Constitutivism and Inescapability: A Diagnosis

A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly because of itsinescapability that agency is a powerless source of normative authority. I investigate why our intuitionsconcerning the appeal to inescapability point into such contrary directions. Why do we feel the attraction ofgrounding categorical normativity in phenomena that not even the skeptic can ignore, on the one hand, butseem to hold dear the principle that “ought implies need not,” on the other? Instead of fully developing thethird, neutral, way of conceptualizing the relationship between inescapability and normativity that theimpasse between constitutivists and their critics suggests, this paper diagnoses the disagreement at hand.That agency is inescapable does neither guarantee nor rule out its status qua source of categoricalnormativity. Both camps of the debate overlook this option and depict their opponents as adhering to animplausible perspective of how appeals to inescapability and unconditional normativity are related. Sincethe debate relies on a false dichotomy it is not surprising that its participants so often talk past each other.     

The attentional blink is susceptible to concurrent perceptual processing demands

In a rapid serial visual presentation stream processing of a first target (T1) impairs detection or identification of a second target (T2) that appears within 500 ms after T1. This effect characterizes the so-called attentional blink (AB). To evaluate contemporary information-processing accounts of the AB phenomenon in terms of the underlying processing mechanisms the present study examined the potential influence of Task 1 difficulty on the AB effect. To this end, T1 contrast and T1 response requirements were systematically varied across four experiments. Experiment 1 ruled out a mere sensory basis of the contrast manipulation on T2 performance. When only T2 had to be reported (Experiment 2) an AB effect occurred that was slightly modulated by T1 contrast. When report of both T1 and T2 was required in a standard AB task (Experiment 3), the magnitude of the AB depended to a larger extent on stimulus contrast, and it increased further when speeded T1 choice responses were additionally required (Experiment 4). On the basis of the present impact of Task 1 difficulty on the AB effect we conclude that processing limitations cause the AB phenomenon. We discuss such limitations in terms of perceptual (T1 consolidation) and central (response selection) bottleneck processes.     

Seeing Motion and Apparent Motion

In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical positions has not yet been fully explored. In particular, I argue that the existence of apparent motion is compatible with an account of the nature of temporal experience that involves a version of direct realism. In doing so, I also argue against two other claims often made about apparent motion, viz. that apparent motion is the psychological phenomenon that underlies motion experience in the cinema, and that apparent motion is subjectively indistinguishable from real motion.     

An inexpensive real-time microcomputer-based cognitive laboratory system

A computer system, based on the Radio Shack Color Computer, for running experiments in cognitive psychology is described. The system was designed according to the following principles: first, all of the equipment should consist of inexpensive, off-the-shelf components; second, the language used to implement experiments should have real-time commands embedded within the character strings to be displayed, and these real-time commands should be interpreted at run time; third, the system should serve multiple subjects, yet one host should be able to run display terminals for several subjects on independent experiments; and fourth, the system should be able to interface to other display devices and other response-recording devices. Two examples of other devices are discussed: an oscilloscope for rapid visual display and an Apple Macintosh for display of pictures.     

Do you feel better or worse? The validity of perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits

The advantages of assessing self‐perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits in cross‐sectional as well as longitudinal studies are discussed in detail. The validity of self‐perceived mood deviations is analysed in a longitudinal study with three occasions of measurement and 176 participants. In order to assess self‐perceived mood deviations, participants rated the deviation of their momentary mood from how they felt in general with respect to 32 mood adjectives belonging to three mood scales (pleasant–unpleasant, calm–restless, awake–sleepy). Furthermore, mood states, mood traits, and other personality variables (hedonic level, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness) are assessed by self‐report. Using models of latent state–trait theory, it is shown that the self‐perceived mood deviation scales are reliable (reliabilities between 0.73 and 0.95) and sensitive to occasion‐specific fluctuations (occasion specificities between 0.38 and 0.72). The self‐perceived deviation scales show high correlations with latent occasion‐specific deviation variables defined on the basis of repeatedly measured mood states (high convergent validity). In contrast to self‐reported mood states, however, self‐perceived mood deviations show much smaller and in most cases non‐significant correlations with personality variables (high discriminant validity). Furthermore, it is shown that self‐perceived mood deviations can be used to suppress stable situation‐specific variance in mood traits defined as aggregated states. Therefore, it can be demonstrated that including self‐perceived mood deviations in analyses on mood–personality associations enhances the association coefficients considerably. Finally, the implications of the results for the individual assessment of mood deviations, as well as for studies on affect and personality, are discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of visual spatio-temporal memory: The icon revisited

With a minimal set of assumptions resulting from considerations about the perception of temporal structure, we argue for the existence of a spatio-temporal memory established by the mapping of time into simultaneous physical properties. The important point of this model is the distinction between external, physical time and the internal representation of time. An immediate consequence of such a structure is the emergence of properties usually associated with the concept of iconic memory or informational persistence. Some of these properties may hence be regarded as epiphenomena produced by the testing of a spatio-temporal system with tachistoscopic spatial stimuli. The model can explain properties of the immediate memory span, the lack of effect of exposure duration on tachistoscopic report, the partial-report superiority, the decay of iconic memory, and effects of a backward mask. It does not only avoid the incompatibility problems of the frozen-image concept in dynamic vision, but also provides an adequate basis for the processing of time-varying scenes.     

Mental-state attribution drives rapid, reflexive gaze following

When presented with a face stimulus whose gaze is diverted, observers’ attention shifts to locations fixated by the face. Such “gaze following” has been characterized by some previous studies as a consequence of sophisticated theory of mind processes, but by others (particularly those employing the “gaze-cuing” paradigm) as an involuntary response that is triggered directly and reflexively by the physical features of a face. To address this apparent contradiction, we modified the gaze-cuing paradigm using a deception procedure to convince observers that prerecorded videos of an experimenter making head turns and wearing mirrored goggles were a “live” video link to an adjacent room. In two experiments, reflexive gaze following was found when observers believed that the model was wearing transparent goggles and could see, but it was significantly reduced when they believed that the experimenter wore opaque goggles and could not see. These results indicate that the attribution of the mental state “seeing” to a face plays a role in controlling even reflexive gaze following.     

Static and Phasic Cross-Talk Effects in Discrete Bimanual Reversal Movements

The authors examined the hypothesis that the phasic and the static cross-talk effects found in bimanual movements with different target amplitudes originate at different functional levels of motor control, which implies that the effects can be dissociated experimentally. When the difference between the short and the long amplitudes assigned to the 2 hands of 12 participants was decreased, the static effect disappeared. In contrast, the phasic effect, which can be observed only at short preparation intervals, did not disappear; although it became smaller in absolute terms, in relative terms it did not. In addition, the authors compared the time course of amplitude assimilation with the time course of amplitude variability and examined the correlation between left hand and right hand amplitudes. The disappearance of the phasic amplitude assimilation at increasing preparation intervals turned out to be delayed relative to the decline of the correlation between amplitudes. That finding suggests that the assimilation of mean amplitudes and the correlation between left hand and right hand amplitudes are not fully equivalent indicators of intermanual interactions, but may indicate different kinds of inter-limb coupling.