Letter legibility and visual word recognition

Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word and decreases drastically to both sides of thisoptimal viewing position. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect (VPE) and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the VPE becomes more exaggerated. To further investigate this phenomenon, we improved letter legibility by magnifying letter size in a way that was proportional to the distance from fixation (e.g., TABLE). Contrary to what would be expected if the VPE were due to limits of acuity, improving the legibility of letters has only a restricted influence on performance. In particular, for long words, a strong VPE remains even when letter legibility is equalized across eccentricities. The failure to neutralize the VPE is interpreted in terms of perceptual learning: Since normally, because of acuity limitations, the only information available in parafoveal vision concerns low-resolution features of letters; even when magnification provides better information, readers are unable to make use of it.     

A novel tool-use mode in animals: New Caledonian crows insert tools to transport objects

New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) rely heavily on a range of tools to extract prey. They manufacture novel tools, save tools for later use, and have morphological features that facilitate tool use. We report six observations, in two individuals, of a novel tool-use mode not previously reported in non-human animals. Insert-and-transport tool use involves inserting a stick into an object and then moving away, thereby transporting both object and tool. All transported objects were non-food objects. One subject used a stick to transport an object that was too large to be handled by beak, which suggests the tool facilitated object control. The function in the other cases is unclear but seems to be an expression of play or exploration. Further studies should investigate whether it is adaptive in the wild and to what extent crows can flexibly apply the behaviour in experimental settings when purposive transportation of objects is advantageous.     

Constitutivism and Inescapability: A Diagnosis

A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly because of itsinescapability that agency is a powerless source of normative authority. I investigate why our intuitionsconcerning the appeal to inescapability point into such contrary directions. Why do we feel the attraction ofgrounding categorical normativity in phenomena that not even the skeptic can ignore, on the one hand, butseem to hold dear the principle that “ought implies need not,” on the other? Instead of fully developing thethird, neutral, way of conceptualizing the relationship between inescapability and normativity that theimpasse between constitutivists and their critics suggests, this paper diagnoses the disagreement at hand.That agency is inescapable does neither guarantee nor rule out its status qua source of categoricalnormativity. Both camps of the debate overlook this option and depict their opponents as adhering to animplausible perspective of how appeals to inescapability and unconditional normativity are related. Sincethe debate relies on a false dichotomy it is not surprising that its participants so often talk past each other.     

Negation in context: Evidence from the visual world paradigm

Literature assumes that negation is more difficult to understand than affirmation, but this might depend on the pragmatic context. The goal of this paper is to show that pragmatic knowledge modulates the unfolding processing of negation due to the previous activation of the negated situation. To test this, we used the visual world paradigm. In this task, we presented affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) while viewing two images of the affirmed and denied entities. The critical sentence in each item was preceded by one of three types of contexts: an inconsistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) that activates the negated situation (a poor man), a consistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual situation (a rich man), or a neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town) that activates neither of the two models previously suggested. The results corroborated our hypothesis. Pragmatics is implicated in the unfolding processing of negation. We found an increase in fixations on the target compared to the baseline for negative sentences at 800?ms in the neutral context, 600?ms in the inconsistent context, and 1450?ms in the consistent context. Thus, when the negated situation has been previously introduced via an inconsistent context, negation is facilitated.     

Theism, Blame And Perfection

Blame and also punishment do not reach many agents in the sense that many agents are not motivated to ethically self-correct, and in fact, may be worsened by these practices. The main reasons agents may not be reached by them are that (on the most plausible secular or naturalistic ethical theory) (a) the agent's second nature may make inaccessible to him a sound appreciation of ethical considerations, and (b) the fixity of mature character may make ethical self-correction practically impossible. Still, when they are ethically rationalized, blame and punishment seem to be requirements. Even the most plausible secular or naturalistic ethics involves an important kind of incompleteness and unclarity concerning this issue. The Jewish and Christian traditions involve conceptions of the accessibility of ethical considerations and also the possibility of character change (both ultimately grounded in grace) in ways that enable us to overcome the perplexity about blame and punishment. They are not 'good for nothing' even when they fail to improve agents. The religious traditions' conceptions of moral agency and the possibility of perfection enable us to see why there are reasons not to ethically 'write off' even persistently vicious agents. Moreover, we can see that the fulfilling of ethical requirements is an enabling condition for perfection that is not merely ethical. To highlight the contrast between the naturalistic view and the theistic view, Aristotle's moral psychology and moral epistemology are contrasted with those of Maimonides and Aquinas, both of whom borrow heavily from Aristotle, but fundamentally transform what they borrow.     

Evaluating Gender Biases on Actual Job Performance of Real People: A Meta‐Analysis1

This study examined gender bias on job performance in work settings where confounding variables (e. g., organizational level, experience, education) were cautiously taken into consideration to ensure fair comparisons. Although previous meta‐analyses examined gender biases on evaluations, findings in tightly controlled laboratory environments may differ from those in highly complicated field studies. We found little evidence of overall gender bias in performance appraisals in nonconfounded field studies. However, there were significant pro‐male biases when only men served as raters. Measure‐specific gender stereotypicality, instead of genera! stereotypicality about the job, produced gender bias in performance appraisal. Masculine measures produced pro‐male bias, and feminine measures produced pro‐female bias.     

Argumentational Integrity: A Training Program for Dealing with Unfair Argumentative Contributions

In this article we present a training program based on the empirical research conducted in the project 'argumentational integrity'. After a brief sketch of the problem dimensions concerning unfair argumentation we give an overview of the training concept and the underlying empirical research. Exemplification of the instructional design is given for the second and the fifth training dimension (standards of argumentational integrity and reactions to unfair contributions). Finally we indicate how the training is to be evaluated and present initial results demonstrating that in comparison with an untrained control group participants in the training significantly improve their skills in identifying and naming argumentative rule violations.     

Do you feel better or worse? The validity of perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits

The advantages of assessing self‐perceived deviations of mood states from mood traits in cross‐sectional as well as longitudinal studies are discussed in detail. The validity of self‐perceived mood deviations is analysed in a longitudinal study with three occasions of measurement and 176 participants. In order to assess self‐perceived mood deviations, participants rated the deviation of their momentary mood from how they felt in general with respect to 32 mood adjectives belonging to three mood scales (pleasant–unpleasant, calm–restless, awake–sleepy). Furthermore, mood states, mood traits, and other personality variables (hedonic level, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness) are assessed by self‐report. Using models of latent state–trait theory, it is shown that the self‐perceived mood deviation scales are reliable (reliabilities between 0.73 and 0.95) and sensitive to occasion‐specific fluctuations (occasion specificities between 0.38 and 0.72). The self‐perceived deviation scales show high correlations with latent occasion‐specific deviation variables defined on the basis of repeatedly measured mood states (high convergent validity). In contrast to self‐reported mood states, however, self‐perceived mood deviations show much smaller and in most cases non‐significant correlations with personality variables (high discriminant validity). Furthermore, it is shown that self‐perceived mood deviations can be used to suppress stable situation‐specific variance in mood traits defined as aggregated states. Therefore, it can be demonstrated that including self‐perceived mood deviations in analyses on mood–personality associations enhances the association coefficients considerably. Finally, the implications of the results for the individual assessment of mood deviations, as well as for studies on affect and personality, are discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.