The abstract selection task: new data and an almost comprehensive model

A complete quantitative account of P. Wason's (1966) abstract selection task is proposed. The account takes the form of a mathematical model. It is assumed that some response patterns are caused by inferential reasoning, whereas other responses reflect cognitive processes that affect each card selection separately and independently of other card selections. The model parameters assess the contributions of different interpretational, inferential, and heuristic factors that jointly determine performance in the selection task. The interpretation of most of the model parameters in terms of these different factors is validated experimentally. This model of the selection task is the first to account for the observed frequencies of all 16 possible response patterns that can arise.     

Attention bias towards personally relevant stimuli: the individual emotional Stroop task

The emotional Stroop task is a widely used method for investigating attentional bias towards stimuli due to mood or affect. In general, standardized stimuli are used, which might not be appropriate when investigating individual contextual frameworks. It was investigated whether words chosen to be related to individuals' personal life events would produce more pronounced Stroop interference (as an indicator of attentional bias) than stimuli without any personal relevance. Twenty-six nonclinical subjects, 20 female and 6 male, participated in the study. Mean age was 36.1 yr. (SD = 18.1). All were recruited by means of local advertising. Stimulus material consisted of four word types: personal words related to negative life events with and without current personal relevance, and negative and neutral words without any personal relevance. Words were presented in three blocks. Analysis of variance showed main effects for word type and blocks, with slower reactions in the personally relevant conditions than in the negative, or neutral conditions, and in response to the first blocks as opposed to the last. These findings indicate that regardless of the word valence, personally relevant stimuli evoke more pronounced Stroop interference than do stimuli without personal relevance.     

The positivity proportion effect: A list context effect in masked affective priming

In the evaluative decision task, participants decide whether target words denote something positive or negative. Positive and negative prime words are known to engender so-called affective priming effects in this task. Primes were sandwich masked, and the proportion of positive to negative target words was manipulated. In Experiment 1, prime valence and positivity proportion interacted, so that primes of the less frequently presented target valence caused larger priming effects. Experiment 2 rendered an explanation of this interaction in terms of response bias unlikely, Experiment 3 ruled out a peripheral locus of the effect, and Experiment 4 ruled out an account in terms of stimulus repetition. The effect is explained by means of an attentional bias favoring the rare kind of valence.     

Integration of syntactic and semantic information in predictive processing: cross-linguistic evidence from German and English

Two visual-world eyetracking experiments were conducted to investigate whether, how, and when syntactic and semantic constraints are integrated and used to predict properties of subsequent input. Experiment 1 contrasted auditory German constructions such as, The hare-nominative eats ... (the cabbage-acc) versus The hare-accusative eats ... (the fox-nom), presented with a picture containing a hare, fox, cabbage, and distractor. We found that the probabilities of the eye movements to the cabbage and fox before the onset of NP2 were modulated by the case-marking of NP1, indicating that the case-marking (syntactic) information and verbs' semantic constraints are integrated rapidly enough to predict the most plausible NP2 in the scene. Using English versions of the same stimuli in active/passive voice (Experiment 2), we replicated the same effect, but at a slightly earlier position in the sentence. We discuss the discrepancies in the two Germanic languages in terms of the ease of integrating information across, or within, constituents.     

Perceptual learning in contrast detection: presence and cost of shifts in response criteria

Contemporary theoretical accounts of perceptual learning typically assume that observers are either unbiased or stably biased across the course of learning. However, standard methods for estimating thresholds, as they are typically used, do not allow this assumption to be tested. We present an approach that allows for this test specific to perceptual learning for contrast detection. We show that reliable decreases in detection thresholds and increases in hit rates are not uniformly accompanied by reliable increases in sensitivity (d′), but are regularly accompanied by reliable liberal shifts in response criteria (c). In addition, we estimate the extent to which sensitivity could have increased in the absence of these liberal shifts. The results pose a challenge to the assumption that perceptual learning has limited or no impact on response criteria.     

Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

ABSTRACT

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132(5), 692–731. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioural information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings (Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 17(11), 954–958. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x) This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, S., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2014). The role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(2), 187–209. doi:10.1177/1088868314527832), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.     

Two-Year-Old Children's Understanding of Visual Perception and Knowledge Formation in Others

A landmark study by O'Neill (1996 O'Neill , D. K. ( 1996 ). Two-year-old children's sensitivity to a parent's knowledge state when making requests . Child Development , 67 , 659 – 677 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), in which 2-year-old children were found to be more likely to point toward a hidden object to help an adult who was unsighted during the hiding event than to point helpfully for an adult who had been sighted, seems to undermine the conventional assumption that children this young do not understand the relationship between seeing/not seeing and knowing/not knowing. Concerns remain, however, as to whether the children's success was mentalistic or behavioral. In two experiments, 2-year-old children received first-person experience with two kinds of glasses of different colors but with apparently identical opaque lenses, one of which blocked their vision and the other of which they could see through. When the parent was wearing these glasses, the children were able to use their own first-person experience of the glasses to infer whether the adult could see or not. Despite this, they did not understand the causal relationship between visual perception and knowledge formation, as demonstrated by their indiscriminate pointing behavior in response to an ignorant or a knowledgeable parent. However, in a third experiment, we examined the relationship between experience of the adult's behavioral incompetence when wearing glasses of a certain color and the children's pointing behavior. Here they tended to point appropriately. We conclude that the phenomenon reported by O'Neill (1996 O'Neill , D. K. ( 1996 ). Two-year-old children's sensitivity to a parent's knowledge state when making requests . Child Development , 67 , 659 – 677 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) yields to an account in terms of the 2-year-olds' assumptions about behavioral competence/incompetence rather than about knowledge/ignorance.     

The volitive and the executive function of intentions

Many philosophers of action, including Bratman and Mele, conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition (e.g. for Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant) another function of intentions, which may be called “volitive”, played a much more prominent role: intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realised and thus, in a possibly rational way, synthesise our motivational, desiderative, and perhaps affective as well as cognitive attitudes towards this action. This paper argues that intentions must fulfil both functions and then develops a concept of ‘intention’ that integrates both functions. One reason for including the volitive function in the definition of ‘intention’ is that only via this function the value of actions as such is realised, namely to enable the person, the kernel of the self to express herself and to control the world. Various forms of dissociation of the two functions are discussed and a proposal how to deal with such cases in the definition of ‘intention’ is developed.     

A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts

Abstract: This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.