Cross modality facilitation in tachistoscopic word recognition

In its old form, the logogen model (Morton, 1969) would have predicted extensive cross-model facilitation of tachistoscopic word recognition. An experiment by Winnick and Daniel (1970) violated this prediction by showing no effects on subsequent visual word recognition of naming a picture or filling a definition. The latter results was replicated, and it was also found that pretraining with handwritten words transferred to printed words from 10-45 min later. A further experiment showed no significant transfer from auditory presentation to subsequent visual recognition. A third experiment, designed to minimize the role of conscious guessing strategies showed a significant cross-model transfer. The logogen model was modified substantially in the light of these data. There are now seen to be modality specific input categorization systems which are separate from the output lexicon and which are identified as the site of facilitation in the experiments.     

Wellness,Emotion Regulation,and Relapse During Substance Use Disorder Treatment

Using a cross-sectional study design, the authors investigated the impact of wellness and emotion regulation on relapse in 179 individuals currently enrolled in substance use disorder treatment. An integration of the indivisible self model of wellness (Myers & Sweeney, 2004) and the covert antecedents model of relapse (Marlatt, 1985) informed the study hypothesis that emotion regulation mediates the wellness-relapse relationship. Binomial logistic regressions revealed that Creative Self wellness (odds ratio [OR] = 1.09, p = .002), reappraisal (OR = 1.08, p = .008), difficulties in emotion regulation (OR = 1.03, p = .007), and Physical Self wellness (OR = 0.95, p < .001) were associated with the odds of relapse on any given day during treatment. Sobel tests indicated 2 occurrences of full mediation, including that difficulties in emotion regulation mediated the relationship between Coping Self wellness and relapse (OR = 0.97, p = .015).     

Virtue and Disagreement

One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive—and compelling—account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle’s ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closely, first elucidating the features of the Aristotelian account that motivate it, and then identifying two further features of the account that the criticism overlooks. These further features show the criticism to be entirely unwarranted. Once these features are acknowledged, a more promising line of criticism suggests itself—namely, that the Aristotelian account does too little to help us to resolve disputes—but that line of objection will have to be carried out on quite different grounds.