Novel metaphor comprehension: Semantic neighbourhood density interacts with concreteness

Previous research suggests that metaphor comprehension is affected both by the concreteness of the topic and vehicle and their semantic neighbours (Kintsch, 2000; Xu, 2010). However, studies have yet to manipulate these 2 variables simultaneously. To that end, we composed novel metaphors manipulated on topic concreteness and semantic neighbourhood density (SND) of topic and vehicle. In Experiment 1, participants rated the metaphors on the suitability (e.g. sensibility) of their topic-vehicle pairings. Topic concreteness interacted with SND such that participants rated metaphors from sparse semantic spaces to be more sensible than those from dense semantic spaces and preferred abstract topics over concrete topics only for metaphors from dense semantic spaces. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used presentation deadlines and found that topic concreteness and SND affect the online processing stages associated with metaphor comprehension. We discuss how the results are aligned with established psycholinguistic models of metaphor comprehension.     

Are intertemporal preferences contagious? Evidence from collaborative decision making

Prior research has provided substantial insight into individuals’ intertemporal preferences (i.e., preferences about delayed rewards). In the present study, we instead investigated the preferences of small groups of individuals asked to express collective intertemporal decisions. The paradigm consisted of three phases. During the precollaboration and postcollaboration phases, participants completed an intertemporal decision task individually. During the collaboration phase, participants completed a similar task in small groups, reaching mutually-agreed-upon decisions. The results suggest that group preferences were systematically related to the mean of the group members’ precollaboration preferences. In addition, collaborative decision making altered the group members’ intertemporal preferences. Specifically, individuals’ postcollaboration preferences converged toward the preferences of their respective groups. Furthermore, we found that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences were independently related to both their precollaboration preferences and the preferences of the other group members, suggesting that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences represented a revision of their precollaboration preferences based on the preferences observed in other group members. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that similar patterns of results were found whether participants were making matching judgments or binary choices.     

Bedding down new words: Sleep promotes the emergence of lexical competition in visual word recognition

Lexical competition processes are widely viewed as the hallmark of visual word recognition, but little is known about the factors that promote their emergence. This study examined for the first time whether sleep may play a role in inducing these effects. A group of 27 participants learned novel written words, such as banara, at 8 am and were tested on their learning at 8 pm the same day (AM group), while 29 participants learned the words at 8 pm and were tested at 8 am the following day (PM group). Both groups were retested after 24 hours. Using a semantic categorization task, we showed that lexical competition effects, as indexed by slowed responses to existing neighbor words such as banana, emerged 12 h later in the PM group who had slept after learning but not in the AM group. After 24 h the competition effects were evident in both groups. These findings have important implications for theories of orthographic learning and broader neurobiological models of memory consolidation.     

The Perceptual Basis of Vast Space

“Vast” is a word often applied to environmental terrain that is perceived to have large spatial extent. This judgment is made even at viewing distances where traditional metric depth cues are not useful. This paper explores the perceptual basis of vast experience, including reliability and visual precursors. Experiment 1 demonstrated strong agreement in ratings of the spatial extent of two-dimensional (2D) scene images by participants in two countries under very different viewing conditions. Image categories labeled “vast” often exemplified scene attributes of ruggedness and openness (Oliva & Torralba, 2001). Experiment 2 quantitatively assessed whether these properties predict vastness. High vastness ratings were associated with highly open, or moderately open but rugged, scenes. Experiment 3 provided evidence, consistent with theory, that metric distance perception does not directly mediate the observed vastness ratings. The question remains as to how people perceive vast space when information about environmental scale is unavailable from metric depth cues or associated scene properties. We consider possible answers, including contribution from strong cues to relative depth.     

Bayesian inference with Stan: A tutorial on adding custom distributions

When evaluating cognitive models based on fits to observed data (or, really, any model that has free parameters), parameter estimation is critically important. Traditional techniques like hill climbing by minimizing or maximizing a fit statistic often result in point estimates. Bayesian approaches instead estimate parameters as posterior probability distributions, and thus naturally account for the uncertainty associated with parameter estimation; Bayesian approaches also offer powerful and principled methods for model comparison. Although software applications such as WinBUGS (Lunn, Thomas, Best, & Spiegelhalter, Statistics and Computing, 10, 325–337, 2000) and JAGS (Plummer, 2003) provide “turnkey”-style packages for Bayesian inference, they can be inefficient when dealing with models whose parameters are correlated, which is often the case for cognitive models, and they can impose significant technical barriers to adding custom distributions, which is often necessary when implementing cognitive models within a Bayesian framework. A recently developed software package called Stan (Stan Development Team, 2015) can solve both problems, as well as provide a turnkey solution to Bayesian inference. We present a tutorial on how to use Stan and how to add custom distributions to it, with an example using the linear ballistic accumulator model (Brown & Heathcote, Cognitive Psychology, 57, 153–178. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2007.12.002, 2008).     

对新冠病毒肺炎危重症患者引入缓和医疗的伦理论证

新型冠状病毒肺炎尚无治疗特效药和疫苗。在继续加强防控的同时,把有限的资源优先放在探索对重症和危重症患者的支持性治疗,积极建立和完善对重症、危重症患者及其家属的缓和医疗等方面,有利于患者群体利益最大化,经得起伦理辩护。缓和医疗有助于改善患者预后,降低住院病死率,有效缓解患者濒死痛苦;对医患双方而言,如果死亡已无可避免,帮助临终者走得平安、少些痛苦,是医学对患者最后的人文关怀。     

Normality,Non-contamination and Logical Depth in Classical Natural Deduction

Studia Logica - In this paper we provide a detailed proof-theoretical analysis of a natural deduction system for classical propositional logic that (i) represents classical proofs in a more natural...     

Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else).