Individuals differ in the attentional blink: Mental speed and intra-subject stability matter

The failure to correctly report two targets (“T₁”, “T₂”) that follow each other in close temporal proximity has been called the “attentional blink” (AB). The AB has, so far, mainly been studied using experimental approaches. The present studies investigated individual differences in AB performance, revealing (among further findings) a high positive correlation between the accuracies of detecting the two targets correctly (r = 0.69); and between T₂∣T₁ accuracy and psychometric intelligence (0.41 ≤ r ≤ 0.43) and RT variability in short-term and working memory (− 0.38 ≤ r ≤ − 0.45). Together, these results support important aspects of major theoretical accounts of the AB from an individual differences perspective and introduce intelligence and intra-subject stability as contributing factors in AB performance.     

Defeat and proficiencies

Virtue epistemology is the view that beliefs are attempts at truth (or perhaps knowledge) and, as a result, can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt. Moreover, virtue epistemology identifies central epistemic properties with normative properties of beliefs as attempts. In particular, knowledge is apt belief and justified belief is competent belief. This paper develops a systematic virtue epistemological account of defeat (of justification/competence). I provide reason to think that defeat occurs not only for beliefs but for attempts more general. The key constructive idea is that defeaters are evidence that attempting (in a certain way) isn't successful and that defeaters defeat the competence of an attempt when one stands in a certain normative relation to the defeater. I argue that while this account handles paradigm cases of defeat both within epistemology and beyond nicely, cases of external (sometimes also ‘normative’ or ‘propositional’) defeat continue to cause trouble. To handle these cases, I develop a distinctively functionalist version of virtue epistemology. This functionalist version of virtue epistemology allows me to countenance proficiencies, that is, roughly, abilities that have the function to produce successes under certain conditions. It is the normative import of proficiencies that delivers the normative relation that serves to explain defeat in cases of external defeat. In this way, the functionalist version of virtue epistemology ushers the way towards a satisfactory account even of external defeat.     

Feeling the green? Value orientation as a moderator of emotional response to green electricity

Framing effects on emotional responses in a green electricity choice are investigated in a survey of a random sample of 655 Swedish residents. The results show that overall more positive and less negative emotions are experienced for a promotion frame (“choosing green electricity and paying more”) than for a prevention frame (“not choosing green electricity and paying less”). Value orientation is shown to moderate the framing effect in that for the promotion frame, individuals with a self‐transcendence value orientation show the most positive and least negative emotion, whereas for the prevention frame, individuals with a self‐enhancement value orientation show the most positive and least negative emotion. Emotional responses are further shown to mediate the relationship between value orientation and intention to purchase eco‐labeled electricity.     

Measuring Implicit Gender-Role Orientation: The Gender Initial Preference Task

Individuals prefer their name letters over nonname letters, which is known as the name-letter effect (NLE). This research aimed to examine a possible NLE for gender-role orientation (GRO) by rating letters for their gender-typicality in an initial preference task (Gender-IPT). Indeed, a clear NLE appeared: Men rated their initials as more male-typical, whereas women rated them as more female-typical. The Gender-IPT showed good convergent validity with other direct and indirect (Gender Implicit Association Test) measures of GRO as well as predictive validity with sensation seeking and gender-typical everyday life behaviors. The Gender-IPT seems to be a useful and practical indirect measure to assess GRO in a short, convenient, and computer-independent way, complementing other indirect measures of GRO.     

Feeling before knowing why: The role of the orbitofrontal cortex in intuitive judgments—an MEG study

In theory, intuitive decisions are made immediately, without conscious, reasoned thought. They are experienced as decisions based on hunches that cannot be explicitly described but, nevertheless, guide subsequent action. Investigating the underlying neural mechanisms, previous research has found the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to be crucial to intuitive processes, but its specific role has remained unclear. On the basis of a two-stage conceptualization of intuition suggested by Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker Cognitive Psychology, 22, 72-110 (1990), we attempt to clarify the OFC’s role in intuitive processing. We propose that it functions as an early integrator of incomplete stimulus input guiding subsequent processing by means of a coarse representation of the gist of the information. On the subjective level, this representation would be perceived as a (gut) feeling biasing the decision. Our aim in the present study was to test this neural model and rule out alternative explanations of OFC activation in intuitive judgments. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to record participants' electromagnetic brain responses during a visual coherence judgment task. As in earlier studies, the OFC was found to be activated when participants perceived coherence. Using MEG, it could be shown that this increase in activation began earlier in the OFC than in temporal object recognition areas. Moreover, the present study demonstrated that OFC activation was independent of physical stimulus characteristics, task requirements, and participants’ explicit recognition of the stimuli presented. These results speak to the OFC’s fundamental role in the early steps of intuitive judgments and suggest the proposed neural model as a promising starting point for future investigations.     

Surveillance,Self and Smartphones: Tracking Practices in the Nightlife

This paper is the result of the EMERGING ICT FOR CITIZEN VEILLANCE-workshop organized by the JRC, Ispra, Italy, March 2014. The aim of this paper is to explore how the subject participates in surveillance situations with a particular focus on how users experience everyday tracking technologies and practices. Its theoretical points of departure stem from Surveillance Studies in general and notions of participatory surveillance (Albrechtslund 2008) and empowering exhibitionism (Koskela in Surveill Soc 2(2/3):199–215, 2004) in particular. We apply these theoretical notions on smartphones and its users to investigate the combination of participation and surveillance. Empirically, the paper uses interviews held with urban nightlife visitors to uncover practices of smartphone use. This qualitative and explorative study contributes to the concept of participatory surveillance by discussing to what extent smartphone-users’ actions and motivations can be seen as forms of surveillance and how that influences these actors in a (nightly) public space. We finish by setting out directions for studying mobile technologies of the self.     

Heuristics versus direct calculation,and age-related differences in multiplication: an evidence accumulation account of plausibility decisions in arithmetic

We offer a new theoretical angle for cognitive arithmetic, which is that evidence accumulation may play a role in problem plausibility decisions. We build upon previous studies that have considered such a hypothesis, and here formally evaluate the paradigm. We develop the finding that performance differences, due to variations in strategy use and aging effects, can indeed be reasonably explained through these accumulation-to-bound cognitive models. Results suggest that these models may be effectively used to learn more about the underlying cognitive processes. In this study, we modelled young (18–24) and older (68–82) adults’ solution times in performing arithmetic verification (e.g. whether 8?×?5?=?41 is true/false). The domain-relevant factors in strategy use (problem-verification heuristics) and aging differences (older/younger adult groups) were analyzed by a response process model of the latency data, that is fit by participant and item. Lower thresholds accounted for the faster response times (RTs) for problems solved with heuristics (arithmetic rule-violation checking strategies), as opposed to problems solved by calculation approaches. A more rapid accumulation accounted for faster RTs on problems in which two arithmetic rules were violated (strategy combination) rather than one. Third, higher thresholds (i.e. preferring to have greater certainty before responding) accounted for older adults’ slower speed. These findings are in support of accumulation models being relevant for more complex cognitive tasks, as well as to account for the age-related differences therein.