The mechanics of reinforcement

Mathematical principles of reinforcement were developed in order to (1) account for the interaction of target responding and other behavior; (2) provide a simple graphical representation; (3) deal with measurement artifacts; and (4) permit a coherent transition from a statics to a dynamics of behavior. Rats and pigeons were trained to make a target response while general activity was measured with a stabilimeter. The course of behavioral change was represented as a trajectory through a two-dimensional behavior space. The trajectories rotated toward or away from the target dimension as the coupling between the target response and the incentive was varied. Higher rates of reinforcement expanded the trajectories; satiation and extinction contracted them. Concavity in some trajectories provided data for a dynamic generalization of the model.     

Inhibitory processing in the false belief task: Two conjectures

Although it is well established that four-year-olds outperform three-year-olds on predicting behavior from false beliefs, this is only true when the false belief is coupled with a positive desire. Four-year-olds perform poorly in an otherwise standard false belief task when the protagonist's desire is to avoid rather than to approach a target. We account for this by assuming that the attribution of a false belief involves inhibitory processing. We present two versions of an inhibition model of successful belief-desire reasoning.     

Faith and reason and physician-assisted suicide.

Aquinas's conception of the relationship of faith and reason calls into question the arguments and some of the conclusions advanced in contributions to the debate on physician-assisted suicide by David Thomasma and H. Tristram Engelhardt. An understanding of the nature of theology as based on revelation calls into question Thomasma's theological argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide based on the example of Christ and the martyrs. On the other hand, unaided reason calls into question his assumptions about the nature of death as in some cases a good for the human person. Finally, if Aquinas is right about the relationship of faith and reason, Engelhardt's sharp contrast between "Christian" and "secular" approaches to physician-assisted suicide needs reconsideration, although his conclusions about physician-assisted suicide would find support.     

Cynthia Willet,Maternal Ethics and Other Slave Moralities

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Runword: An IBM-PC software package for the collection and acoustic analysis of speeded naming responses

Researchers generally collect two dependent measures from most types of speeded responses: reaction time and error proportion. Recently, experimenters have tested lexical theories using alternative empirical measures, such as response force in decision tasks and response duration in naming tasks. We offer a set of software tools that expands the battery of dependent measures normally available to naming experimenters to include various duration and intensity measures of digitized voice recordings. This article explains the functionality, programming logic, and theoretical motivation behind each measure, as well as the software to support digitized naming experiments. The software runs in DOS on IBM-PC-compatible hardware with SoundBlaster 16-bit sound cards, and it takes advantage of the decreasing costs of hard-drive space and digital sound cards.     

‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a 'metaphysical fideist'. This involves looking at the notion of 'truth as subjectivity'. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of 'religious truth'.
In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense.     

Random Generation and the Executive Control of Working Memory

A series of experiments explores the capacity for generating sequences of random responses, relating it to the central executive component of working memory. Experiment 1 shows a broadly similar pattern of redundancy increasing with speed of generation for both the verbal generation of digits and the manual pressing of keys. In both cases deviations from randomness are shown to reflect the increasing use of a limited number of stereotyped response sets. The remaining experiments use keyboard generation. Experiment 2 demonstrates that concurrent immediate serial recall decreases randomness, and that longer recall sequences produce less random output. Experiments 3 and 4 show that whereas simple counting has no effect on randomness, serial recall, semantic category generation, and concurrent digit generation have substantial effects, and a concurrent fluid intelligence test has the greatest influence on the randomness of key pressing. It is suggested that the task of random generation resembles that of category fluency because it requires the subject to switch retrieval plans and inhibit repetition. On this basis it is predicted that a task involving repeated switching of categories will interfere with generation, despite being predictable and having a low memory load. Experiments 5 and 6 confirm this prediction. Strengths and limitations of the switching hypothesis are discussed, as are the implications of our results for the analysis of executive processes.     

Accuracy in perceptions of interpersonal interactions: effects of dysphoria, friendship, and similarity.

Conflicting views of depressives' interpersonal accuracy were addressed in an investigation of the accuracy of mild depressives (dysphorics) across differing social contexts. Women who were either friends or strangers and who were either similar or dissimilar in level of dysphoria conversed about 3 topics: a neutral topic, their own disclosure of a personal problem, and their partner's disclosure. Dysphorics were not more accurate in general than nondysphorics. After self-disclosure, all women more accurately detected sympathy from a similar stranger. After the partner's disclosure, women also better detected the mood of a similar partner. When interacting with nondysphoric strangers, however, dysphorics underestimated their partner's sympathy toward them. Implications for cognitive and interpersonal theories of depression and for depressives' relationships are discussed.