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261.
Steve Clarke 《国际科学哲学研究》2013,27(3):341-351
In a previous article in this journal, we examined John Dupré's claim that ‘scientific imperialism’ can lead to ‘misguided’ science being considered acceptable. Here, we address criticisms raised by Ian J. Kidd and Uskali Mäki against that article. While both commentators take us to be offering our own account of scientific imperialism that goes beyond that developed by Dupré, and go on to criticise what they take to be our account, our actual ambitions were modest. We intended to ‘explicate the sense in which the term is used by Dupré’ and to ‘identify the normative content of his critique of scientific imperialism’. We made no claim to have developed our own account of scientific imperialism that went further than what was implicit in Dupré's work already. However, that said, the discussions presented by both Kidd and Mäki raise important general issues about how the idea of scientific imperialism should be understood and framed. Here, we offer our considered responses to Kidd's and Maki's discussions of scientific imperialism. 相似文献
262.
Using a phenomenological research design with a photovoice method, we aimed to understand the lived experience of eight individuals diagnosed with mental illness and identify factors affecting their recovery. We conducted focus group interviews whereby participants discussed their recovery, shared photographs taken of items symbolizing their recovery, and created personalized photobooks or scrapbooks. Data analysis yielded the following themes: (1) caring relationships, (2) leisure and outings, and (3) relaxation, stress reduction, and coping. Findings revealed factors influencing recovery from mental illness and can be used to develop person-centered and occupation-based interventions to promote recovery in clients with mental health issues. 相似文献
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Brendan Clarke 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2011,32(1):19-32
In this article, I begin by giving a brief history of melanoma causation. I then discuss the current manner in which malignant
melanoma is classified. In general, these systems of classification do not take account of the manner of tumour causation.
Instead, they are based on phenomenological features of the tumour, such as size, spread, and morphology. I go on to suggest
that misclassification of melanoma is a major problem in clinical practice. I therefore outline an alternative means of classifying
these tumours based on causal factors. By analogy with similar systems that have recently emerged for other cancers, I suggest
that this causal classification is likely to be both workable and helpful, even in the absence of a full causal-mechanistic
understanding of the aetiology of the tumour. 相似文献
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Randolph Clarke 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(2):153-160
A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s
characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things
extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic
to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties
from so-called categorical properties fails. 相似文献
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Justin Clarke‐Doane 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2019,53(2):266-295
It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non‐rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real (non‐epistemic, non‐deontic) notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory. 相似文献