Questionnaire Assessment Potentially Overestimates Anxiety in Parkinson's Disease

Assessment of anxiety in Parkinson's disease (PD) is complicated by symptoms, such as trembling and shaking, that the two disorders have in common. This symptom overlap produces a potential for overestimation of the rate and severity of anxiety when assessed by self-report questionnaire. The purpose of this study is to estimate the extent to which anxiety scores in PD patients might be overestimated by two commonly-used mood state questionnaires. Fifty-nine patients with PD were administered the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Profile of Mood States. Results indicate that the rate of clinically significant anxiety on these measures is indeed higher than the rate of clinical anxiety as determined by interview alone, suggesting the potential for overestimation of anxiety in PD when using self-report questionnaires.     

Church-Based Social Support and Religious Coping

The purpose of this study is twofold: to explore the nature of church-based social support, and to see whether support received in religious settings is related to the use of religious coping methods. The data come from a nationwide survey of members of the Presbyterian Church USA. Three dimensions of religious support are examined in detail: emotional support from church members, spiritual support from church members, and emotional support from the pastor. These dimensions of support are used to evaluate an issue that has been largely overlooked in the literature—the relationship between religious support and religious coping. The findings reveal that people are especially inclined to use positive religious coping responses when they receive spiritual support from church members. Even though emotional support from the pastor also increases the use of religious coping methods, the relationship is not as strong. Finally, emotional support from church members has no effect.     

Was It My Fault? Effects of Counterfactual Mutation Focus and Self‐Presentation Strategy1

A recent perspective proposes that counterfactual thinking mutates controllable events that could have prevented a specific outcome, and so provides knowledge that can be used to prevent similar outcomes in the future. This implies that counterfactual thinking does not necessarily influence causal reasoning, although they may be associated in some circumstances. Results of 2 studies reported here show that, for serious outcomes where actions of the self are antecedents and different self‐actions might have prevented the outcome, there was an associated increase in self‐blame. Findings from these studies also suggest that whether self‐mutations are reflected in public expressions of blame will depend on whether the context favors self‐serving self‐presentation strategies, or mitigating strategies incorporating the face concerns of others.     

Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.     

The effect of divided attention on false memory depends on how memory is tested

In three experiments, we investigated the effects of divided attention on false memory, using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied six DRM lists with full attention and six in one of two divided-attention conditions (random number generation or digit monitoring). Both divided-attention conditions increased false recall of related words (Experiment 1) but reduced false recognition (Experiment 2). These results were confirmed in Experiment 3, in which the type of secondary task was manipulated within groups. We argue that the increase in false recall with divided attention reflects a change in participants' response criterion, whereas the decrease in false recognition occurs because the secondary tasks prevent participants from generating associates of the words presented at study.     

Electrophysiological and behavioral measures of the influence of literal and figurative contextual constraints on proverb comprehension

Proverbs tend to have meanings that are true both literally and figuratively (i.e., Lightning really doesn't strike the same place twice). Consequently, discourse contexts that invite a literal reading of a proverb should provide more conceptual overlap with the proverb, resulting in more rapid processing, than will contexts biased towards a non-literal reading. Despite this, previous research has failed to find the predicted processing advantage in reading times for familiar proverbs when presented in a literally biasing context. We investigate this issue further by employing both ERP methodology and a self-paced reading task and, second, by creating an item set that controls for problems with items employed in earlier studies. Our results indicate that although people do not take longer to read proverbs in the literally and proverbially biasing contexts, people have less difficulty integrating the statements in literal than figurative contexts, as shown by the ERP data. These differences emerge at the third word of the proverbs.     

The emergent coordination of cognitive function

1/f scaling has been observed throughout human physiology and behavior, but its origins and meaning remain a matter of debate. Some argue that it is a byproduct of ongoing processes in the brain or body and therefore of limited relevance to psychological theory. Others argue that 1/f scaling reflects a fundamental aspect of all physiological and cognitive functions, namely, that they emerge in the balance of independent versus interdependent component activities. In 4 experiments, series of key-press responses were used to test between these 2 alternative explanations. The critical design feature was to take 2 measures of each key-press response: reaction time and key-contact duration. These measures resulted in 2 parallel series of intrinsic fluctuations for each series of key-press responses. Intrinsic fluctuations exhibited 1/f scaling in both reaction times and key-contact durations, yet the 2 measures were uncorrelated with each other and separately perturbable. These and other findings indicate that 1/f scaling is too pervasive to be idiosyncratic and of limited relevance. It is instead argued that 1/f scaling reflects the coordinative, metastable basis of cognitive function.     

From the interpersonal to the international: understanding commitment to the "war on terror"

Applying constructs from the investment model used traditionally to understand interpersonal commitment, the present investigation seeks to elucidate social cognitive antecedents of commitment to the war on terror waged by the United States. In Study 1, satisfaction with, investments in, and alternatives to the war on terror predict levels of commitment to the war beyond several important control variables. In Study 2, levels of satisfaction with, investments in, and alternatives to the war are experimentally manipulated. The highest levels of commitment to the war are observed among participants exposed to a high satisfaction, high investment, and low alternatives scenario, and the lowest levels are among those exposed to a low satisfaction, low investment, and high alternatives scenario. These results support broadening the targets of commitment normally considered within the context of the investment model and suggest applying relational models to understanding broader societal concerns.     

Interpersonal Attachment and Patterns of Ideological Belief

We examine whether two general dimensions of sociopolitical belief—right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO)—are rooted in insecure psychological attachment. Based on an undergraduate sample ( N =  255), we model the relations among attachment styles, general worldviews, RWA, and SDO. A structural equation model indicated that anxious attachment led to RWA but not SDO and that this effect was mediated by the belief that the world is a dangerous place. In contrast, avoidant attachment led to SDO but not RWA, and this effect was mediated by the belief that the world is an uncaring, competitive jungle in which people are motivated to maximize personal utility. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature and origins of political conservatism.