Different paths to protest: predictors of collective action in the Occupy Movement

This study investigated the variables that shaped people's willingness to engage in collective action in the context of the Occupy Movement. Data were collected in 2011 from nonprotesting supporters at the New York City Occupy encampment and active occupiers at the New York and Atlanta encampments. Participants distinguished between different kinds of collective action based on cost. Furthermore, different predictors motivated distinct kinds of collective action. Identity and anger predicted low‐cost collective action. Efficacy predicted relatively costly collective action and mediated the link between identity and costly collective action. This study provides evidence that people draw distinctions between different actions based on cost and that, when it comes to predicting collective action, these distinctions matter.     

Limits to preference and the sensitivity of choice to rate and amount of food

Studies of choice holding food‐amount ratio constant while varying food‐rate ratio within sessions showed that local changes in preference depend on relative amount of food. The present study investigated whether sensitivity of choice to food‐rate ratio and sensitivity to food‐amount ratio are independent of one another when food‐rate ratios are varied across sessions and food‐amount ratios are varied within sessions. Food deliveries for rats’ presses on the left and right levers were scheduled according to three different food‐rate ratios of 1:1, 9:1, and 1:9; each food‐rate ratio lasted for 106 sessions and was arranged independently of seven food‐amount ratios (7:1, 6:2, 5:3, 4:4, 3:5, 2:6, and 1:7 food pellets) occurring within sessions in random sequence. Each amount ratio lasted for 10 food deliveries and was separated from another by a 60‐s blackout. Sensitivity to rate ratio was high (1.0) across food deliveries. Sensitivity to amount ratio was low when food rates were equal across alternatives, but was high when rate ratio and amount ratio opposed one another. When rate ratio and amount ratio went in the same direction, choice ratio reached an elevenfold limit which reduced sensitivity to approximately zero. We conclude that three factors affect sensitivity to amount: (1) the limit to preference, (2) the equal effect on preference of amounts greater than four pellets, and (3) the absence of differential effects of switches in amount in the equal‐rates (1:1) condition. Taken together, these findings indicate that rate and amount only sometimes combine independently as additive variables to determine preference when amount ratios vary frequently within sessions.     

Alone in the Crowd: I Failed the ABGC Certification Exam

The American Board of Genetic Counseling (ABGC) certification examination (often referred to as “the board exam”) has become a milestone within the field of genetic counseling. For many, it is the final standardized test taken and indicates the examinee has met “the standards of minimal competence to practice as a genetic counselor” (Bulletin 2015). Although voluntary, certification is strongly encouraged, and in some employment situations, required. Although recent statistics indicate the majority of those who take the test pass, each year there are those who sit for the test unsuccessfully. Despite this fact, exam failure and tools for dealing with this experience are not often broached in the literature. This essay recalls my experiences with a failed exam attempt and the subsequent emotional turmoil. It also aims to start the conversation regarding the difficulty of coping with the “secret” shame of public, professional failure, and suggests there is room for further discussion and resource development in this area.     

Rare targets are less susceptible to attention capture once detection has begun

Rare or low probability targets are detected more slowly and/ or less accurately than higher probability counterparts. Various proposals have implicated perceptual and response-based processes in this deficit. Recent evidence, however, suggests that it is attentional in nature, with low probability targets requiring more attentional resources than high probability ones to detect. This difference in attentional requirements, in turn, suggests the possibility that low and high probability targets may have different susceptibilities to attention capture, which is also known to be resource-dependent. Supporting this hypothesis, we found that, once attentional resources have begun to be engaged by detection processes, low, but not high, probability targets have a reduced susceptibility to capture. Our findings speak to several issues. First, they indicate that the likelihood of attention capture occurring when a given task-relevant stimulus is being processed is dependent, to some extent, on how said stimulus is represented within mental task sets. Second, they provide added support for the idea that the behavioural deficit associated with low probability targets is attention-based. Finally, the current data point to reduced top-down biasing of target templates as a likely mechanism underlying the attentional locus of the deficit in question.     

Reference in human and non-human primate communication: What does it take to refer?

The concept of functional reference has been used to isolate potentially referential vocal signals in animal communication. However, its relatedness to the phenomenon of reference in human language has recently been brought into question. While some researchers have suggested abandoning the concept of functional reference altogether, others advocate a revision of its definition to include contextual cues that play a role in signal production and perception. Empirical and theoretical work on functional reference has also put much emphasis on how the receiver understands the referential signal. However, reference, as defined in the linguistic literature, is an action of the producer, and therefore, any definition describing reference in non-human animals must also focus on the producer. To successfully determine whether a signal is used to refer, we suggest an approach from the field of pragmatics, taking a closer look at specific situations of signal production, specifically at the factors that influence the production of a signal by an individual. We define the concept of signaller’s reference to identify intentional acts of reference produced by a signaller independently of the communicative modality, and illustrate it with a case study of the hoo vocalizations produced by wild chimpanzees during travel. This novel framework introduces an intentional approach to referentiality. It may therefore permit a closer comparison of human and non-human animal referential behaviour and underlying cognitive processes, allowing us to identify what may have emerged solely in the human lineage.