A new model of sportive cooperation and its evaluation by means a questionnaire

We present in this paper the sportive cooperation as a theoretical framework for the teams' dynamics, and as an alternative to others theories, specially the sportive cohesion. This theory has a double basis: 1) The rational and utilitarist decision taking upon the personal cooperation or not, with the team's goal, based on the internal teammates interaction, and the environmental stimuli; and 2) A personal, and more stable, disposition to cooperate, despite the possibility of obtain any counterparts for this behavior. From this framework, we have build--in a three phase process--a questionnaire addressed to evaluate the sportive cooperation. The final version--composed of 15 items with standard psychometric propierties--shows two kinds of factors. First, we have two dispositional, traitlike, factors: The Conditional cooperation, and the Unconditional cooperation. Second, we have three situational factors: the Cooperation with the Coach, with the teammates, and the Cooperation outside the game and the training. Lastly, we discuss the maining of this theory respect to the sportive team's dynamics, and its relevance for the applied psychology, both for the evaluation and the interventions on the teams.     

How is the therapeutic relationship talked into being?

A review of the place of the therapeutic relationship within systemic approaches to therapy is provided. This serves to contextualize the findings of a research study that subjects therapy sessions to a discursive analysis. The purpose of the analysis is to learn more about the therapeutic relationship through an examination of what actually takes place in sessions. Moments in therapy where therapeutic engagement is stronger and moments when it is weaker are identified and analysed. The discursive contours of a robust therapeutic relationship are highlighted. A theoretical account of the constituents of a stronger therapeutic relationship is constructed from this analysis.

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Is belief reasoning automatic?

Understanding the operating characteristics of theory of mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, and for understanding the role such inferences could play in other cognitive processes. We present the first investigation of the automaticity of belief reasoning. In an incidental false-belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. Results in other conditions showed that responses to belief questions were not necessarily slower than responses to reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in response times to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the person's beliefs about the object's location. The results suggest that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically.     

The frontal hypothesis of cognitive aging: factor structure and age effects on four frontal tests among healthy individuals

With 101 healthy aging adult participants, the authors investigated whether executive functions are a unitary concept. The authors established the factor structure of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; E. A. Berg, 1948), the Stroop color and word test (C. J. Golden, 1978), verbal fluency using the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton, 1967), and the Digits Backwards subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R; D. Wechsler, 1981). The authors also evaluated the extent to which age and other demographic variables predicted common underlying properties of these frontal tests. Results revealed an age-related decline in executive abilities differentially reflected by the selected tasks. These data suggest caution using the COWAT to evaluate executive abilities in older people. The authors interpret findings to support the unitary view of executive abilities and the executive decline proposed by the frontal hypothesis.