Development of the Diabetes Self-Care Efficacy Scale

The present study elaborates the conceptualization and process of development of a scale for assessing diabetes self-care efficacy (DSCE) in patients of diabetes, type 1 and type 2. Health maintenance in chronic illness as diabetes is dependent on performing several key self-care behaviours. The present study discusses two parts—Part I elaborates the qualitative exploration of the research construct through semi-structured interview of diabetic patients. It included 25 diabetic patients, Type-I (n?=?5) and Type-II (n?=?20). Part II discusses the quantitative research methods. The sample consisted of 233 diabetic patients, Type-1 (n?=?39) and Type-2 (n?=?194), who were randomly selected from diabetes and endocrine outpatient department (OPD) of a hospital in, Kolkata, India. Following an exploratory approach employing Principal Component Analysis (PCA), three components were yielded that accounted for approximately 60% of explained variance. Cronbach’s alpha was established at 0.89 indicating satisfactory internal reliability. The components were identified as component 1, “Beliefs about physical exercise regimen” (BPE), component 2, “Beliefs about food and insulin administration and medication recommendations” (FMR) and component 3, “Beliefs about learning and following from others” (LFO). To test the obtained factor structure of the proposed DSCE scale, a confirmatory analysis was performed to help validate the 3-factor, 15-item DSCE scale. The scale is first one of its kind to be proposed and developed in an Indian diabetes context and can prove useful in other settings. Study findings have implications for use in hospital setup and for development of intervention programs in dealing with diabetes patient population.     

The Tyranny of Taxonomy Sexuality and Anomaly

Human sexuality is not binary: this, although counter-intuitive initially, is a medical fact. Homo-sexuality was an anomaly under a M/F taxonomy, and so ‘unnatural’ and ‘an abomination’. It is a mere statistical anomaly: it is a fact of Nature, nevertheless. Doctrines of Natural Law must recognize that even if Nature is stable, the notion/word ‘Nature’ is a shifter. As medical and other sciences amend our understanding of Nature, the idea of ‘Nature’ shifts. Natural Law theory is – and must continue to be – based on Nature: the contents of the idea of ‘Nature’ change progressively. So must cultural attitudes.     

Reconstructing the Topology of the Elementary Self-embedding Monoids of Countable Saturated Structures

Every transformation monoid comes equipped with a canonical topology, the topology of pointwise convergence. For some structures, the topology of the endomorphism monoid can be reconstructed from its underlying abstract monoid. This phenomenon is called automatic homeomorphicity. In this paper we show that whenever the automorphism group of a countable saturated structure has automatic homeomorphicity and a trivial center, then the monoid of elementary self-embeddings has automatic homeomorphicity, too. As a second result we strengthen a result by Lascar by showing that whenever \({\mathbf {A}}\) is a countable \(\aleph _0\)-categorical G-finite structure whose automorphism group has a trivial center and if \({\mathbf {B}}\) is any other countable structure, then every isomorphism between the monoids of elementary self-embeddings is a homeomorphism.     

A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty

Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly (IF) logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to the conclusion that the thirders are correct while identifying the main error in the halfers’ argument.     

Arithmetical Soundness and Completeness for $$\varvec{\Sigma }_{\varvec{2}}$$ Numerations

We prove that for each recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic and \(n \ge 2\), there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) numeration \(\tau (u)\) of T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate \(\mathsf{Pr}_\tau (x)\) naturally constructed from \(\tau (u)\) is exactly \(\mathsf{K}+ \Box (\Box ^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p\). This settles Sacchetti’s problem affirmatively.     

A New Rootedness? Education in the Technological Age

This paper explores the challenges facing educators in a time when modern technology, and especially modern social technology, has an increasingly powerful hold on our lives. The educational challenge does not primarily concern questions concerning the use of technology in the classroom, or as part of the learning environment, but a changeover in the whole social environment that marks our time. Taking guidance from Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and Nietzsche, the essay explores what we want the education of children to achieve, and how, if at all, this can be achieved in an age of modern social technology. The central argument is that the most basic educational goal of human flourishing cannot be achieved today as long as the main criteria of “best practice” in the classroom foreground pupil enjoyment rather than endurance of suffering. The paradox is that any call for the latter is now largely heard in a way cultivated by the culture of the former: namely, poorly and vulgarly, associated only with bullying authoritarianism, rather than the devoted care of teachers who want to awaken their pupils to self-responsibility.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.