Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom

Promotion of pro‐social attitudes and moral behaviour is a crucial and challenging task for social orders. As traditional ways such as moral education have some, but apparently and unfortunately only limited effect, some authors have suggested employing biomedical means such as pharmaceuticals or electrical stimulation of the brain to alter individual psychologies in a more direct way — moral bioenhancement. One of the salient questions in the nascent ethical debate concerns the impact of such interventions on human freedom. Advocates argue that moral bioenhancements do not pose a serious threat to freedom. This contention, however, is based on an overly narrow, if not impoverished, sense of freedom, which comprises only freedom of action and freedom of will. Mind‐altering interventions primarily affect another sense of freedom: freedom of mind, a concept that has not received much attention although it should rank among the most important legal and political freedoms. The article introduces three senses of mental freedom potentially infringed upon by moral bioenhancement and places it in a broader perspective. Ignorance of mental freedom has far‐ranging consequences for the shape of the political and legal order at large. As many advocates are apparently not aware of the freedoms they seek to undermine, their calls for moral enhancement programmes are dangerously premature.     

Spiritual Dryness and Celibacy in Catholic Priests – Discernment of Ongoing Spiritual Journeys from Relational and Psychosexual Immaturities

Pastoral Psychology - The celibacy of Roman Catholic priests, in contrast to a single lifestyle, implies an existential choice for spiritual reasons as a conscious motivation. Nevertheless, several...     

Meerkats (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Suricata suricatta</Emphasis>) fail to prosocially donate food in an experimental set-up

Although humans are usually believed to be prosocial, the evolutionary origins of prosociality are largely debated. One hypothesis is that cooperative breeding has been one major precursor to the emergence of prosociality. In vertebrates, however, experimental evidence of prosociality has been mainly gathered in non-human primates. In this study, we tested the cooperative breeding hypothesis in cooperative breeding meerkats (Suricata suricatta). In particular, we tested whether meerkats take into account partners’ benefits when distributing food rewards. Nine individuals were presented with two platforms baited with different food distributions (providing food to themselves, to a partner or both). In all conditions, the decision to operate the apparatus was based on the presence of food on the subject’s side, and not on the possible benefits to partners. Despite being cooperative breeders, meerkats in this study failed to be prosocial, suggesting that prosociality in this species may be limited to specific contexts.     

Multiple value dimensions spill‐over—An experimental approach in a consumption system comprising a product and a service

Through the customer's eyes, wireless telecommunications are a typical example of a so‐called consumption system, comprising a product and a service subsystem. People consume an entity in which multiple value perceptions from both subsystems (wireless service and cell phone) are gained and affect attitudes, intentions and future behaviour within and across the subsystems. Value perceptions are gained along the dimensions of functionality, economic aspects, emotions and social facets, regarding both service and product. Some of those value perceptions spill over, from product to service and vice versa, while others do not. Those that spill over affect value perceptions and loyalty intentions in the other subsystem. These results provide the basis for deriving practical implications for the marketing management of firms operating in such a consumption system. Given the presence of spill‐over effects, both parties involved are advised to revise their marketing activities accordingly. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Two distinct patterns of interference in between-attribute Stroop matching tasks

In between-attribute Stroop matching tasks, participants compare the meaning (or the color) of a Stroop stimulus with a probe color (or meaning) while attempting to ignore the Stroop stimulus’s task-irrelevant attribute. Interference in this task has been explained by two competing theories: A semantic competition account and a response competition account. Recent results favor the response competition account, which assumes that interference is caused by a task-irrelevant comparison. However, the comparison of studies is complicated by the lack of a consensus on how trial types should be classified and analyzed. In this work, we review existing findings and theories and provide a new classification of trial types. We report two experiments that demonstrate the superiority of the response competition account in explaining the basic pattern of performance while also revealing its limitations. Two qualitatively distinct interference patterns are identified, resulting from different types of task-irrelevant comparisons. By finding the same interference pattern across task versions, we were additionally able to demonstrate the comparability of processes across two task versions frequently used in neurophysiological and cognitive studies. An integrated account of both types of interference is presented and discussed.     

Cut-Elimination for Quantified Conditional Logic

A semantic embedding of quantified conditional logic in classical higher-order logic is utilized for reducing cut-elimination in the former logic to existing results for the latter logic. The presented embedding approach is adaptable to a wide range of other logics, for many of which cut-elimination is still open. However, special attention has to be payed to cut-simulation, which may render cut-elimination as a pointless criterion.     

Conscientiousness but not agreeableness mediates females’ tendency toward being a morning person

Individuals differ in their chronotype, and some are identified as morning ones and others as evening ones. Earlier studies showed that women were higher on morningness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. In this study, we aimed at exploring the mediational effects of conscientiousness and agreeableness in the relationship of gender and morningness‐eveningness. Participants were 669 university students. Results supported positive relationships between morningness and conscientiousness and agreeableness and between conscientiousness and agreeableness. Females were higher on all these three variables. Mediation analyses suggested that the effect of gender (here females) on chronotype (here morningness) was mediated by conscientiousness but not agreeableness so that after the mediation partially occurred, the gender's effect did not remain significant anymore. This study backed our hypothesis that conscientiousness might play a more pronounced role than the intrinsic diurnal rhythm concerning the sex differences in chronotype.