose.