A gentle reminder that mean does not imply modal behavior: Few are in-group biased in minimal groups

Previous research reports that people organized into newly formed, arbitrary groups (i.e., minimal groups) are on average in-group biased. However, that people on average behave in a certain way does not imply that most people behave that way. Here, I report four studies (n = 224) demonstrating in-group biased average behaviors driven by a minority of about 30% participants. Further, only 14% reported allocating resources in a group-biased manner because they “favored the in-group.” I investigate and discuss how methodological issues related to non-normally distributed data, not taking participants’ intentions into account, and using fixed response matrices can lead to overestimations of how widespread in-group bias is in minimal groups.     

Hegel and Gadamer on Bildung

Hegel argues that Bildung (cultivation or education) involves an ability to reflect on one's habitual beliefs in a detached, uncommitted way. According to Hegel, the educated (gebildete) individual is able to consider a manifold of standpoints on a given issue through awareness of the historical and cultural variability of beliefs. Hans‐Georg Gadamer invokes Hegel's account of Bildung in arguing that historical study permits current presuppositions (Vorurteile) to become reflected through the awareness of cognitive plurality and change that such study brings about. The paper mainly tries to show three things: (i) that Hegel is a source of inspiration for Gadamer in this regard but that there are also important differences between their accounts of Bildung; (ii) that these accounts are not unambiguous; and (iii) that Gadamer, in particular, makes somewhat elusive claims on the power of Bildung.     

An investigation on the olfactory capabilities of domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris)

Animal Cognition - The extraordinary olfactory capabilities in detection and rescue dogs are well-known. However, the olfactory performance varies by breed and search environment (Jezierski...     

Engaging with Cultural Sport Psychology to Explore Systemic Sexual Exploitation in USA Gymnastics: A Call to Commitments

In this article, we engage with cultural sport psychology (CSP) to explore sexual exploitation in USA Gymnastics. Specifically, using critical reflexivity on the Larry Nassar case, we bring to life how systemic abuse in sport is more than a tragedy. We argue that perpetration of abuse persists in sport spaces largely because athletes train and compete in relations of force that privilege structures and practices to which athletes are subordinate. A return to recenter discussions on the significance of oppression and power in the larger discourse and ethical practice of CSP became imperative with the news of U.S. doctor Larry Nassar’s sexual predation. As tools in our advocacy for the reduction of sport sexism and sexual exploitation and abuse, we offer four ethical commitments to the field as we examine the ways systemic gendered violence and oppressions in sport are perpetrated in systems, decision-making, and every practices. We invite CSP scholars and sport psychology practitioners to interrogate and disrupt systemic intersectional disempowerment and cultures of sexual exploitation.     

Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism

This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as the most promising classical invariantist solution to the puzzle, namely, that beliefs about the outcomes of fair lotteries do not qualify as knowledge because they are too lucky to do so (or, relatedly, because they do not satisfy a safety condition on knowledge), while other beliefs based on potentially weaker inductive grounds are not too lucky (or, relatedly, because they are safe). A case is presented that shows that this solution to the puzzle is actually not viable. It is argued that there is no obvious alternative solution in sight and that therefore the puzzle still awaits a classical invariantist solution.