The associations of cultural worldviews,political orientation,and trust with COVID-19 risk beliefs in the U.S.

Given that risk beliefs predict engagement in behaviors to prevent disease, it is important to understand the factors associated with risk beliefs. In the present paper, we conducted path analyses to investigate the associations of belief systems (political orientation and cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy) with COVID-19 risk beliefs (i.e., perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and worry about disease; Studies 1 and 2), and the indirect effect through trust in information sources in these relationships (Study 1). Two online panels of U.S. adults were surveyed at three timepoints during the COVID-19 pandemic (Study 1: baseline n = 1,667, 1-year follow-up n = 551; Study 2: n = 404). Results of path analyses indicated that, across studies and timepoints, when controlling for political orientation, trust, and demographic factors, greater individualism had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity and worry about COVID-19, whereas greater hierarchy had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity. However, after accounting for cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy (and trust and demographic factors), none of the associations among political orientation and any of the three COVID-19 risk beliefs were significant. The test of indirect effects indicated that individualism and hierarchy were indirectly associated with lower perceived severity of and worry about COVID-19 through less trust. The findings suggest that cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy play a role in shaping people's risk beliefs.     

The interplay of persuasion inference and flow experience in an entertaining food advergame

Increasingly, unhealthy food is being advertised through online games known as advergames. The advergame is designed for entertaining fun to promote the brand featured in the game. But what happens if the food advertised is healthy or the source of the game is non‐commercial? This study examines how people's entertainment (flow experience) interacts with their inference about the persuasion impact of food brands featured in an advergame, which vary according to their persuasion knowledge about the source (e.g., non‐commercial versus commercial) and the perceived persuasion effect on self (e.g., beneficial versus harmful). Results of an experiment show that flow is positively associated with persuasion effects of the advergame. Brand attitudes and purchase intentions were the most favorable for non‐commercial brands with perceived benefits (healthy food) followed by commercial brands (healthy food) and commercial brands with harmful effects (less healthy food). However, persuasion effects for purchase intention were mitigated when participants were immersed in a flow state. Ramifications for persuasion and health promotions are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Enhancing feedback and improving feedback: subjective perceptions,psychological consequences,behavioral outcomes

Three experiments examined subjective perceptions, psychological consequences, and behavioral outcomes of enhancing versus improving feedback. Across experiments, feedback delivery and assessment were sequential (i.e., at each testing juncture) or cumulative (i.e., at the end of the testing session). Although enhancing feedback was seen as more satisfying than useful, and improving feedback was not seen as more useful than satisfying, perceptions differed as a function of short‐term versus long‐term feedback delivery and assessment. Overall, however, enhancing feedback was more impactful psychologically and behaviorally. Enhancing feedback engendered greater success consistency, overall satisfaction and usefulness, optimism, state self‐esteem, perceived ability, and test persistence intentions; improving feedback, on the other hand, engendered greater state improvement. The findings provide fodder for theory development and applications.     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation: a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152–176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179–188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Stürzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1–14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191–212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419–422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909–5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915–5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540–566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.     

Enhanced Cognitive Behavior Therapy: A Single Treatment for All Eating Disorders

Eating disorders are serious mental illnesses affecting a significant proportion of women and a smaller number of men. Approximately half of those with an eating disorder (ED) will not meet the criteria for anorexia or bulimia nervosa, and will be diagnosed with an eating disorder not otherwise specified (EDNOS). Until recently, there were no recommended treatments for EDNOS. This article provides an overview of enhanced cognitive behavior therapy, a validated treatment for all forms of EDs.     

Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame

In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also tend to commit a kind of fundamental attribution error with respect to moral responsibility and blame. Do we also tend to ignore situational factors and overconfidently assume that people are morally responsible and blameworthy for their distinctive patterns of wrongful behaviour? Very few scholars have addressed this issue, and none has ever given a comprehensive account of moral responsibility and blame from a situationist perspective. In this paper, I argue that situationist social psychology impugns subjective theories of responsibility and blame which focus on the agent’s inner states and supports an objective theory—namely, the standard of the reasonable person. I defend this standard as a tool for moral appraisal, and then I refute the common misperception that this approach lets most perpetrators off the hook and poses a threat to society.     

Concreteness of positive, negative, and neutral repetitive thinking about the future

Consistent with assertions that the adaptiveness of repetitive thinking is influenced by both its valence and style, Stöber (e.g., Stöber &; Borkovec, 2002) has argued that worry is characterized by a reduced concreteness of thought content and that the resulting abstractness contributes to its inhibition of some aspects of anxious responding. However, extant research does not provide a direct test of Stöber's reduced concreteness theory of worry. We sought to test Stöber's theory and to examine the adaptiveness of repetitive worrisome thinking by randomly assigning 108 participants to engage in five consecutive periods of repetitive thinking about positively, negatively, or neutrally valenced potential future events. Results based on coding of thought data indicated that (a) repetitive thinking became increasingly less concrete as periods progressed; (b) contrary to Stöber's theory, both negative and positive repetitive future thinking were more concrete than neutral repetitive future thinking (and did not differ from each other); and (c) abstractness of thought during negative repetitive future thinking was associated with reduced reports of imagery-based activity. Results based on self-reported affect indicated that negatively valenced repetitive future thinking was uniquely associated with initial decreases in anxious affect, followed by increased anxious affect that coincided with increased imagery-based activity. This suggests that worry is associated with a sequential mitigation of anxious meaning followed by a strengthening of anxious meaning over time. Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Written exposure as an intervention for PTSD: A randomized clinical trial with motor vehicle accident survivors

The present study examined the efficacy of a brief, written exposure therapy (WET) for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Participants were 46 adults with a current primary diagnosis of motor vehicle accident-related PTSD. Participants were randomly assigned to either WET or a waitlist (WL) condition. Independent assessments took place at baseline and 6-, 18-, and 30-weeks post baseline (WL condition not assessed at 30 weeks). Participants assigned to WET showed significant reductions in PTSD symptom severity at 6- and 18-week post-baseline, relative to WL participants, with large between-group effect sizes. In addition, significantly fewer WET participants met diagnostic criteria for PTSD at both the 6- and 18-week post-baseline assessments, relative to WL participants. Treatment gains were maintained for the WET participants at the 30-week post baseline assessment. Notably, only 9% of participants dropped out of WET and the WET participants reported a high degree of satisfaction with the treatment. These findings suggest that a brief, written exposure treatment may efficaciously treat PTSD. Future research should examine whether WET is efficacious with other PTSD samples, as well as compare the efficacy of WET with that of evidence-based treatments for PTSD.     

Three-year-olds Remember a Novel Event from 20 Months: Evidence for Long-term Memory in Children?

Abstract

Thirty-seven 3-year-old children, who had learned a 9-action event sequence (“making Play-Doh spaghetti”) when they were 20 months old, returned to the lab to determine whether they would be able to verbally and/or behaviourally recall the event after a 12- to 22-month delay. Children originally participated in the event either one or three times and experienced different parts of the event either at three distinct locations (spatial condition) or at a single location (nonspatial condition). Results show very little evidence of long-term memory for the event after one to two years. Returning children did not verbally recall the event, and they did not perform more actions or sequence the event more accurately than controls, with the exception of the older experimental children who had a tendency to sequence the event more accurately than same-aged controls. Although the results indicate that young children's memory for novel events is not very enduring, there were individual differences in children's ability to remember the event. These differences are discussed in terms of potential differences in cognitive abilities and changing knowledge about retrieval strategies or memory.