Sex-role orientation and psychological adjustment: Implications for the masculinity model

The present study tested the theory that masculine persons are as favorably adjusted psychologically as androgynous persons. Grouped on the basis of Bem Sex Role Inventory scores, androgynous, masculine, feminine, and undifferentiated college males and females were compared on MMPI, self-efficacy, and assertiveness measures. Strong support was obtained for superior adjustment of masculine males and females. A factor analysis was performed to elucidate the nature of the Masculinity scale, and it suggested that masculinity is related to assertiveness and self-efficacy rather than to the absence of maladjustment.     

CONSCIOUSNESS IN EXTREMITY: DISCOURSE ON MADNESS AMONG THE TABWA OF ZAIRE

The madman makes it possible for us to grasp the radical potential of consciousness at its limits. He contradicts the other person's discursive thinking towards the virtually inarticulable or unthought self. The Lakeside Tabwa of Shaba, Zaire, apprehend madness in three rather different, discursive domains. There is, firstly, wazimu, or its ‘mature’, incurable form, kizenzezia, considered as a fact of social life. It is seen as inverting the norms or functions of personhood and undoing those of mentality. It breaks down reciprocity, it is the negative function of ‘Death’. Secondly, it is in the prodromal illness, mubulibuli, and certain related emotion states, that madness appears as the artefact of another's malicious and intrusive ‘Desire’: the madman is said to have ‘closed anger’ in his heart alienating him from ongoing experience and interaction. Finally, in the diviner, the ‘otherness’ of gaze and speech is transformed into the normative power of clairvoyance bringing about its own logic and historicity. Here, the inversion of personhood becomes an emblem of insight and ‘Law’, but at the risk of insanity. The ethnographic encounter with the very otherness of the thinking of madness and of another culture toward the unthought itself is, in a sense, epistemogenic.     

Jealousy: loss of relationship rewards, loss of self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and anger

White's (1981) theory of romantic jealousy states that the loss (or anticipated loss) of a romantic partner to a rival causes two kinds of suffering: loss (or anticipated loss) of relationship rewards and loss (or anticipated loss) of self-esteem. Elaborating this theory, we proposed that loss of relationship rewards causes depression, whereas loss of self-esteem causes anxiety and anger. General support was found for White's theory and the elaborations, but not for the hypothesis that the loss of self-esteem causes anxiety. Anxiety may be a product of both loss of self-esteem and loss of relationship rewards.     

Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

ABSTRACT

While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.