A method for sensation scaling based on an analogy between perception and judgment

Two techniques for studying judgment are discussed. In the first of these one assumes invariance of perception over different judgment processes and conceives of the properties of one judgment process as known. Then, perceptions may be estimated under this process and utilized in the study of other judgment processes of interest. A second technique disposes of the reliance up on a basic, “known” process and instead suggests that perception be treated as free parameters to be estimated from data. The paper then proceeds to show how this second technique may be used under certain conditions on perception themselves. A concept of sensation is introduced which is thought of as generating percepts in formally the same manner as percepts are thought of as generating judgments. The idea is tried out on the perception of movement time. A simple perception process appears to give a good fit to data.     

Toward a new conceptualization and operationalization of risk perception within the genetic counseling domain

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an historical overview of studies of risk, risk perception, and decision making under risk within the genetic counseling domain. Second, it proposes an alternative conceptualization and operationalization for the study of risk perception. The conceptualization involves probability, adversity, incompleteness, and ambiguity. Prior studies of risk perception focus on the recurrence risk and operationalize risk perception by asking for interpretations of the magnitude of the probability of the outcome. Their focus is on the probability of a particular outcome. We formulate the problem in terms of a gamble and suggest that risk perception be operationalized in terms of the riskiness of the gamble. Our focus is on the riskiness of a decision option which entails two or more outcomes.     

The importance of a holistic concept of health for health care. Examples from the clinic

One of my main points in this study is that the knowledge of orthodox medical theory is an incomplete guide for practical action when relating to our patients' specifically human problems. By following a holistic perspective on patients' health and on our medical enterprise we will be more efficient as doctors. This standpoint is illuminated by means of two case reports. Instead of focusing on symptoms as such and letting them refer to orthodox medical theory, I explicitly relate to the patients as if they are conveying a personal meaning by means of experienced symptoms. The experience of illness could be a successful strategy on the existential level although destructive on the technical biological level. A holistic theory of health can give doctors a good conceptual base when relating to people whose presented illnesses are to be regarded explicitly as their way of making themselves understood. The doctor's understanding of the patient's illness, of the theory of health, and of how health is regained, is dependent on the doctor's having the courage to reduce the distance to the patient, the courage to participate and be changed.     

Salience of rape affects self-esteem: The moderating role of gender and rape myth acceptance

In two experiments, conducted in Germany and the U.S.A., it was found that exposure to a rape report lowered self-esteem and positive affect in women who do not accept ‘rape myths’ (stereotypical beliefs which blame the victim and exonerate the rapist; Burt, 1980). Men high in rape myth acceptance (RMA) showed an increase in positive affect and self-esteem as a function of exposure to rape; men low in RMA and women high in RMA were largely unaffected. Both experiments demonstrated that these effects were specific to rape, as opposed to violence in general. These results support the feminist hypothesis that the threat of rape serves the function to exert social control over women and to sustain men's dominance. Potential cognitive mechanisms mediating the observed effects are discussed.     

Preference for familiar humans by rats

Many “higher” animals are commonly assumed to distinguish between individual humans. This belief is based largely on anecdotal reports; in reality, there is little empirical evidence to support human recognition in nonhuman species. We report that laboratory rats consistently chose a familiar human over an unfamiliar human following fourteen and five 10-min exposures and even following a single 10-min exposure. Furthermore, this preference was retained in the absence of additional contact for at least 5 months. These results confirm that laboratory rats can tell individual humans apart, a prerequisite for associating them with hedonic events. Such human-based conditioning, described by Pavlov and by Gantt, Newton, Royer, and Stephens (1966), may have important implications for animal research in a variety of settings.     

The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics

Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with a hidden contextual parameter. But such a ternary construal raises problems of its own.     

Assessment of retrieval strategy in incidental, intentional, and inclusion tests with word-fragment cues

The purpose of this study was to assess retrieval strategy in incidental, intentional, and inclusion tests with word-fragment cues following a levels-of-processing manipulation at study. The results of Exp. 1 showed small levels-of-processing effects in incidental tests, and most subjects reported involuntary rather than voluntary retrieval of study-list words. In an intentional test, although levels of processing had a much greater effect, quite a few subjects also reported involuntary rather than voluntary retrieval of study-list words, and these subjects showed a smaller effect of levels of processing than subjects reporting voluntary retrieval. These results suggest that subjects given instructions for both voluntary and involuntary retrieval of study-list words in an inclusion test might not in fact attempt voluntary retrieval at all, but simply adopt an involuntary retrieval strategy. The results of Exp. 2 provided evidence to support this suggestion. The general implication is that where test contamination refers to subjects' failure to use retrieval strategies in accordance with test instructions, inclusion tests can be contaminated, as well as incidental or intentional tests, and that it is always necessary to obtain converging evidence about the actual strategies subjects use.     

Referenzsemantik in der Partnermodellierung

How can we explain that an assertion on something perceived can be understood in the same manner by somebody who cannot perceive that scene? This problem bases the interest in computational linguistics in how listener modeling could possibly be harmonized with reference semantics. Mental images substituting real perception appear as a way out. The architecture of the listener model has to be adapted to the creation and use of such pictorial data structures. Furthermore, the relation between the latter and a verbal (i. e., propositional) representation must be understood. The resulting architecture of a listener model with reference semantics can be employed to solve communicational problems from three general classes in a better way, as is demonstrated by an example implementation.     

THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE AND TASK PREFERENCE ON THE WORK PERFORMANCE OF ADULTS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES

We evaluated the effects of choice versus the assignment of tasks of varying preferences on the work engagement of adults with severe disabilities. The combined results of two experiments suggest that the relative preference for a task may be an important variable in the effectiveness of choice for some individuals.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.